THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 9 MARCH 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993183
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 9, 1972

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The President's Daily Brief
9 March 1972
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
9 March 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
/Laos.. (Page 1)
\North VietnaM
I (Page 2)
Libyan Deputy Premier Ja11ud's recent visit ?,t the
USSR is discussed on Page 3.
At Annex, we discuss the North Vietnamese military
campaign in Laos during the current dry season.
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LAOS
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INDOCHINA
The North Vietnamese recently transported an
unusually large amount--some 2,800 tons--of military
supplies to a logistic authority southeast of Ban
Phone in the Laotian panhandle. According to an in-
tercept of 5 March, the shipments included nearly
15,000 AK-47 rifles--enough to equip four infantry
divisions--and ammunition for a wide variety of
weapons from the AK-47s to 82-mm. mortars, 122-mm.
field guns and howitzers, and 160-mm. mortars.
The supplies probably are destined for
combat units in South Vietnam's central
highlands, where 160s were recently in-
troduced as well as for the COSVN area
farther south. The shipments occurred
during February, before the start of the
new March logistic phase/
2
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USSR-LIBYA
Alt did not go well during Deputy Premier Jallud's
recent visit to the USSR. Jallud left the Soviet
Union on 4 March, but no communique was issued un-
til the 7th. Separate Soviet and Libyan documents
were then released, and they contained some notable
differences: for instance, whereas the Libyan com-
munique called for the closing down of all military
bases in the Mediterranean, the Soviet statement
referred only to "imperialist" bases. Neither com-
munique mentioned military aid, which was one of
Jallud's reasons for undertaking the trip.
Both sides have devoted little media coverage to
the trip, and neither felt the need even to tone
down criticism of the other. On the day of Jallud's
departure for Moscow, for example, the Libyans
criticized the idea of a Soviet-Iraqi friendship
pact which Baghdad had earlier announced would be
signed later this year. One day after Jallud left
the USSR, the Soviets castigated the Libyan press
for trying to drive a wedge between the USSR and
the Arab states.
The only positive achievement of Jallud's visit
was an agreement for Soviet aid in extracting and
refining Libyan oil. A few Soviet experts have
been in Libya since 1970, and this new agreement
would seem to require an increase in personnel.
Premier Qadhafi, however, remains extremely sus-
picious of the Soviets and is unlikely to allow
a large influx of technicians.
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LAOS
With more than half the dry season over, the North
Vietnamese must view the results of their military
campaign in Laos as mixed. They have been success-
ful in the south, where they ousted dispirited gov-
ernment forces from the Bolovens Plateau in mid-
December, recaptured the town of Dong Hene in Janu-
ary, and have kept government forces tied down well
away from the infiltration corridors. Indeed, they
have withdrawn one main-force regiment from the
area, suggesting that they plan no major new offen-
sive action.
In north Laos the Communists retook the Plaine des
Jarres, but then lost momentum. Despite the un-
seemly alacrity with which they claimed victory in
mid-January, the Communists have not taken the Long
Tieng complex, nor have they destroyed the fighting
spirit of Vang Pao's forces or of the Thai volun-
teers who have played a crucial role in Long Tieng's
defense. Hanoi has nothing decisive to show for
the additional men and firepower it committed to the
battle in the north this year, and it has only about
two months of good weather remaining to achieve its
objectives.
The Struggle for Long Tieng
The campaign in north Laos began in October when
Hanoi reinforced its troops there with the remain-
ing part of the 312th Division, an independent regi-
ment, 130-mm. field guns and anti-aircraft artillery
units. In mid-December these forces swept across
the Plaine, scattering Vang Pao's irregulars in only
three days and dealing a stinging blow to their mo-
rale. By early January, the North Vietnamese had
breached the government's hastily prepared defenses
and on 12 January carried the fight into the Long
Tieng Valley. A tenacious defense by the irregu-
lars, particularly along Skyline Ridge overlooking
the valley, combined with allied air power and Com-
munist logistic problems, finally halted the North
Vietnamese advance.
Having failed in their first attempt to overrun the
stronghold, the Communists apparently spent the next
several weeks stockpiling supplies in forward caches
and filling out depleted units with replacements.
They also began a new effort to overcome the logis-
tic difficulties that have always plagued them
southwest of the Plaine by building a road from the
Plaine toward Long Tieng.
(continued)
Al
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While the Communists prepared for the next round,
yang Pao rallied and strengthened his battered
forces. In an audacious bid to regain the initia-
tive he split his 11,000-man force in early Febru-
ary and launched more than 5,000 irregulars north
from Pha Dong to threaten the enemy's supply lines
south and east of the Plaine.
The irregulars never seriously interfered with Com-
munist supply movements, but they helped relieve
the pressure on Long Tieng. The Communists felt
it necessary to pull back
from the Long Tieng area to protect logistic cor-
ridors near the Plaine. Last week, however, the
Communists forced the irregulars back toward Pha
Dong.
What Now?
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Intercepts
indicate that at least 13500 replacement troops
have moved into or are en route to northern Laos.
Other messages urge units to prepare for new offen-
sive action.
Whatever the immediate tactics chosen by both sides,
the irregular offensive has bought the government
some important time. If Long Tieng should fall,
the North Vietnamese would have little time left
to push beyond. The major Meo refugee settlements
south and west of Long Tieng appear to be safely
removed from any major offensive aimed at breaking
the back of Meo resistance. If Long Tieng holds
until the rainy season, then both the government
and the Communists will be left once again in pos-
session of territory they consider vital to their
interests in the north, and the possibility will
once again arise of a negotiated or de facto under-
standing providing for a de-escalation of the war
there.
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