THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 4 MAY 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993281
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: May 4, 1972

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010700040001-4
The President's Daily Brief
4 May 1972
44?
Top Secret
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
4 May 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
On Page 1 we report on the latest military develop-
ments in South Vietnam
President Thieu's efforts
to provide more competent leadership for South Viet-
namese military forces are discussed on Page 2.
The keynote speaker at Hanoi's May Day celebration
indicated that the Vietnamese Communists remain
deeply concerned about great power maneuvering on
Vietnam. (Page 4)
Chancellor Brandt and opposition leader Barzel are
no closer to finding common ground on which the
Eastern treaties could be ratified. (Page 5)
The Soviets have given the Japanese
hint that they will be flexible on the question o
returning the southern Kuriles. (Page 6)
In Chile, the most important leaders of the govern-
ment coalition may be ready to agree on more radical
policies. (Page 9)
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108
Demilitarized Zone
MR 1
Tonle
Sop
Mekong ;
VO
GAM
'RANH
*LAM DON
SI EN
HOA
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KILN TUONG
CH" ? \ PHONG
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LONG
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VINH
LONG
Gulf of
Thailand
KILN HON
VINH
El/NH
8A UYEN"
?OCiEUMR 4
AN
XUVEN
104
PHUOG
TUY_y
'MR 3'
- ? ?
Capitol Special Zone
118
110
16--
14-
MR2
12-
South
China
Sea
10?
SOUTH VIETNAM
. 100
MILES 1110
552986 5-72
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VIETNAM
There has been little change in the military
situation in South Vietnam. The Communists still
are consolidating their gains in Quang Tri Province
and preparing to push on toward Hue. In Hue, a
fire that gutted the central market has aggravated
the unsettled conditions there. In the highlands,
the Communists are increasing their strength around
Kontum City, but there are no indications when the
attacks against the city will begin.
In MR 3, the situation at An Loc is unchanged,
but there are further indications that North Viet-
namese units are planning to move closer to Saigon.
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SOUTH VIETNAM
President Thieu is trying to provide more com-
petent and vigorous leadership for some of South
Vietnam's forces. In the wake of the fall of Quang
Tri City, Thieu has replaced the MR 1 commander,
General Lam, with the more aggressive General Truong,
until now commander of MR 4 and formerly commander
?of the respected 1st ARVN Division. Thieu has also
removed General Giai from command of the marginally
effective 3rd ARVN Division, which had manned the
string of fire support bases along the DMZ and had
been unable to hold Quang Tri City. The recently
formed 3rd was outgunned along the DMZ and outnumbered
at Quang Tri City, but there is some suspicion that
Giai panicked, and his performance is to be investi-
gated.
(continued)
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Generals Dzu and Minh, commanders of MR 2
and MR 3 respectively, are both close to
Thieu, and this may help account for the
fact that Thieu has not yet replaced them,
despite the fact that both have come under
heavy criticism for their occasionally
timid handling of their forces. Pressures
may now begin to mount for their removal.
The same kinds of criticism and dissension
that have arisen within the military lead-
ership also developed in the past follow-
ing serious tactical reverses.
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NORTH VIETNAM
The keynote speaker at Hanoi's May Day celebration
has indicated that the Vietnamese Communists remain
deeply concerned about great power maneuvering on
Vietnam. In his speech, labor leader Hoang Quoc
Viet acknowledged Hanoi's gratitude for both Soviet
and Chinese assistance, but he left no doubt that
his praise was mainly for their material aid, not
their political backing. Indeed, at no less than
three different points he called on Hanoi's sup-
porters abroad?particularly the socialist bZoc--
to "strengthen and broaden" their support for the
war effort. He also sought to discount the effec-
tiveness of any possible "cunning schemes by the
US"--almost certainly an allusion to President
Nixon's summit diplomacy as well as US maneuvering
at the Paris talks.
In citing both the Chinese and the Soviets for their
aid, Viet may well have been trying to emphasize
that Hanoi's options are not tied exclusively to
Soviet assistance, and that Moscow's aid does not
confer any special influence over North Vietnamese
poZicy. The only other open reference the North
Vietnamese have made to Chinese assistance since
the offensive began came in a communiqug issued-
during the visit last week of Soviet party secre-
tary Katushev.
Much of Viet's speech seems designed to convince
foreign as well as domestic listeners that there
is no reason for any Communist to compromise on
the war. He assessed Communist prospects in the
South in much bolder terms than most other Hanoi
spokesmen have done recently, claiming that Commu-
nist forces are nearing a "total victory" on the
battlefield. He also argued that there is nothing
the US can do to turn the tide.
Viet phrased Communist negotiating demands so as to
suggest that the next move is up to the US. Rather
than dwell on the political aspects of a settlement
(President Thieu's resignation was not mentioned),
he focused solely on Communist demands for a US
troop withdrawal and cessation of all US support for
the Thieu regime. In recent days, other Communist-
spokesmen have similarly emphasized the withdrawal
question, suggesting that Hanoi may be ready to con-
centrate on this point in its diplomatic dealings
with the US.
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WEST GERMANY
After three meetings, Chancellor Brandt and op-
position leader Barzel are no closer to finding com-
mon ground on which the Eastern treaties could be
ratified. Barzel wants Brandt to get a commitment
from the USSR and Poland that the treaties would not
preclude eventual reunification or a German peace
treaty.
Brandt wants to settle the issue quickly
in order to avoid casting a,shadow over
President Nixon's visits to the USSR and
Poland. 1
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USSR-JAPAN
the question of the southern Kurile Islands, seized
from Japan at the end of World War II, was being/
discussed
Soviet hints
of flexibility on the return of the is-
lands, could ease the way for peace talks
between the two governments. The Japanese
have long held that they would not nego-
tiate a peace treaty that did not include
the return of the islands.
There are varying reports of what specific
concessions Moscow might envision. Some
Russians have hinted that Moscow might re-
turn two of the four disputed islands;
others have talked of the return of all
four. Soviet officials have also suggested
that Japan might be satisfied with some
formula by which Tokyo obtained de facto
control while Moscow retained final sover-
eignty. Meanwhile, Moscow and Tokyo are
exploring the nature of peace treaty talks,
which seem likely to begin later this year.
Moscow may hope to get reciprocal conces-
sions from the Japanese. Foreign Minister
Fukuda, for example, recently suggested
that Japan would consider demilitarization
of the islands if they were returned. If
Moscow decides to negotiate settlement of
the territorial question, it might seek
to include a provision such as Fukuda
suggested or other concessions, such as
a firm Japanese financial commitment to
Siberian development.
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ISRAEL
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ISRAEL
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CHILE
The most important leaders of the government
coalition maybe ready to adopt more radical poli-
cies
Both Communist and So-
cialist members of the coalition are increasingly
concerned over the erosion of public support for
the government. Their resentment over Allende's
high-handed personal methods is beginning to over-
ride their own deep differences over how fast Chile
should become a socialist state.
. The Communists are chiefly disturbed over the
deep inroads into their sources of support being
made by the extremist Movement of the Revolutionary
Left, which.is-.not in the coalition.. Party leaders
have decided to adopt a more radical position in an
attempt to fight the MIWs:.growing influence among
labor, youth., and the news.thedia.
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Soviet Submarine Moored at Bay of Nipe
. .
Submaririe tender
G-l!-clasi ballistic missile submarini..
Havana
Cienfuegos
CUBA
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Bay of Nipe
Antina.
Guantanamo
Naval Bar
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NOTES
USSR-Cuba: U-2 photography of the Bay of Nipe
on Tuesday showed the G-II class ballistic missile
submarine that arrived in Cuba on 29 April tied
alongside the submarine tender. The Kotlin-class
destroyer and the Gagarin, a Soviet space support
ship, were also in the bay.
Cambodia: Students have ended their week-long
antigovernment demonstration and may return to
classes today. This: should tend to ease tensions
in Phnom Penh, but will not bring a,return to the
relatively calm situation that prevailed before
blood"was spilled on 27 April. The students are
not likely to forgive President Lon Nol or his first
minister, Son Ngoc Thanh, for the shootings, and
they could renew overt opposition to the government
if they found an issue which would gain wider popu-
lar support.
Bangladesh: Prime Minister Mujib is resuming
a more active schedule after a period of reduced
public activities in mid-April apparently caused by
ill health. 1
III /on Monday the
prime minister spoke over radio and television con-
cerning his domestic program. He also has partici-
pated in party and cabinet meetings in the past
week.
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