THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 12 APRIL 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993242
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 12, 1972

Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600100001-8
The President's Daily Brief
12 April 1972
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
12 April 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
The military situation in South Vietnam and an exam-
ination of the changing balance of forces in the
delta are reported ?on Page 1.
Soviet party chief Brezhnev's reception of Secretary
Butz is an unprecedented gesture of personal good-
will toward the US. (Page 3)
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Fidel Castro appears to be planning a visit to the
USSR and Eastern Europe before President Nixon's
visit to Moscow. (Page 5)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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Deployment of North Vietnamese Main Force Regiments in the Delta
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOUTH VIETNAM
North Vietnamese forces are maintaining pres-
sure against South Vietnamese units in the north,
the highlands, and along the Cambodian border north
of Saigon. Although government defenses are stiff-
ening, enemy deployments indicate that heavier at-
tacks are in store for each of these regions and in
parts of the Mekong Delta as well. Late reports
indicate that the Communists on 11 April carried
out a heavy attack against South Vietnamese forces
operating in Kampot Province opposite the delta in
extreme southeastern Cambodia. The South Vietnamese
apparently held their ground and claim to have in-
flicted significant casualties.
The balance of opposing main force units
in the delta (Military Region 4) has
shifted significantly in recent weeks with
the departure of Saigon's 21st Division
and the arrival of several Communist main
force re iments rom Cambodia.
The two South Vietnamese divisions
remaining in the region, the 7th and 9th,
together with government territorial
forces, are spreading out to cover the
provinces in the southeastern part of
the delta that are being vacated by the
21st Division.
The commander of MR-4, General Truong, is wor-
ried about the influx of enemy forces, especially
in view of the departure of the 21st Division. The
South Vietnamese have had considerable success during
the past year in reducing Communist influence in
areas of the delta that had long been enemy bastions.
For example, operations in Communist sanctuaries such
as the U Minh Forest and western Dinh Tuong Province
had whittled down enemy capabilities to operate in
much of the rest of the delta.
(continued)
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Since the upsurge of Communist activity, how-
ever, government operations in the delta provinces
have been relatively unsuccessful, and Truong judges
that the territorial forces are not capable of handling
major Communist attacks. Furthermore, the rate of
Communist-initiated incidents so far in April has jumped
dramatically over previous months. Truong is also
deeply concerned over the Communists' ability to lie
dormant for long periods and then take rapid action
that could, if not checked, have considerable ad-
verse impact on the pacification program in the delta.
The North Vietnamese party central committee
met recently and, according to press treatment, the
party's elite gave a ringing endorsement to Hanoi's
current war strategy. They also took a tough line
on negotiations with the US and by implication ex-
cluded negotiations with the South Vietnamese until
after Thieu and his government have been set aside
through US intervention.
The plenum's public endorsement of the
current war strategy suggests that any
divisions over this strategy have been
suppressed for now. While the press treat-
ment may distort Hanoi's position vis-a-
vis the South, it clearly indicates that
the war has first place in North Vietnam's
priorities. A similar party meeting took
place last year, but the assignment at
that time of first priority to the war
was not publicized until much later. This
year's more candid approach is intended
to offer underpinning to the offensive
now under way.
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
US-USSR
Soviet party chief Brezhnev yesterday received
Secretary Butz and, according to TASS, had an "in-
formal, businesslike" talk with him. Ambassador
Beam also participated in the meeting.
This meeting is an unprecedented gesture
of personal good-will toward the US by
Brezhnev. Secretary Butz is the first
American official to be publicly received
by Brezhnev since he replaced Khrushchev
as ,party boss in 1964.
The Soviet leader's decision to receive
Secretary Butz was apparently made at the
last minute, forcing postponement on short
notice of Brezhnev's meeting with a West
German official.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
EGYPT
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OR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CUBA-USSR-GUINEA
Fidel Castro plans to visit Guinea on 3 May,
The fact that Castro is going to Conakry
suggests that there is something to re-
ports that he is going further and plans
a visit to the USSR and Eastern Europe
before President Nixon's visit to Moscow.
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NOTE
Chile: President Allende has finally managed
to get a military officer into his cabinet, but he
made the appointment without consulting with the
leaders of his coalition. This independence no
doubt will further hurt Allende's relations with
fractious leaders of the disparate coalition. On
the other hand, the appointment of a military man
could bring Allende the additional political support
from the armed forces that he desires.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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Top Secret
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