THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 3 FEBRUARY 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993117
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 3, 1972

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The President's Daily Brief
3 February 1972
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
3 February 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
On Page 1 we comment on yesterday's statement by
Viet Cong representatives in Hanoi on their require-
ments for a settlement.
Communist supply movements in southern Laos, South
Vietnam. and Cambodia continue to increase, and
elements of the 2nd Divi-
sion are following the 320th toward the central
highlands. (Page 3)
Probes and shellings persist around Long Tieng, and
Communist forces have made some gains to the west
along Route 13. (Page 4)
The communique issued at the end of President
Bhutto's visit to Peking shows that China is not
about to increase its political support for Pakistan.
(Page 5)
The Panamanian Government has begun a campaign to
air the canal issue in international forums.
(Page 7)
Last week's party conference in Yugoslavia approved
some stopgap measures aimed at tightening central
control, but they offer little hope of resolving
the issue of regional nationalism. (Page 8)
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VIETNAM
Viet Cong representatives in Hanoi yesterday
issued a statement which ostensibly elaborates some
of the key elements in their seven-point proposal
of last July, particularly with regard to a South
Vietnamese political solution. According to the
new statement, the Communists' Provisional Revolu-
tionary Government is now willing to discuss with
the "Saigon administration" arrangements for a care-
taker regime and new elections. Such discussions,
however, could take place only after the resignation
of President Thieu, the freeing of "political prison-
ers," the disbanding of Saigon's "machine of oppres-
sion and constraint against the people," the ending
of the pacification program, and a guarantee of free
movement throughout Vietnam to the Viet Cong.
Previously the Communists have called for
the immediate and total elimination of the
Saigon regime, stating that they would deal
only with forces "favoring peace and na-
tional accord" in setting up a transitional
administration to prepare for elections.
In their refinement of this position, they
may be trying to undercut the US charge
that they are insisting that a Communist
government be formed in South Vietnam.
They may also hope their demands for Thieu's
immediate resignation and for the setting
of stringent demands on the remaining Sai-
gon administration will undermine morale
and confidence in Saigon.
The Viet Cong statement fails to include
the standard explicit call?included in the
seven points--for an end to all US support
and backing for the Saigon regime, although
it does generally assert that the US must
end its interference in South Vietnamese
internal affairs. It remains rigid and ex-
plicit, however, on the issue of the with-
drawal of US military forces and arms, spec-
ifying that the US must seta terminal date
for all US air, ground, and naval action in
both North and South Vietnam, and that the
withdrawal of US forces and arms must be
unconditional.
Instead of pacing the return of US pris-
oners to the US withdrawal, the Viet Cong
statement indicates that the prisoners will
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not be returned prior to the end of the US
withdrawal. Unlike most formulations of
the past few months, the statement does
not say that US military withdrawal and
implementation of a political settlement
are "closely linked, but it does say that
agreement on the two issues will make it
"easy" to resolve the other problems in a
settlement. The omission of the cease-
fire issue in the statement suggests that
the Communists may intend to preserve some
flexibility on this subject.
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INDOCHINA
We also have further signs that elements
of the Communist 2nd Infantry Division
appear to be following the 320th Division
toward the highlands?tentative radio
direction-finding indicates that one ele-
ment of the 2nd Division has arrived in
the tri-border area,
Most of the 320th Infantry Division, which has
been moving south since December, apparently now
is in the tri-border area.
3
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uang Prabang
Kiou Kacham Captured by
Communist forces
Sala Phou Khou
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LAOS
Probes and shellings continue daily in the Long
Tieng area but no positions have changed hands in
the last several days. Communist intercepts con-
tinue to stress resupply and reconnaissance in pre-
paration for future action.
To the west ofLong Tieng, increased Communist
pressure has caused some Lao Army forces to. abandon
their positions near Muong Kassy.. Small Communist
units, have also overrun Kiou Kacham. on Route 13 be-
tween Sala Phou Khoun and Luang Prabang.
The Communist forces operating along Route
13 are Pathet Lao and dissident Neutralist
troops. The fact that they are outnum-
bered by Lao Army forces and are opera-
ting at the end of long supply lines sug-
gests that they will not pose a serious
threat either to Luang Prabang or to the
government base at Vang Vieng. Nonethe-
less, the poor performance of Lao Army
units will make government leaders uneasy
and perhaps cause them to divert resources
from other areas to the Route 13 defenses.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
COMMUNIST CHINA - PAKISTAN
The joint communique issued in Peking yesterday
to mark the end of President Bhutto's visit provides
further evidence that China is not prepared to in-
crease its political support for Pakistan and is re-
serving its freedom of maneuver. The communique con-
tains a plea by Bhutto that all states refrain from
legitimizing "Indian aggression"--i.e., by recogniz-
ing Bangladesh--but Chou En-lai's response? is lim-
ited to expressing his understanding and respect ?for
Pakistan's stand.
The communique also suggests that Peking is not
now interested in increasing economic assistance to
Pakistan. The Chinese agreed only to convert their
four previous loans into grants and to defer payment
for 20 years on their 1970 loan of $200 million.
Peking also promised to provide Islamabad with fresh
loans "on similar terms," but only after the 1970
loan has been utilized.
Both sides call upon India to withdraw its
troops from occupied territory and to fulfill its
Geneva Convention obligations for the safety of Pak-
istani prisoners of war. The language, however, is
nonpolemical and does not represent an intensifica-
tion of earlier Chinese propaganda attacks on India.
Although the Chinese had appeared reluc-
tant to play host to Bhutto at this time,
they apparently went along with his visit
in order to bolster his political position
at home and to maintain some pressure on
India to come to an accommodation with
him. Long ago, however, Peking warned Is-
lamabad that China intended to improve its
relations with India, and this goal has
undoubtedly assumed greater urgency with
India's new pre-eminence in the subconti-
nent and Pakistan's diminished utility as
a bulwark against Soviet influence in the
region. The Chou-Bhutto communiqug does
not depart from this policy.
5
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PANAMA
The Torrijos government has begun using inter,-
national forums to focus world attention on the canal
issue. Panama's Ambassador Boyd, in his only two
statements to the UN Security Council following Pan-
ama's election to the Council, has featured his-cOun-
try's complaints against "US neocolonialism." Ata
recent meeting of the OAS Inter-American Council for
Education, Science, and Culture the Panamanian'edu-
cation minister spoke in a similar vein.
Boyd told Ambassador Bush on Tuesday that Pan-
ama planned to submit a resolution to the Security
Council on the canal issue. If the US vetoed it,
Boyd said he would take the issue to the General
Assembly.
Since General Torrijos apparently believes
that by discomfiting the US at international
meetings he can compel Washington into fur-
ther concessions in the canal negotiations,
we expect that he will continue to exploit
opportunities in the UN and OAS. Recent
Cuban and Soviet pronouncements are likely
to have convinced Torrijos that he has the
diplomatic and propaganda support of Commu-
nist states. By portraying Panama's stand
in the canal negotiations as part of the
world-wide struggle against colonialism he
is bidding hard for third world support.
7
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YUGOSLAVIA
The party conference last week approved some
organizational changes aimed at tightening national
control over party organization. The most important
move was the naming of three Serbs to a tight-knit
eight-man party executive bureau. (Serbs tradition-
ally tend to support the federal party's rights and
prerogatives as against regional interests.)
These changes are no more than stopgap
measures. They offer tittle hope of re-
solving the divisive issues such as re-
gional nationalism that are deeply trou-
bling the country. The failure to adopt
stronger measures shows that there is
much resistance in the party to any retreat
from Yugoslavia's decentralized system.
The party's continued failure to find a
way of reasserting itself as a unifying
force could eventually cause the military
to play such a role. The armed forces
have long regarded themselves as guardi-
ans of a unified Yugoslavia. This feel-
ing has been reinforced by Tito's reli-
ance on them for support in times of cri-
sis, as he did most recently during his
move against Croatian nationalists,
8
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Road
Trail
Chinese Roadbuilding in Northwest Laos
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NOTES
Communist China - Laos: Recent photography
shows that since early December the Chinese have
added two miles of construction and improvements to
the road being built southwest from Muong Houn to-
ward Pak Beng on the Mekong River. The road now is
motorable to within seven miles of Pak Beng. The
Chinese are also continuing to improve Route 45 as
far as the Nam Ou River, are widening and straight-
ening Route 321 from the Chinese border to Muong
Sing, and are building a new road southeast of Muon
Sing.
International Monetary Situation: Major Euro-
pean currencies rose sharply against the dollar yes-
terday, and a growing demand for marks caused the
Bundesbank to support the dollar substantially for
the first time since the realignment last December.
The Belgian and Dutch central banks may soon follow
suit. European bankers apparently do not expect the
dollar to strengthen until an increase in the price
of monetary gold seems certain. Continued upward
movement of the European currencies could cause cen-
tral bankers to resume currency floats or? tighten
controls on movement of capital rather than absorb
new, large amounts of dollars.
9
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Top Secret
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