THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 1 DECEMBER 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993004
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: December 1, 1971

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The President's Daily Brief
1 December 1971
o ecret
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NJ
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
1 December 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Indian and Pakistani officials are expressing still
more pessimism on the chances for peace, Prime Min-
ister Gandhi delivered a particularly tough speech
to parliament yesterday, and Peking has issued its
strongest accusations against India in the current
phase of the crisis. (Page 1)
In Cambodia, Communist troops are pressing hard
against the government's Chenla II force along
Route 6 and the situation has been declared criti-
cal. (Page 3)
On Page 4 we discuss some implications of last Sun-
day's elections in Uruguay.
At Annex, we examine the current status of the
Cyprus dispute, especially the disturbing effect
caused by General Grivas' presence on the island.
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INDIA PAKISTAN
Both Indian and Pakistani officials are express-
ing growing pessimism on the chances for peace. Am-
bassador Keating describes the Pakistani high com-
missioner in New Delhi as "resigned" to the likeli-
hood of war. The Indian ambassador to Afghanistan
yesterday told US Embassy officers in Kabul that he
anticipated hostilities within one week. In Karachi,
the Indian deputy high commissioner, previously, an
optimist on the likelihood of avoiding war, expressed
the opinion that a full-scale conflict could erupt
at any time. Apparently in line with this thinking,
virtually all dependents of Indian officials in
Karachi have left by air for New Delhi since last
Sunday.
Prime Minister Gandhi told the upper house of
parliament yesterday that the presence of West Pak-
istani troops in East Pakistan constitutes .a threat
to India's security. She warned that India would
not stand by while Bengalis in East Pakistan were
"annihiliated."
These tough statements further escalate
India's pressure on Islamabad into either
accepting a political settlement or ini-
tiating full-scale war with its more power-
ful neighbor. Mrs. Gandhi also may be
setting the stage for a still more active
role for the Indian armed forces in sup-
port of the guerrilla offensive in East
Pakistan,
The Bangla Desh radio has broadcast the long-
est and most vitriolic attack on the US Government
in sometime. Washington is charged with attempt-
ing to destroy the unity between the Bangla Desh
regime and the guerrilla forces and seeking to "in-
ternationalize" an internal Pakistani crisis so as
to give President Yahya a chance to recoup his
dwindling strength.
The radio attacks conceivably could lead
to guerrilla action against US personnel
or facilities in East Pakistan although,
as in the past, the broadcast tended to
differentiate between the government and
people of the US.
Chinese Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien on Monday
voiced Peking's strongest and most authoritative
accusation against India in the current phase of
the crisis, but again made evident China's desire
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Balurghat
Santahar.
Karnaphuli
Reservoir
I BAY OF BENGAL
88
552199 12-71
?
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for a political settlement. Li accused India of
carrying out subversive activities and military
provocations as well as invading and occupying Pak-
istani territory. Li lashed out at the USSR indi-
rectly, accusing it of supporting and encouraging
the Indians, but his criticisms did not match those
delivered last Friday at the UN by Deputy Foreign
Minister Chiao Kuan-hua, who called the Indo-Soviet
treaty signed last August essentially a military
alliance, adding that it had led to "bare-faced ag-
gression against Pakistan."
Despite this step-up in Peking's public
expressions of concern, these harsh words
do not show any change in China's basic
policy of maintaining cautious political
and military assistance to the Pakistan
Government, while urging it to work as
rapidly as possible toward a political
settlement within East Pakistan and with
India.
In New York, the president of the UN Security
Council has circulated to Council members Yahya's
letter. to Secretary General Thant requesting that
UN observers be sent to the Pakistani side of the
East Pakistan borders. Thant commented that the
matter was beyond his competence and should come
before the Security Council under the terms of the
UN charter.
Thants conception of a limited mandato
for himself and the need for a_formal
decision by the Security .Council in order -
to _dispatch UN observers kills any im-
mediate prospect that a_mission will be
sent, rahya's appeal will remain in limbo
unless some member formally requests a
Council meeting to deal with the question.
, The military situation_ has not changed signif-
icantly. Clashes continue near Jessore, and New
Delhi admits that Indian troops are still involved
in the fighting inside East ? Pakistan near Hilli.
To,the north, a battle appears to be continuing
near Pachagarh--which the Pakistani Army has aban-
doned under pressure--and other clashes are occur-
ring near Kamalpur in Mymensingh District, inside
the northern border of Sylhet District., and along
the eastern border of East Pakistan in the Belonia
salient.
/ The bor-
der between India and West Pakistan remains gener-
ally quiet.
2
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CAMBODIA: Route 6 Area
eozt-z-
,14,0e.dit
1:3
Lthul?.*
itplahiation?
? ?
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CAMBODIA
Communist troops have surrounded some of the
government's Chenla II units near Kompong Thmar,
the logistics base for the operation's northern
force
South of the town, the Communists have captured a
portion of Route 6 and isolated the government base
at Baray, where heavy fighting now appears to have
broken out. In addition, US aerial observers have
reported that there is fighting along Route 21 south-
east of Kompong Thmar and that some retreating gov-
ernment troops have abandoned weapons, ammunition,
and vehicles. This morning the US defense attache
reported that the Chenla II situation had been de-
clared "critical," with the Communists now occupying
three portions of Route 6.
In resuming the offensive in the area, the
Communists may be trying to take advantage
of the fact that almost 20 battalions of
government troops, including several elite
Khmer Krom units, have been diverted to
the defense of Phnom Penh. Although there
are still about 22,000 government troops
in the Chenla II force, those in the
northern part remain cut off and dependent
on aerial resupply. The government had
planned to build a series of strongpoints
along the road, but will probably be un-
able to hold such positions if the Commu-
nists keep up the pressure.
Since two regiments of the Vietnamese Com-
munist 9th Division--the 95C and 271st
regiments--have moved north into the Kom-
pong Thmar area since the South Vietnam-
ese began their offensive east of the Me-
kong, it seems unlikely that the Commu-
nists will be quickly drawn away from the
Route 6 area by South Vietnamese opera-
tions. Continued Communist attacks on
the Chenla II forces may prompt Phnom
Penh to ask that South Vietnamese troops
be sent to operate west of the Mekong, ?as
they did last year at this time.
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URUGUAY
With reporting from some rural districts still
incomplete and a substantial absentee vote in Sun-
day's general elections uncounted, the incumbent
Colorado Party, is maintaining a precarious lead over
the Blanco Party. Under Uruguay's complex election
law, if this lead holds the presidency will go to
Juan Maria Bordaberry, handpicked choice of Presi-
dent Pacheco. If the Blancos pull ahead, Wilson
Ferreira will succeed Pacheco. Thefl Communist-led
Frente Amplio coalition nationwide attracted less
than 20 percent of the vote, but finished a strong
second in the Montevideo mayoralty race with some
30 percent. The final outcome may not be clear for
several days, until the 100,000 remaining ballots
are counted.
We expect that Bordaberry would operate
much in the Pacheco pattern--championing
tough security measures against leftist
terrorists, blaming Congress for its re-
fusal to grant him increased police powers,
and following conservative economic pol-
icies. Ferreira, on the other hand, ef-
fectively articulated a platform calling
for selected nationalization and land re-
form, and his approach might lower ten-
sions of recent years by reducing the ap-
peal of the extreme leftist forces. Neither
man would have majority support in Congress.
With the Congresdional representation of
the Frente Amplio participants at Zast
somewhat increased, it is in a position
to generate additional legislative problems
for any new president. Judging by the in-
tra-Frente difficulties encountered during
the campaign, however, there is a question
whether the Frente will be able to hold
together as a coordinated political force
for the longer term.
Some of the Uruguayan leftists, however,
will be receptive to the Tupamaro terror-
ists' charge that the system is so rigged
that a "popular" victory can come only by
force of arms. In any event, the Tupamaro
?operational?standdown during the election
period could end soon, especially if Borda-
berry is confirmed as the winner. Secu-
rity force operations will also be less
restricted than they were in the campaign
period, at least until Pacheco leaves of-
fice in March.
4
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URUGUAY
With reporting from some rural districts still
incomplete and a substantial absentee vote in Sun-
day's general elections uncounted, the incumbent
Colorado Party, is maintaining a precarious lead over
the Blanco Party. Under Uruguay's complex election
law, if this lead holds the presidency will go to
Juan Maria Bordaberry, handpicked choice of Presi-
dent Pacheco. If the Blancos pull ahead, Wilson
Ferreira will succeed Pacheco. Thefl Communist-led
Frente Amplio coalition nationwide attracted less
than 20 percent of the vote, but finished a strong
second in the Montevideo mayoralty race with some
30 percent. The final outcome may not be clear for
several days, until the 100,000 remaining ballots
are counted.
We expect that Bordaberry would operate
much in the Pacheco pattern--championing
tough security measures against leftist
terrorists, blaming Congress for its re-
fusal to grant him increased police powers,
and following conservative economic pol-
icies. Ferreira, on the other hand, ef-
fectively articulated a platform calling
for selected nationalization and land re-
form, and his approach might lower ten-
sions of recent years by reducing the ap-
peal of the extreme leftist forces. Neither
man would have majority support in Congress.
With the Congresdional representation of
the Frente Amplio participants at Zast
somewhat increased, it is in a position
to generate additional legislative problems
for any new president. Judging by the in-
tra-Frente difficulties encountered during
the campaign, however, there is a question
whether the Frente will be able to hold
together as a coordinated political force
for the longer term.
Some of the Uruguayan leftists, however,
will be receptive to the Tupamaro terror-
ists' charge that the system is so rigged
that a "popular" victory can come only by
force of arms. In any event, the Tupamaro
?operational?standdown during the election
period could end soon, especially if Borda-
berry is confirmed as the winner. Secu-
rity force operations will also be less
restricted than they were in the campaign
period, at least until Pacheco leaves of-
fice in March.
4
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A DECEPTIVE QUIET ON CYPRUS
Secretary General Thant will formally report today
that little progress has been made toward resolu-
tion of the intercommunal strife on Cyprus. Later
this month the Security Council will consider whether
to renew the mandate of the UN peacekeeping force on
the island; there are signs that some nations con-
tributing troops to the force are considering drop-
ping out. Although the situation on Cyprus has been
remarkably quiet for several months, old animosities
remain and threaten again to burst into violence.
The presence on Cyprus of General George Grivas has
introduced a new air of uncertainty into the situa-
tion. Since Grivas arrived clandestinely in early
September, there has been a revival of speculation
concerning enosis--union of Cyprus with Greece--or
double enosis--partition of Cyprus between Greece
and Turkey. Speculation in Athens, Ankara, and
Nicosia about such radical solutions is undercutting
efforts to negotiate a settlement.
Grivas is a naturalized Greek of Cypriot origin who
has made his mark as a leader of guerrilla forces.
He Zed a resistance movement in Greece during World
War II and directed the Cypriot struggle against
the British from 1955 to 1959. After hostilities
again broke out between Turkish and Greek Cypriots
in 1964 Grivas organized the Cyprus National Guard,
became the supreme commander of the Cyprus Armed
Forces, promoted union with Greece, and ultimately
became the bate-noir of Archbishop Makarios. Grivas
apparently never forgave Makarios for accepting the
London-Zurich Agreements of 1959, which made Cyprus
an independent republic rather than opening the way
for enosis. His difficulties with Makarios prompted
numerous threats to resign as commander of the Cyp-
riot Army, but he remained until late 1967, when
he was withdrawn by Athens under Turkish pressure.
Then, as now, Makarios had no intention of giving up
supreme power as head of a sovereign state. He sees
no future for himself under enosis--single or double.
Both the Turkish Cypriots and the mainland Turks
despise Grivas. The Turks believe he was the di-
rect cause of the sacking of a Turkish Cypriot vil-
lage in 1964 and the death of some 27 Turkish Cyp-
riots there. There are no present indications that
Grivas has the large force of old behind him, but
his almost legendary role in the turbulent Cypriot
problems during the past two decades has raised
fears that he will attract a new following in the
coming months.
(continued)
Al
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Grivas, now 74 years old, is at his best as an elu-
sive and mysterious organizer of guerrilla units.
Possibly with the connivance of the Greek Govern-
ment, he escaped surveillance from his home in Ath-
ens in late August, and a few. days later arrived
secretly on Cyprus to begin testing his support in
the villages. As expected, Turkey initially in-
sisted that Makarios and the Greek Government appre-
hend the General and return him to Athens. When it
became apparent that Grivas was more interested in
challenging Makarios than in terrorizing the Turkish
Cypriots, however, the Turks noticeably softened
their objections.
Grivas is forming
illegal armed groups. They estimate that Grivas
has the necessary weapons to arm a force of 400 to
600 men with mortars and light machine guns. It is
also reported that the General could equip a reserve
force of 1,000 to 2,000 men with small arms. Gen-
eral Angelis, commander of the Greek Armed Forces,
anticipates that Grivas will begin an active phase
against Makarios within the next few weeks. Grivas
has disguised his moves, however. Although he has
not surfaced on the island, rumors about his plans
have put Makarios on the defensive. The Archbishop
reportedly has been arming his own loyal bands. He
has also been removing officials whose loyalty he
questions. Thus far, Makarios has forced at least
five Greek Cypriot officials to resign. US observ-
ers on the island believe that if the Archbishop
continues his purge, he will drive others, who
would otherwise remain neutraZ, over to Grivas'
side.
One critical element in Grivas' fortunes is the ex-
tent to which the Greek Government will support him.
Athens denies any involvement in the affair but has
made no effort to inhibit the General's activities
and, indeed, seems to be using Greek assets in
Cyprus to support him. The Greek-sponsored press
and mainland Greek officers on the island have
been accused of disseminating pro-Grivas propa-
ganda. Athens' official hands-off attitude in the
present circumstances clearly helps Grivas more than
Makarios.
Although Grivas' motives are not clear, his past ac-
tions provide some insights into his present plans.
As an ardent anti-Communist, he is violently opposed
to Makarios' dealings with the Communist bloc. The
General reacted strongly against the gains the Com-
munist Party of Cyprus made in the July' 1970 Cypriot
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elections. He also strongly opposed Makarios' trip
to Moscow last spring. Because of Makarios' contin-
uing flirtation with the Communists, several sources
believe that Grivas' primary goal now is double
enosis. Grivas had always wanted complete union
with Greece but now is said to be willing to accept
double enosis rather than see a further rise ?of
left-wing influence .on the island.
The latest intercommunal meeting between Greek and
Turkish Cypriot representatives occurred shortly
after Grivas arrived on Cyprus. As expected, it
failed to break the stalemate of many years over
the degree of autonomy for Turkish Cypriots. No
further meetings have been scheduled.
Meanwhile, despite considerable discussion, Greek
and Turkish foreign ministers have been unable to
find a way to resuscitate the intercommunal talks
that would be acceptable to all parties. Their
activities, however, have stimulated rumors in Nic-
osia to the effect that Grivas has their support
for double enosis. The two foreign ministers have
sought the help of Thant, who in turn has been un-
successful in efforts to interject a UN participant--
along with Greek and Turkish constitutional experts--
into the intercommunal talks. None of the affected
parties is completely satisfied with this proposal,
and Makarios' suspicions of Athens and Ankara will
probably defeat it.
As the year draws to a close, some of the nations
(particularly Canada) contributing troops to the
UN peacekeeping force on the island are threatening
to withdraw from Cyprus unless the intercommunal
talks are resumed. Makarios cannot be counted on
to give in to this pressure either. If he does
not, however, the situation could easily deterio-
rate and the Archbishop would run the risk of bring-
ing about what he fears most--an effort by the
Greek and Turkish governments to unseat him and
divide the island among themselves.
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Top Secret
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