THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 28 JANUARY 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993107
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: January 28, 1972

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The President's Daily Brief
28 January 1972
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THE: PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
28 January 1972'
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Hanoi's, Moscow's, and Peking's initial reactions
to the President's peace proposal are reported on
Page 1.
Egyptian President Sadat's forthcoming trip to Mos-
cow, seems-mainly designed to divert domestic criti-
cism away from himself. (Page 3)
During his visit to Japan, Gromyko succeeded in im-
proving the atmosphere between Moscow and Tokyo.
(Page 4)
India has set a number of preconditions that Paki-
stan must meet before peace talks can begin.
(Page 5)
On Page 7, we report on the efforts of the Cambodian
Communists to build their movement.
At Annex, we discuss Cuba's changing relations with
the governments of Latin America.
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NORTH VIETNAM - US
In its initial reaction to President Nixon's
peace proposal, Hanoi has reserved most of its com-
ment and vituperation for the provisions calling for
open elections in South Vietnam under a caretaker
government. Only with respect to this part of the
proposal have the North Vietnamese discussed any of
the specifics outlined by the President. According
to a Radio Hanoi commentary on 25 January, Thieu's
resignation would still leave his "lackeys" in con-
trol of an election, while US troops--even though
in the process of withdrawing--would still be in
South Vietnam to help maintain Thieu and keep the
war going.
Other aspects: of.the President's peace plan
have either been-ignored in North'Vietnamese public
pronouncements or have:drawn-a standard denunciation.
No-mention has been made in the North Vietnamese
press-or-by Communist spokesmen in Paris of the pro-
posal for international- supervision of the proposed
elections?a notion which the Communists themselves
endorsed in their ten-point peace package two years'
ago Nor has Hanoi made any effort to relate-the
POW issue to the new proposal. Instead, the North
Vietnamese have reasserted their- demand for a with-
drawal of all American forces under a set deadline
and US abandonment of the Thieu government in re-
turn-for the prisoners' release. The North Vietnam--
ese have termed unacceptable the President's call
for a cease-fire throughout Indochina, claiming-
that it would deprive the peoples of Indochina of
their right to self-defense- and self-determination.
None of Hanoi's public pronouncements can
be read as rejecting the proposal out of.
hand, At-the very least the North Viet-
namese may still be debating how to-re-
spond. publicly to the initiative and.
avoid giving the impression that they are
the primary roadblock in the way.of sub-
stantive negotiations.
There has been no authoritative Soviet comment
on the President's proposal, and what little treat-
ment there has been of the subject has-been essen-
tially negative. TASS failed to carry its normally
prompt news report of the President's address and
did not issue its first independent commentary un-
til after the initial Vietnamese reaction had become
known. In that commentary, the Soviets complained
of the President's failure to set --a date for total
1
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US withdrawal and berated him for "trying to conduct
the Paris talks from a position of strength." Yes-
terday afternoon a Moscow Radio commentator broad-
casting in English called the proposal "nothing new,"
and characterized it a "propaganda stunt." Much of
his denunciation followed the lines taken by the
North Vietnamese.
Peking's only reaction so far has been to re-
publish without comment the responses of Hanoi, the
Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Viet-
nam, and Pyongyang, suggesting that the Chinese have
not decided on what line to take.
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EGYPT-USSR
President Sadat's coming visit to the USSR and "other
friendly states" appears mainly inspired by a need
to undercut domestic critics of his inaction in the
Middle East impasse. The trip is vaguely scheduled
for sometime after this week, perhaps to give Sadat
time to ensure that domestic unrest is under control
prior to his departure. Although the recent student
demonstrations are the only clearly visible manifes-
tation of malaise in Egypt, other groups may share
some of the students' unhappiness.
While in Moscow, Sadat can be expected to stress
again his need for more tangible proof of Soviet
commitment to the recovery of the occupied territo-
ries. On this occasion, the Egyptian President will
certainly argue that US deliveries of additional
Phantom jets to Israel require a response in kind
from the USSR.
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USSR-JAPAN
During his visit to Tokyo, Gromyko seems to
have succeeded in creating a favorable atmosphere
for future contacts between the USSR and Japan.
While he was there, the Japanese Foreign Ministry
tried to create the public impression that the two
sides could agree to exchange visits of heads of
government in the coming year and to begin negotia-
tions on. a peace treaty. The communique was equiv-
ocal on these points, however, stating that the USSR
and Japan "expect". the visits to take place and
"favor" peace talks.
Japan has hitherto insisted that negotia-
tions for a peace treaty could not be held
without Soviet willingness to discuss the
problem of the Northern Territories--the
four islands occupied by the Soviets after
the Second World War. Thus Gromyko may
privately have shown signs of flexibility
on this issue, although no mention of this
was made in the communiqug. Previously
the Soviet position has been that the prob-
lem of the Northern Territories was a
"closed matter," but at a press conference
today Gromyko appeared to acknowledge that
a solution to this problem was a prerequi-
site to the signing of the treaty.
4
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CHINA
Both sides make
minor pins
Peshawar
?
AFGHANISTAN .Islamabad
\ .
Sialkot.
Jammu
Kashmir
Lahore;
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L.?110,0
0 ? .Quetta
WEST
PAKISTAN
Multans,-,`
.Jodhpur
Pakistani gain
? Indian gain
c.
552477 1-72 CIA
MILES
ISO
Amritsar
New Delhi*
INDIA
76
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INDIA-PAKISTAN
India has established a_number of prerequisites
that must be met before serious peace talks with
Pakistan can begin. Foreign Minister Swaran Singh
has claimed the Indians do not rule
out the possibility that the Pakistani military might
overthrow President Bhutto and initiate another war.
Consequently, he said, they will seek to ensure that
Pakistan does not maintain a military capability suf-
ficient to threaten India's security.
In order to survive as President, _Bhutto
cannot appearto be using an .Indian,yard7
stick to determine his country's military
strength levelS. He is already under pres-
sure from his army commander in chief,
General Gul Hasan, who recently told the
acting head of the US Mission in Islamabad'
that he wants to maintainthe level of the
Pakistani Army at about prewar size, de-
spite the loss of the east.. Hasan believes
.such a strength level is necessary to serve
as a,credible deterrent against_India, and
claims to have Bhutta's concurrence for
such an effort
Indian spokesmen have made it plain that, while
they are willing to. return territory captured in
West Pakistan, Islamabad first must indicate its
willingness to relinquish claims to Indian-held
Kashmir and make "mutually acceptable" rectifications
of the 1949 Kashmir cease..-fire line so as to stabi--
lize the border situation. According to Singh, India
will maintain a high state of readiness on the west-
ern front;: its troops will not: be withdrawn behind
prewar boundaries until a comprehensive settlement
has been negotiated..
The presence of these forces will make it
difficult for Bhutto to meet Mrs. Gandhi's
demand that he abandon a "policy of con-
frontation." In any case, Bhutto would
have great difficulty in accepting pre-
conditions that included relinquishing Pak-
istan's claims, however theoretical, to
Indian-held Kashmir,
Meanwhile, Bhutto is under considerable domestic
pressure to effect the release of some 90,000 West
Pakistani prisoners of war. New Delhi insists that
the prisoners are held jointly with Bangladesh and
that Bhutto must also deal with the Bengalis on the
issue.
(continued)
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Bhutto will find it difficult to do this
as long as Indian troops remain in BangZa-
desh, and India will probably not com-
pletely withdraw its forces for several
months. The return of the prisoners is
also complicated by Bhutto's inability at
this time to "accept the reality of Bangla-
desh" as demanded by the Indians, even
though this problem may ultimately be
solved on a practical rather than an offi-
cial basis.
If the Indians persist in posing rigid
preconditions, Bhutto may feel compelled
to take a more strident nationalistic,
anti-Indian position in order to placate
the military.
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CAMBODIA
Since Sihanouk's ouster, the Vietnamese Commu-
nists have borne the brunt of the fighting in Cam-
bodia, while the Khmer Communists have been working
hard to build up their movement. The Khmer Commu-
nists now are some 15,000 to 30,000 strong and en-
gage mostly in small-scale attacks and rear service
activities in support of the Vietnamese. A recent
Khmer message gives us a fairly good picture of their
organizational plans and problems, particularly with
regard to the Phnom Penh area.
--The Communists-are.stressing the formation of
additional battalions and companies, possibly
at the provincial and: district levels.
--They may be forming some artillery units.
--They hope to increase recruitment and intel-
ligence activities in areas south of Route ,4
and just north of Phnom Penh.
--With regard to the capital itself, the Commu-
nist aim is to isolate the city even further
and to increase sabotage and political agita-
tion within the city to take advantage of the
disarray in the Lon Nol government.
--To overcome organizational problems in the
capital area, the Khmer Communists are consid-
ering creating a new region to include the city
and its environs and a "committee" for the city.
itself.
Cryptic references in the message t
agreements"
"dis-
there are pobiticaL problems
both within the. 'Khmer Communist movement
and between the Khmer and the Vietnamese
Communists
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NOTE
Malta-BK.-NATO: Lord Carrington told Ambassador
Annenberg.on 25 January that LOndon-regards a number
of bilateral.issues-as.potential rupture points in
the negotiations'with-Malta. The British:have'mis-
givings about: the dependability of any agreement
with Mintoff and do not, want to leave loose ends
that would allow him to cause trouble later. Car-
rington stated that, if Mintoff cannot soon be
brought to terms, London tentatively had decided
to halt its negotiations and leave it up to some
other NATO member to carry on. In that event, Lon-
don would complete the withdrawal of all its troops
from the island.
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CUBA'S CHANGING RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA
Fidel Castro has greatly modified his aggressive
tactics toward the rest of Latin America over the
past four years. He is now engaged in a more conven-
tional pursuit of closer economic: and political ties
with selected countries in the region,. His new pol-
icy results primarily from the repeated failures of
Cuba's previous attempts tb foster subversion and in-
surrection, culminating in Che Guevara's death-in
Bolivia in 1967..: The stress on exporting revolution
was also diverting Cuba from its mounting problems'
at home, particularly the mismanagement ofits econ-
omy. Castro had also come under Soviet pressureto
reduce his external adventures, which MOSCOW saw as
both unrealistic and damaging to' its. own strategy
for increasing Communist influence in the area.
Castro's new approach has benefited not only
from the fervent and frequently anti-Yankee nation-
alism of Latin American states generally, but more
specifically from the accession to power of "inde-
pendent" or leftist regimes in Peru, Bolivia (at
least until August 1971), Chile, Panama, and Ecuador.
By providing the leaders of such regimes with a con-
venient means of demonstrating their "leftism" or
their independence of the US, Castro's overtures
have enabled him to regain a measure of respectabil-
ity in Latin America. With the passage of time,
fear of Cuban subversion in many other countries
throughout ?the area has also diminished. Both of
these factors have tended to undermine the economic
and political sanctions imposed on Cuba by the OAS.
Castro is working hard to capitalize on this
trend, but this does not mean he has completely
stopped all support for revolutionary movements
abroad.'
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/ It is highly unlikely
that Castro is prepared to risk what he has gained
through his new policy by reverting at any time in
the near future to all-out emphasis on the fomenting
of violence.
Castro's trip to Chile last fall, with stop-
overs in Peru and Ecuador, provides the most dramatic
evidence that he is seeking ways under his new policy
to advance his gains and reduce Cuba's isolation from
the rest of the hemisphere. Apart from this trip,
Al
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most of Castro's actions have taken the form of ex-
changes of athletic teams, cultural groups, and ag-
ricultural delegations, and these are likely to re-
main the cornerstone of his efforts. Offices of the
Cuban news agency, Prensa Latina, are already located
in Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela, and
more may be established in other nations as well.
Cuba may try to follow up such contacts with-trade,
offers, aimed at the gradual establishment of perma--
nent trade missions just short of formal diplomatic
relations. Moves in this direction, however,.are
likelyto remain selective Castro stated during
his visit to Chile-that Cuba is "not desperate-to
normalize relations with other Latin American coun-
tries," indicating that his basic criterion for es-
tablishing diplomatic relations will be that a coun-
try's foreign policy is independent of US influence.
Cuba now has stronger ties with Chile than with
any other nation in the hemisphere. Since the inau--
guration of President Allende, Cuba and Chile have
re-established diplomatic relations, signed a two-
year trade agreement and a bilateral civil air ac-
cord, and exchanged numerous cultural, agricultural,
and commercial delegations. Castro will work
strengthen this relationship, probably through in-
creased contacts and .cooperation between the various
agencies of the two governments.
Castro is also trying to expand Cuba's ties
with Peru. Although Peru has been compelled, for
the time being, to shelve its initiative in the OAS
to permit individual member states to re-establish
relations with Cuba, Lima is likely to normalize
relations with Havana before the end of the year.
Castro has .been currying favor with Panama by
publicly supporting its position against that:of-the
US in the canal talks. The outcome of the talks is
of intense interest to Castro, not only because of
the impact a settlement will have on US influence in
the area, but because, an agreement favorable-to:
Panama could serve Castro as a convenient:tool for
pressuring the US to get. out of Guantanamo. Torri-
jos, for his part, is probably using his dalliance
with Cuba both as a manifestation of his independ-
ence from the US-and as an ace in the hole for use
in pressuring the US in the treaty negotiations.
(continued)
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The question of Havana's future relationship
with Ecuador is trickier. Quito is likely to pro-
ceed cautiously in Lima's footsteps toward recogni-
tion of Cuba. This is because of military opposi-
tion partially stemming from Castro's refusal to ex-
tradite the murderers of an Ecuadorean military pi-
lot aboard an aircraft hijacked to Havana. There
are indications that negotiations may soon take
place on this matter in Cuba, and its resolution
could reinforce Quito's present inclination.
The new moderation in Cuba's foreign policy
does not extend to the OAS. Fidel still uses his
most vituperative language in speaking of the organ-
ization, and he is not likely to change his stand
against rejoining it as long as the US remains a
member. Cuban representatives at regional confer-
ences continue rather to call for a "union of Latin
American nations" that would replace the OAS and ex-
clude the US.
The outlook for continued small Cuban successes
under its new Latin American policy is good. Cuba
will probably continue to expand its commercial and
agricultural contacts in the Caribbean area, prima-
rily in the French territories, Trinidad-Tobago, and
Jamaica. In addition, once diplomatic relations are
re-established with Peru and Ecuador, one or two
other nations may follow suit.
A number.of Latin governments however, are
still strongly opposed to Castro. Brazil, Paraguay,
Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and several Central
American states oppose any
reconciliation with the Castro government: Such
opposition is partly in deference to the US posi-
tion, but a number of Latin American countries still
perceive a threat_from-Cuban subversion. The Uru-
guayan Government, moreover, was especially angered
by Castro's statement. inChile that violence was the
only road to power in Uruguay. Uruguay's anger.may
only be temporary, but strongly anti-Castro countries
are likely to reject ties with Cuba for some time to
come even if a number of other states normalize rela-
tions with Cuba.
The ultimate success of Castro's policy will de-
pend upon a continuation in power of the present more
sympathetic regimes in Latin America and the extent
?
to which Castro's relations with them can set in mo-
tion a limited bandwagon in Cuba's favor. As more
ties are established, however, Cuba may become a
less attractive symbol by which Latin leaders can
demonstrate independence of the US. Historical as
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well as economic and political obstacles will still
stand in the way of Castro's quest for a position of
leadership. South American states, for instance,
have traditionally lacked rapport with the Caribbean
nations, viewing them as "banana republics." Cuba's
weak international economic position is not likely
to give it much of an advantage with countries such
as Brazil, which is already making its own claims
for Latin leadership. Moreover, many other leaders
still regard Castro as a brash, rude, and arrogant
upstart. The Cuban leader is used to having his way
at home, and it remains to be seen whether he can
cope with the frustrations of occasional setbacks,
the necessity to compromise, and occasional outright
rejection of his views in his dealings with other
Latin American nations.
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