THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 29 FEBRUARY 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993165
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 29, 1972

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The President's Daily Brief
29 February 1972
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
29 February 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
The Israeli aim in attacking Lebanon was to end
fedayeen terrorism for some time to come. (Page 1)
The weak enemy offensive in South Vietnam has so
far failed to achieve the kind of military successes
that pay political dividends. (Page 2)
Soviets:
(Page 4)
Laotian
The West Germans wish to achieve more normal rela-
tions with Communist China. (Page 5)
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MEDITERRANEAN
SEA
--Armistice line. 1949 and 1950
Israeli-occupied territory
-33
-32 --
Tel Aviv.
Yafo
Ashdod
415
Beirut'
Sidon.
Az Zahrani Rasya
*Damascus
Arcialb Area
Lebanese forces reportedly
replacing fedayeen
LEBANO
36
Zahlah.
Tyre
SYRIA
itumayr
?34-
-33-
Al Mat rag ,
As Salt.
ISRAEL
Ashgelon? "
GAZA STRIP
GaCy*;;;/.)
?/-
Beersheba'
315
' *Amman
JORDAN
I
Al Karak
STATUTE MILES
90
552610 2-72 CIA
?-?
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ISRAEL-LEBANON
was under-
taken with the intention of ending fedayeen terror-
ism for some time to come. The Israeli ?aim is now
closer to realization, for as their troops withdrew
across the border yesterday, the Lebanese Army had
been issued orders to replace the fedayeen in the
Arqoub area which abuts Lebanon's frontier with the
Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.
The Israelis will not be able to relax
their guard, however, because it is doubt-
ful that the Lebanese are capable of in-
terdicting all fedayeen activity in this
mountainous region. The Lebanese Army
has been relatively successful in con-
trolling the fedayeen along the western
part of the frontier with Israel, but for
some time had abandoned the eastern por-
tion to the guerrillas. The Israelis ap-
parently expect some terrorists to remain
active in the east, and during their foray
into Lebanon built three roads along the
slopes of Mount Hermon to facilitate fu-
ture operations against the fedayeen.
1
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SOUTH VIETNAM
The anticipated Communist offensive around Tet has
so far been small and unimpressive. The evidence
of enemy battle directives and major combat prepa-
rations was so extensive and convincing that it does
not seem possible the allies were victims of a hoax.
Many battle directives emphasized the need for a
show of military muscle during President Nixon's
trip to China. Moreover, Hanoi's propaganda tirade
against the President's journey, plus its willing-
ness to have the Communist walkout at the Paris
talks interpreted as a slap against the President's
visit, indicate that the enemy intended to hit as
hard as it could.
Communist military action in and around populated
areas following Tet did increase above levels of
the preceding months. When all the statistics are
recorded, the incident rate, if not the intensity
of the action, will probably show a significant
increase. The rise in enemy action, primarily in-
volving raids by local forces and sappers, began on
the eve of the President's departure and continued
to sputter along with scattered strikes against
pacification projects and military strongpoints.
The Communists struck many targets which had not
been hit for a long time, including a number which
had been mentioned in enemy battle orders. It thus
appears that the Communists did try to mount a sub-
stantial offensive near populated areas. Many of
their plans for action by local forces flopped, how-
ever, and main force units apparently were not
ready to kick off major attacks.
One problem was lack of surprise. The allies,
were ready with extensive counteraction. Enemy
communications make it clear
that heavy allied counteroperations, both from the
air and on the ground, significantly disrupted en-
emy plans.
Another problem was that, for all the exhortations
to the Communist troops to go all out, the enemy
still seemed bent on exercising economy of force.
At no point did he commit the kind of forces that,
regardless of superior allied combat support, might
have turned the tide.
(continued)
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The Populated Lowlands and Delta
In the coming weeks, we expect a few hard strikes
here and there and a slight increase in the pace
of operations at one point or another. So far,
however, it does not appear that the Communists
have the organization or strength near populated
areas to take advantage of US withdrawals to pose
a threat which remaining friendly forces cannot
contain. There is considerable evidence, neverthe-
less, that the Communists are still working hard to
improve their position near population centers.
The Highlands and Western Border Areas
Throughout the past few months, the Communist
buildup in the central highlands and in northwest-
ern Military Region 1 has proceeded rapidly. The
Communists gave every indication of wanting to
launch significant attacks in this area ?during Tet
to support intended operations elsewhere. The
evidence, however, suggests that the Communists
were unable to complete preparations for major op-
erations in time. First-line main force units in
these areas or en route to them have been hit hard
by allied counteractions, particularly air attacks,
and their plans have been thrown off schedule. It
thus seems likely that the biggest share of the
Communist campaign in the west and north is still
to come. Climatic conditions will supporta Com-
munist ground campaign in these areas any time over
the next several months. Furthermore, the recent
movement of other main force units from positions
in Cambodia to areas opposite the South Vietnamese
border in Military Region 3 suggests that the enemy
still hopes to increase the military pressure on
the allies in this area as well.
In assessing the dry season campaign so far, Hanoi
can hardly be happy with the results. The Commu-
nists have clearly failed to achieve the kind of
military successes that pay immediate political
dividends with the small-unit actions of the past
couple of weeks. Although Communist operations
have probably diverted a good many South Vietnamese
troops from the pacification program, even this
achievement is likely to be short-lived unless the
enemy can achieve a bigger impact on the battle-
field.
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LAOS-USSR
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WEST GERMANY - COMMUNIST CHINA
The President's visit has whetted West German
interest in normalizing relations with Communist
China. Reports from our embassy in Bonn
indicate the Brandt government and
the opposition parties agree on the desirability
of establishing relations but differ on timing.
The government would seek preliminary discussions
in .a third country capital, possibly Paris, but
only after ratification of Bonn's treaties with
the Soviet Union and Poland. The opposition, which
opposes ratification of the treaties, has called
for negotiations without delay.
The Brandt government is concerned lest
approaches to Peking jeopardize its rap-
prochement with the USSR. The opposition,
on the other hand, sees relations with
Peking as possibly providing Bonn with
leverage in its relations with Moscow.
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NOTE
Cuba: We now estimate that the sugar harvest
this year will be less than five million tons,
mainly as a result of unseasonably heavy rains over
the past few weeks which followed a severe drought.
This compares with nearly six million tons last
year and 8.5 million tons the year before. In
order to help meet export commitments, the govern-
ment has reduced individual monthly sugar rations
from six pounds to four. Sugar normally accounts
for about 80 percent of Cuba's exports, and it will
be difficult this year to maintain imports of food-
stuffs, raw materials, and capital goods at current
levels.
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Top Secret
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