THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 20 JANUARY 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993091
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: January 20, 1972

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010300170001-4
The President's Daily Brief
20 January 1972
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010300170001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010300170001-4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
20 January 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
In Laos, North Vietnamese units in the Long Tieng
area may be preparing a major attack from the south.
(Page 1)
Moscow may believe it can recognize Bangladesh with-
out alienating Pakistan. (Page 2)
Hanoi and Tokyo are taking precautions to keep their
trade mission talks secret. (Page 3)
Communist China has anew foreign minister. (Page 4)
The situation along Israel's border with Lebanon
has eased, but Israel may still be considering re-
prisals against Syria. (Page 5)
Egyptian President Sadat is faced with student
dissent. (Page 5)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010300170001-4
LONG TIENG AREA
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LAOS
Government units have made no further progress
in their attempts to clear Skyline Ridge, and the
enemy threat continues to develop south of Long
Tieng. General yang Pao is increasingly concerned
that North Vietnamese units may attempt to approach
the Long Tieng valley from the south, where its de-
fenses are vulnerable. An irregular battalion has
tried unsuccessfully for the past two days to clear
this area. Elements of six North Vietnamese battal-
ions have now been detected west and south of Long
Tieng.
The Communists' strategy appears to be to
keep the government's best units tied
down on Skyline Ridge while they move to
encircle the valley and prepare a major
assault from the south.
The South Vietnamese have rejected the Laotian
appeal
to send three ARVN battalions into south
Laos. The chairman of the South Vietnamese Joint
General Staff, General Vien, told two high-ranking
Laotian generals visiting Saigon earlier this week
that South Vietnamese assistance is out of the ques-
tion at this time because of the withdrawal of Amer-
ican forces and the new enemy buildup in several re-
gions close to South Vietnam.
1
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USSR-BANGLADESH-PAKISTAN
Moscow may soon recognize Bangladesh. The
agreement of the European Community coun-
tries and the UK to recognize Bangladesh,
plus Islamabad's relatively mild reaction
to recognition by Burma and Nepal, could
convince the Soviets that they too should
act. Moscow probably would like further
to ingratiate itself with New Delhi by
being among the first of the major powers
to recognize Bangladesh and may now cal-
culate that it can do so without causing
a serious breach with Pakistan.
Moscow has already made some small gestures
aimed at getting back into Islamabad's good graces.
Soviet President Podgorny sent a congratulatory mes-
sage to President Bhutto on his assumption of office,
and Soviet media have hailed Bhutto's initial eco-
nomic and political moves as steps in the right di-
rection.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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JAPAN - NORTH VIETNAM
We reported
on Japan's efforts to work out arrange-
ments for an exchange of permanent trade missions
with North Vietnam. We now learn that Hanoi and
Tokyo apparently are both taking great precautions
to keep these plans from becoming too widely known.
The key Japanese official involved in the contacts
has told our Tokyo Embassy that, according to the
North Vietnamese, Hanoi has taken no other govern-
ment into its confidence on the subject and has
asked the Japanese not to mention it even to friends
of North Vietnam.
The Japanese, for their part, are more
and more inclined to postpone informing
South Vietnam about these exchanges, pre-
sumably because they want the talks to
make as much progress as possible before
triggering the inevitable protests from
Saigon. As for the North Vietnamese,
they could use their contacts with Tokyo
as a reminder to the Chinese of their
independence, but they clearly want to be
able to inform Peking at a time of their
own choosing.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
COMMUNIST CHINA
Peking has moved swiftly to confirm a replace-
ment for recently deceased foreign minister Chen I.
Chi Peng-fei, a professional diplomat who has been
"acting" foreign minister since April 1971, was-
identified as Chen's successor at a theatrical per-
formance yesterday.
Unlike Chen I, Chi is not a member of the-
politburo and the party central committee.
Chi's appointment thus represents a down-
grading of the post and reaffirms the
tight rein on foreign policy-making held
by Premier Chou En-Lai. His posting, how-
ever, is not inconsistent with the pattern
established over the past year in which
several ministerial portfolios have been
awarded to functionaries who do not hold
high party posts.
4
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTES
Israel-Lebanon-Syria: The situation along:Is-
rael's border with Lebanon has eased, but Israel may
still be considering reprisals against Syria. The
Lebanese have thus far had considerable success in
a campaign to reduce the level of fedayeen activity
in response to-Israeli raids and the threat to oc-
cupy Lebanese territory, In contrast, the Israelis
have warned the Syrians that they must bear responsi-
bility for the continuing high level of incursions
and other violations from the Syrian side. They have
specifically referred to the decapitation of an Is-
raeli civilian engineer on 6 January, an act for
which they have yet to even the score.
Egypt: President Sadat is faced with his first
significant manifestation of open dissent. Student
demonstrations, beginning on Monday and continuing
through yesterday, have occurred at two of Cairo's
largest universities. The demonstrations appear di-
rected almost entirely at the government, and plac-
ards have been displayed criticizing Sadat for hav-
ing-promised much and delivered little. The "no .
war- no peace" situation was also decried, with
some students said to be demanding military training.
Sadat has promised to talk to the students in an at-
tempt to discourage further disturbances, but there
is little he can do to ease their sense of frustra-
tion. If the demonstrations spread and intensify,
Sadat could feel impelled to call in the police and
army to quell the students.
5
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Top Secret
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