THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 21 APRIL 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993258
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 21, 1972

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600180001-0
The President's Daily Brief
21 April 1972
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
21 April 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Satellite photography shows that the Soviets are
developing a large new ICBM.. (Page 1)
In South Vietnam, critical situations are shaping
on several fronts. (Page 2)
Enemy units have taken several towns along Route 1
in Cambodia. (Page. 4)
The North Vietnamese are maintaining pressure on
the USSR and their other allies for stronger pub-
lic support. Of Hanoi's war? effort. (Page 6)
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Soviets
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USSR
The latest satellite photography of.the
Tyuratam missile test center indicates
that the Soviets are developing a new
large ICBM for deployment in the large
silos which have been under construction
at five of the six SS-9 complexes since
the fall of 1970. The new missile appears
to be at least as long as the SS-9 and one
or two feet larger in diameter.
Two missile bodies on rail cars and a new mis-
sile transporter were seen at the support facility
serving Launch Complex H--the part of the range used
for the initial testing of all four variants of the
SS-9 ICBM. On rail cars adjacent to each of the
missile bodies is a cylindrical object with about
the same diameter. This cylinder could be an addi-
tional section of the new ICBM and could extend its
length. well .beyond that of the SS-9.
Near the two launch pads at Complex H there is
a considerable amount of debris, lincluding the rem-
nants of a missile body with about the same diameter
as those on the rail cars--12 feet.
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108
Demilitarized Zone
ang Tri
a Nang
MR 1
THAIL
Tonle
Sap
RANH
'Phnom Penh
PHUOC
,4 TUY
"7"..
WON 140A
?10
Gulf of
Thailand
104
552897 4-72
AN
XUYEN
hi
LIEU
MR 4
MR 3
Capital Special Zone
110
MR 2
South
China
Sea
SOUTH VIETNAM
190
118
16-
14-
12-
10--
MILES 110
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOUTH VIETNAM
Critical situations are shaping up on sev-
eral fronts in South Vietnam.
Following another massive shelling, An Loc was .
again attacked by tanks and infantry which-penetrated
the. northern part of town on 19 April. The defend-
ers' ammunition and medical supplies are running
low,
In Saigon, government leaders are becoming con-
cerned about a new threat to the capital. They are
evidently worried about the series of enemy attacks
along_ Route .1 in Cambodia's "Parrot's Beak" region,
a traditional launching point for enemy moves against
Saigon..
This possibility may be behind the South
Vietnamese high command's reluctance to
hurry more of the 21st Division to the
relief of An-Loc.
In the delta, intercepts suggest the Communists
will-soon,try to exploit their recent successes-in
Chuong Thien:Province, There are now three main
force regiments controlled by a divisional headquar-
ters in the-province, and they have recently moved
close to the provincial capital-, Vi Thanh. Govern-
ment forces throughout the delta are on full alert
in. anticipationof a general increase in enemy-at-
tacks.-
In the central part of the country, South Ko-
rean-forces are bogged down in their effort to clear
the strategic An Khe Pass into the highlands. The
eneMy_has kept the pass closed for more than a week
and food and ammunition shortages in the Kontum-
Pleiku area are becoming a significant problem.
In Military Region 1, stiff clashes continue
west of Quang Tri city and Hue. In the three south-
ernmost provinces of the region, Viet Cong and'North
Vietnamese. units are continuing a damaging guerrilla
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campaign along the coast. They are striking hard at
refugee resettlement centers, provincial towns, roads,
and regional defense units. The US consul general
in Da Nang has reported that in Quang Ngai Province,
following the departure of some regular South Viet-
namese units for battlefields farther north, a Viet
Cong main force battalion has been moving from one
government-sponsored settlement to the next, system-
atically burning each to the ground.
the Communists
are setting up "revolutionary political administra-
tions" in areas that they dominate militarily.
3
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Cy'
d,c mpong Thom
vP*
PHNOM PENH
tog Chinn'
CAMBODIA
Kompong Cham
MEKONG
Shelled by enemy
0 cupied b \enemy
Takeo
.Kompong Tract'
VINH RACH GIA
rev Veng
96th Atty Regt
Ne'ak Luang
Krek.
1st Ind
Reet
Kompongi--\
Trabek Svay Rie
111111141111
o.
Et()
Krahe
\jay Ninh
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Regt
hipou
SOUTH VIET
7702 Giarig
c.;
Miles
eSnuol
?An Loc
SAIGON/
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CAMBODIA
Enemy units have attacked a number of govern-
ment positions along Route 1 between the Mekong
River and the South Vietnamese border, closing the
main road between Phnom Penh and Saigon. The enemy
has taken the towns of Kompong Trabek, Prasaut, and
Chipou. The Communists have also shelled the pro-
vincial capitals of Prey Veng and Svay Rieng, but
have not followed with ground attacks.
Thus far the Cambodians have done little to re-
open the highway. The regional Cambodian commander
has claimed that he must have additional troops.be-
fore's. clearing operation can be launched along
Route 1. For the moment, he plans only to expand
and clear a large zone around the South Vietnamese
base at Neak Luong, on the Mekong's east bank.
The Communists may have seized control of
the eastern section of Route .1 in order
to facilitate the flow of supplies through
Cambodia to the South Vietnamese delta
area; indeed the .two enemy main force regi-,
ments involved in these attacks. could be
passing through Svay Rieng's "Parrot's
Beak" region en route to southern South
Vietnam.
Almost all of the enemy main force units
in Cambodia are concentrated on the South
Vietnamese border, and thus are not in a
position to open a broader offensive
throughout Cambodia, or to threaten Phnom
Penh or other population centers west of
the Mekong River. Nevertheless, the ef-
fect of the attacks on the Cambodian Gov-
ernment will be to heighten its-nervous-
ness that the heavy fighting in South
Vietnam is now spilling over the border.
There will also be some concern that the
supply flow to Phnom Penh via Route 1
will be interrupted for a long period,
although the Mekong River is the prin-
cipal-pipeline into the capital.
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line
uang Khe
ong Hoi
25 50 Miles
Fl\e?avy Communist Logistic
Activity
ipipeline construction
emilitolized Zone
Quang Tr'
VIETNAM
Kontum
CAMBODIA
552890 4-72 CIA
Ling Tren
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
INDOCHINA
A recent Communist message discussed plans to
establish a new storage complex on Route 9 in South
Vietnam and to stockpile supplies for use during
the rainy season. In addition, aerial photography
shows that between 7 and 14 April a pipeline from
a petroleum storage area along Route 101 approximately
14 miles south of Dong Hoi has been extended 30
miles to a point just north of the Ben Hai River in
the DMZ.
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NORTH VIETNAM - SOVIET UNION
On 20 April, the North Vietnamese Fatherland
Front (a grouping of mass organizations under con-
trol of the Communist Party) voiced yet another
appeal for more international support, the fourth
time since the offensive began that the Vietnamese
Communists have formally called on their allies to
be more forthcoming. On the same day the party
daily published an editorial that emphasized the
value of Soviet aid to the current offensive. In
discussing the notes exchanged by Moscow and Wash-
ington over the bombing of Haiphong last weekend,
the editorial quoted approvingly the US assertion
that Moscow and other socialist countries must
"share the responsibility" with Hanoi for the re-
cent attacks in South Vietnam. It strongly implied
that Hanoi continues to expect its comrades in Mos-
cow and elsewhere to render full support to the war
effort.
By stressing the "valuable support from
the Soviets, Hanoi is making it as diffi-
cult as possible for the USSR to equivo-
cate in its public support of North Viet-
nam.
The USSR probably resents Hanoi's efforts
to extract stronger and more open backing
of the current offensive. Moscow must
regard the timing of the offensive as
most unfortunate and must be concerned
that matters of far more import to the
USSR--i.e., the Soviet-US summit and its
European policy?will be jeopardized.
Indeed, the Turks tell us that during
President Podgorny's recent visit to
Turkey, Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov
professed ignorance about the actual sit-
uation on the ground in Indochina but
said the USSR could not condone increased
US bombing raids over North Vietnam.
During the visit, which ended on 17 April,
the Soviets stressed that the USSR attaches
great importance to the forthcoming meet-
ing with the President and has hopes of
making substantial progress in Soviet-US
relations.
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CHINA-US
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USSR
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