THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 27 NOVEMBER 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992996
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: November 27, 1971

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The President's Daily Brief
27 November 1971
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
27 November 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Fighting along the East Pakistani border seems to
have eased somewhat as both Indian and Pakistani
officials acknowledge how excessive some claims
have been. The Pakistanis have failed so far to
obtain a firm public statement of support from Pe-
king. (Page 1)
Premier Pham Van Dong's visit to Peking apparently
has eased Sino - North Vietnamese tensions. (Page 3)
On Page 4 we review the Laotian military situation.
We have additional evidence that the Communists in
South Vietnam are having difficulty in countering
Saigon's pacification program. (Page 5)
On Page 6 we discuss the implications of the agreement
between Britain and Rhodesia.
Ecuador/
(Page 7)
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BAY OF BENGAL
5521 82 11-71
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INDIA - PAKISTAN - COMMUNIST CHINA
Fighting continues at a somewhat slower pace
-along the East Pakistani border, with clashes again
reported near. Jessore and in the Belonia salient.
Indian troops apparently made a new strike into the
northwestern part of the province just above the
Bogra-Dinajpur district line.
Representatives of both sides-privately acknowl-
edge the excessiveness of their public claims:. The
military adviser to the governor of East Pakistan
yesterday told US officials in Dacca that none of
the cross-border attacks had been in greater than
two-battalion strength and that he believed that
regular Indian troops remained inside East Pakistan
only near Jessore. He admitted that the Mukti Bahini
controls five small enclaves near the border and
stated that the guerrillas are growing stronger
throughout the interior, including near Dacca. In
Calcutta, Indian Army and Bangla Desh spokesmen have
told US officials that the Mukti Bahini controls no
More than 1,100 square miles along the border, out
of East Pakistan's total land area of 59,000 square
miles, although they state that guerrilla units deep
inside the province may control an additional 10,000
square miles.
On the diplomatic front, President Yahya yes-
terday responded enthusiastically to Ambassador Far-
land's suggestion that Pakistan request the UN to
station observers on the Pakistani side of' the bor-
ders with India, and said he would instruct his am-
bassador at the UN to make the request "immediately."
He. believed this would either prove to the world
:.that the Indians are involved in the attacks or give
. New Delhi pause before engaging in new "aggression."
Japanese and Belgian UN delegations are taking
soundings on separate draft resolutions calling for
a cessation of hostilities but lacking any demand
for withdrawal of troops. 'While finding most Secu-
rity' Council members neutral, friendly or sympathetic,
the Belgians report a negative response from the
Chinese as well as the Soviets and Poles. The Chi-
nese delegate claimed to have no position at the '
moment, but termed the matter. an internal Pakistani
matter in which. other states andthe UN should not
interfere.
(continued)
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Me.Chinese are currently showing a marked
restraint toward Islamabad, in contrast to
MOscow's?support for New Delhi./
I Yesterday
NCNA carried a speech by the head of a
Chinese economic delegation visiting Pak-
istan that contained an innocuous and un-
defined promise of Chinese support "if"
Pakistan should be threatened with foreign
aggression. Peking media also all but ig-
nore reports of fighting in East Pakistan.
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NORTH VIETNAM - COMMUNIST CHINA
Premier Pham Van Dong 's just concluded five-day
visit to Peking apparently has eased Sino - North
Vietnamese tensions. There were no hints of Hanoi's
distrust of Peking's intentions, evident since the
announcement of President Nixon's visit to China,
in North Vietnamese speeches during the visit and
in the final communique. Instead, the visitors ex-
pressed effusive gratitude for Chinese aid. The
Chinese, for their part, made it clear that Peking
does not intend to sell out Hanoi. "You and you
alone," said Premier Chou En-Zai in a speech on 23
November, "are entitled to decide the affairs" of
Vietnam.
The Chinese left no doubt that they are solidly be-
hind Hanoi's seven-point negotiating proposal.
The tougher and more comprehensive presentation of
Hanoi's demands in the communique continues a recent
trend. The communiqug's version of the first of the
"two basic points," for instance, now involves ces-
sation of all US military and military-related ac-
tivity in both parts of Vietnam. The formulation
of the second point, which calls for an end to US
support for the Thieu government, now suggests that
a cessation of US economic as well as military aid
to Saigon is one of Hanoi's preconditions.
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Ban
Lao Nga marA
.Priksong '
i? !--,eki: _
Pak'' V-17 -- 1
Bolovens
L_ : '...r.e7 Plateab i 4 I
ttapat
1 T .., i 7
viek?
552186 11-71 CIA
? Government-held location ? Communist-held location
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LAOS
A task force. of government irregulars on Thurs-
day occupied Thateng, which:had become an important
logistic center north of the Bolovens since it fell
to the Communists-in April 1969. Another irregular
force, operating in the Ban Phone region to the east,
has so far encountered little resistance, which is
surprising because Ban Phone lies astride a poten-
tially important logistic route to Cambodia.
The government has now regained a sizable
portion of the territory lost to the Com-
munists in this area of Laos over the past
two or three years We doubt that it
hopes to hold all of it during the dry sea-
son, however. The area is important. to
the Communists as a buffer to the infil-
tration corridor. The North Vietnamese
may be expected to counterattack in the
coming months with forces already avail-
able, and they may well. bring in rein-
forcements.
The Communists are faring better in the central
panhandle, where they have pushed government units
well to the west of Muong Phalane. Troop, commanders
report that substantial North Vietnamese reinforce-
ments have moved into the area, 50X1
what maybe new, possibly bat- 50X1
talion-sized, units. 50X1
the North Vietnamese intend to go at least as far
west on Route 9 as Dong Hene, which they captured
during the last dry season.
In north Laos, infiltration groups are continu-
ing to move toward the Plaine des Jarres. At least
6,500 troops are now involved.
The Communists also appear to besetting the
political stage for their dry season offensive.
Lao communist leader Souphanouvong on 20 November
sent a harsh letter to Prime Minister Souvanna reit-
erating that a total bombing halt must precede any
talks and castigating Souvanna for "conspiring" with
the US to increase the level of fighting. In addi7
tion, a North Vietnamese Embassy official in Vien-
tiane recently cold-shouldered a US Embassy officer
who tried to sound him out on the subject of pos-
sible Lao peace talks..
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SOUTH VIETNAM
We have additional evidence that the Communists
are having difficulty in countering Saigon's pacifi-
cation program.
--A recent COSVN directive warned that counter-
pacification methods must be adjusted to the
"realities of the situation." The document ex-
pressed particular concern that cadres were un-
derestimating the government's ability to deny
the Viet Cong access to the people. To help
meet the problem, COSVN stressed the need for
rebuilding the local cadre network.
--Viet Cong in a province in the Mekong delta
were told recently to adopt a "cold war" stra-
tegy, evade large government operations, and
rebuild the political network.
--Communist documents from other parts of the
delta, believed to originate with COSVN, state
that "political activities" currently are the
most important part of the revolution. Cadre
are instructed to .get back in touch with the
people and to build up their local organizations.
--A recent series of articles in the North Viet-
namese army journal suggested the need for a
better coordinated anti-pacification effort,
possibly to be combined with a bigger military
effort.
Despite the hint of increased anti-paci-
fication measures, the Communists appar-
ently intend in the short term to continue
to rely primarily on low-keyed activities
such as exhorting the cadre. This applies
especially to the southern half of the
country, where Communist military capabil-
ities are weakest.
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UK-RHODESIA-UN
The agreement between Foreign Secretary
Douglas-Home and Rhodesian Prime Minister
Smith offers a theoretical possibility of
bringing eventual rule by Rhodesia's Af-
rican majority, but no prospect for re-
ducing the contentiousness of the issue
in the UN.
As outlined to the two parliaments and the UN
Security Council on Thursday, the agreement calls
for improvements for the Africans on several fronts,
including immediately increased representation in
the Rhodesian parliament once both governments rat-
ify the accord. By a complicated formula, the Af-
rican seats would eventually reach parity with those
of the whites, but the addition of seats that might
tip the balance in the Africans' favor would require
a two-thirds vote of the parliament in Salisbury and
hence be subject to an effective white veto.
We expect that opposition will center on
this ultimate veto and on the prolonged
period for building African representation
up to parity. Although the new provisions
are to be entrenched in Rhodesia's consti-
tution so that they cannot legally be re-
moved without African, as well as white,
approval, African opinion is generally
skeptical of the value of such safeguards
without outside enforcement. Hence, most
African states are almost certain to op-
pose any British effort to remove UN sanc-
tions, and the Communist permanent members
of the Security Council can be expected to
veto any formal move to end them.
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CUBA-ECUADOR
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NOTES
East Germany: Yesterday's re-election of Ul-
bricht as chairman of the Council of State implies
that party chief Honecker believes he will need the
older man in this ceremonial position to preserve
an image of stability in a time of great change.
Honecker may also believe that Ulbricht's voice can
make an impact on Soviet leaders, who have been
pressing for an early agreement with West Germany.
Honecker is still clearly in command, however, and
he used the elections to move himself and his dep-
uty into places on the Council of State that were
formerly held by Ulbricht's proteges.
Uruguay: President Pacheco's backing of Agri-
culture Minister Bordaberry has made him the favor-
ite in tomorrow's general elections, even though
Bordaberry has little personal political following.
The traditional opposition Blanco party poses the
only serious country-wide challenge to the incum-
bent Colorados, but in Montevideo the Communist-led
Frente Amplio has concentrated a massive publicity
campaign and could win in the mayoralty contest.
are concerned that the Tupamaros
may be planning another major jail break to embar-
rass Pacheco, who has been stressing the law-and-
order theme.
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Top Secret
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