THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 3 APRIL 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993225
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 3, 1972

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600020001-7
The President's Daily Brief
3 April 1972
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600020001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18: CIA-RDP79T00936A010600020001-7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
3 April 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
The Communists have shattered most of the South Viet-
namese Army's forward positions in northernmost Quang
Tri Province and are increasing their activity in
some other parts of the country. (Page 1)
North Vietnamese forces continue to exert pressure
on Lao Government irregulars defending Long Tieng,
but there has been no major change in the situation
there. (Page 3)
North Vietnamese leaders have expounded a harsh line
on the war before their national assembly. (Page 4)
The Soviets are reported to be urging the Kurds to
settle their differences with the Iraqi? Government.
(Page 5)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600020001-7
25x125x1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600020001-7
VIETNA, .11#1
DEMILITARIZED
ZONE
. ? FSB - fallen to Communists
FSB - ARVN occupied (under attack)
GULF OF TONKIN
?
LAOS.
,
552762 4-72 CIA
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18: CIA-RDP79T00936A010600020001-7
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18: CIA-RDP79T00936A010600020001-7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOUTH VIETNAM
With the collapse of another government base
last night, the Communists have now forced the
abandonment or surrender of at least 15 South Viet-
namese outposts in northern and central Quang Tri
Province since they began their drive there on Thurs-
day. Other bases in the area remain under pressure
and the provincial capital now appears directly
threatened. Yesterday, a North Vietnamese tank col-
umn tried to break through South Vietnamese Army
positions near Dong Ha. Government tanks, with US
air support, engaged the column and destroyed two
North Vietnamese tanks.
Infantry and artillery regiments operating
under the senior Communist military com-
mand in the Demilitarized Zone, together
with about two regiments of the North
Vietnamese 304th Division, seem to have
done most of the enemy's fighting so far.
Intercepts suggest that the rest of the
304th as well as the 308th Division may
now be preparing to join the attack. The
headquarters of the 308th, previously well
inside North Vietnam, has moved south to
within a few miles of the DMZ. Should
both divisions now be fully committed to
this area, Communist strength would nearly
double. Such an increase would indicate
that the Communists intend to do much more
than overrun a number of South Vietnamese
outposts.
Heavier fighting may also be in store just to
the south of Q.4ang Tri Province near the Hue area.
Recent intercepts suggest that the North Vietnamese
324B Division, which has been probing governMent
defenses west of Hue for about two weeks, is pre-
paring for heavier combat.
In the central highlands, Communist attacks
have increased somewhat in the past few days, and
more apparently are planned. According to several
intercepts, Communist artillery units have targeted
their weapons against South Vietnamese fire support
bases and outposts between Dak To and Kontum city.
One message stated that all of the bases will be
brought under fire as'soon as orders are received.
(continued)
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600020001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600020001-7
?16
?14
104
*Savannakhet
106
NORTH
VIE TNA
Tchepone.
Khe Salih
108
Demilitarized Zone
g Tri
,OUANG TRI
?
Hue'
HUA THIEN
A Shau
Sara vane
LAOS
THAILAND
Warin Chemtap ?
Siam Reap
Tonle
Sap
12
?10
,?t
? Pa
Slung Tren
Bolovens
Plateau
MBODIA
Mekong
ympong Cham .Chup
N Lac Long FSB
Svay Rien
PHNOM PENH
Gulf of
Thailand
104
CHAU
DOC
?
KIEN
AMONG
GlaNd
BIEN
GIA NG
Kratie
?
TAY
NINH
lay N11111
KIEN
TUONG
My Tho
AttoPeu
?
PHUOC
'Loa inh
LONG
LONG
BINH
OUONG
HA U
NGHI
51:3aEe
an Tho.
PHONG
!DINH
CHUONG
MIEN
?C
AN
XUYEN
KtBN HO
LONG
Vinh
\ BINH \ri,
BA XUT CNN,/
BAC LIEU
Mau
MR 4
116
te
l'HEN
OA
ON
IN
LONG
HHANH
Oa
PH UOC
TUT
110
Be Ne.ng
It
oi,An mR
OUANG NA M
IOU.A:NG?' TIN
ouA NG ? Q
Dak T
NTUM
Central
.Kon
aHighlands
Pleiku.
PLE1KU
PHU'
BON
DARLAC
'Ban Me
Thuot
OU'ANG
DUC
LAM ?ONG
BINH
T UY
MR 3
TUYEN
Da Lat.
DUG
THUAN
Vung Tau
Capital Special Zone
17.
ang Ngai
BINH
DINH
vi Nhon
MR 2
PHU
YEN
uy Hoe
KRANH
HOA
tha Trang
CAMnAN t ?
WINN
THUAN
South
China
Sea
SOUTH VIETNAM
110
16--
14-
12-
10?
NILES 110
552763 4-72
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T006-36A016600020001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18: CIA-RDP79T00936A010600020001-7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Farther south, Communist forces--reported to
be using tanks and armored personnel carriers--over-
ran a South Vietnamese base at Lac, Long in Tay Ninh
Province.
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600020001-7
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600020001-7
LAOS
ang Prabang
. <
/2
? Government-held location
? Communist-held location ,
doua Long
0 Miles 20 t
'
\..
Irregular
orces
4/7
Soul
uong Kassy Sarn?r1:11
Ban Ban
Nong Pet,
en Kho an ville
yang Vien
Ban So
MILES 50
552761 4-72 CIA
THAILAND
CAMBODIA
'
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00.936A01.0600020001-7
25X1
* _
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600020001-7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LAOS
Communist forces kept up their pressure on gov-
ernment irregulars in the Long Tieng area over the
weekend, but launched no new drives to break the
stalemate. Several positions on Skyline Ridge have
changed hands during the past two days, but neither
side appears to have made significant headway. The
North Vietnamese are still pounding the ridge and
the Long Tieng Valley with artillery and mortar fire,
causing some casualties among the irregulars.
The Communists may be taking losses them-
selves from government air strikes and
heavy weapons fire, but they show no signs
so far of revising their tactics or the
disposition of their forces.
The government's diversionary task forces north
and east of the Plaine des Jarres reported some
clashes on 1 April with enemy units. There is no
indication, however, that the Communists have moved
any of their forces away from the Long Tieng area
in order to engage these irregulars.
In south Laos, the government launched a large
operation on 1 April to regain a foothold on the
western edge of the Bolovens Plateau. Elements of
11 irregular, Lao Army, and neutralist battalions
staged from the vicinity of Lao Ngam and are now
advancing eastward along Route 23. No significant
enemy contact has yet been reported, although light
resistance was encountered yesterday.
3
FOR? THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600020001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18: CIA-RDP79T00936A010600020001-7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NORTH VIETNAM
The convening of Hanoi's rubber-stamp national as-
sembly last week provided an occasion for the regime's
leaders to weigh in with some further harsh rhetoric
on the war. Premier Pham yang Dong, in a long key-
note speech, asserted that military strength was the
principal asset of the North and reiterated the re-
cent propaganda claim that the balance of forces in
the war is rapidly shifting in favor of the Commu-
nists. He made it clear that the Communists intend
to use all the forces at their disposal to win "ever
greater victories" and that this will entail even
greater sacrifices on the home front.
The speeches of both Dong and Foreign Minister Trinh
gave short shrift to prospects for negotiations.
Dong implied at one point that any attempt to meet
the allies half-way would be tantamount to tempor-
izing with evil. There were no echoes of Hanoi's
ambiguous line of last summer and last fall that
suggested it might be willing to separate the po-
litical and military aspects of a settlement. Dong,
in fact, specifically characterized the Communist
negotiating proposals as "an over-all solution, an
integral, indivisible whole."
We consider it likely that North Vietnam's leaders
fairly recently reviewed their policy toward the
war and reconfirmed the tough line enunciated last
week by Dong and his colleagues. There were passing
references by Dong and another speaker to a central
committee meeting held earlier this year.
4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600020001-7
Declassified in Part- .Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600020001-7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR-IRAQ
In late February, a Soviet delegation visited
Kurdish leader Barzani in order to urge the Kurds
to resolve their differences with the Iraqi Govern-
ment and join a national front coalition,
Moscow is pressuring both sides to come to
terms. Its interest in fostering Iraqi
stability stems from a desire to tie up
any loose ends that affect its relations
with Arab countries prior to President
Nixon's visit to the USSR next month. The
Soviets may also be hedging against a pos-
sible setback in Egypt.
Although Baghdad has given Zip service to
the idea of a national front government,
Barzani most likely sees no need to go
along. He is not dependent upon Moscow
for arms or financial support/
Barzani's difficulties with Baghdad stem
from the Iraqi Government's failure to im-
plement a 1970 agreement ending the inter-
mittent civil war the Kurds have waged
against Iraqi regimes since the late 1950s,
5
25X1
25X1
25X1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600020001-7
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600020001-7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
ROMANIA - WARSAW PACT
6
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600020001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18: CIA-RDP79T0093eA010600020001-7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
UGANDA - ARAB STATES
7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600020001-7
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18: CIA-RDP79T00936A010600020001-7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
West Germany:
NOTE
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600020001-7
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T60936A610600020001-7
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600020001-7