THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 24 NOVEMBER 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992990
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: November 24, 1971

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The President's Daily Brief
24 November 1971
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
24 November 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Developments in the Indian-Pakistani confrontation
along the borders of East Pakistan are reported on
Page 1.
On Page 2 we comment on the Soviet party central
committee's two-day session, including its minimal
changes of the composition of ?top leadership bodies.
The latest satellite photography shows no additional
silos of the new type at ICBM complexes, but provides
some further details on silo construction. (Page 3)
Recent photography also shows the Chinese Communists
have installed missile tubes in their G-class sub-
marine. (Page 4)
The Communists' seasonal logistics push through the
Laos panhandle is now under way. (Page 5)
At Annex, we present an appraisal of Communist in-
tentions in Indochina during the coming winter months.
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BAY OF BENGAL
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INDIA-PAKISTAN
Both Indian and Pakistani radio broadcasts are
reporting continued fighting along the borders of
East Pakistan in Jessore and Sylhet districts. Their
claims are contradictory, however, and the degree of
Indian Army participation remains unclear. The Pak-
istanis say that Indian troops are spearheading the
drives and have launched?a new offensive into Comilla
District. The Indians insist that the Mukti Bahini
alone are conducting the campaigns and are scoring
new successes in Rangpur and Khulna districts. In-
dian leaders are still denying adamantly that Indian
troops have crossed the border.
In a meeting with Ambassador Farland yesterday,
President Yahya Khan, while "visibly tense," indi-
cated that he was not yet prepared to take the bor-
der issue before the UN Security Council and would
not do so, in any event, for the next several days.
Yahya seems to be still casting about for
a way out of his dilemma in East Pakistan.
He has summoned both the Bengali governor
of the East and leading West Pakistani poi-
itieian Z. A. Bhutto for talks allegedly
intended to speed up the formation of a
civilian government. It is unlikely, how-
ever, that the guerrillas will settle for
any 11th-hour solution short of immediate,
full independence.
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USSR
The party central committee, in its two-day session
in Moscow, made minimal changes in the composition
of the top ruling bodies. Mikhail SoZomentsev, who
replaced Gennady Voronov as premier of the Russian
Republic last July, was elevated to candidate mem-
bership in the politburo and was, at the same time,
released from his former job on the party secretar-
iat. Voronov, however, was not removed from the
politburo despite the fact that he now holds an in-
significant post which does not warrant representa-
tion on the top policy-making body.
Voronov may owe his present reprieve at least partly
to the efforts of his politburo colleagues to keep
Brezhnev from completely dominating the decision-
making process. Over the years, Brezhnev has been
able to put his own supporters into the politburo
and secretariat and to maneuver critics, such as
Voronov and AZeksandr SheZepin, into positions of
little power. Matters have stopped there, however,
and no one has been removed from the politburo since
Brezhnev became party chief in 1964.
The central committee approved the five-year plan,
accepted last month by the politburo, and discussed
a report by Brezhnev on recent conduct of foreign
policy, but the terse announcements gave no details
of either of these plenum activities. Some indica-
tion of the thrust of Brezhnev 's remarks may be re-
flected in the Supreme Soviet session which opens
today. The main business of the session will be
the adoption of the five-year plan and next year's
plan and budget.
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, Derazhnya
\ A 4+11
? ail
Frvomaysk
Ajedrovo
MOSCOW I A Kostroma
A *A Pi ?
Kolersk Teykovo ?Yur'ye
ICBM Complexes
? SS-7, SS-8
0 SS-9
A ss-ii
II SS-13
4""x Location of new
type silo
Zatishchevo
Yoshkar-Ola
Perm'
A oVerkhnyaya Saida
? Tyumen'
Kartaly Shadrinsk
. 0 ?001
Dombarovskty0 ? Omsk
? Italica
AGladkaya
'men' Gastelloo Novosibirsk. 0 ittr ASvobodniy
? 4..?vyanaya A AOlovyannaya
0 Aleysk
Tyuratam,Missile Zhangiztobe
Test Center
552170 11-71 CIA TCS 886692/71
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USSR
The latest satellite photography shows no addi-
tional new-type missile silos or test corings at
ICBM complexes. The current total of new-type silos
at SS-9 installations remains 25--five each at five
complexes. There are still six groups, each with
11 new-type silos, under construction at Derazhnya
and Pervomaysk where SS-11s are deployed (along with
a few MRBMs and IRBMs). However, what appear to be
extra large silo liner segments, seen earlier near
one of the silos at Derazhnya, are now seen at one
silo in each group of the new-type silos at both
Derazhnya and Pervomaysk. In addition, extra large
segments have been seen near three silos at the SS-9
complexes--two at one complex and one at another.
No new groups of ICBM silos are known to
have been started since March 1971. The
last silos filling out the groups begun
earlier were started in July 1971.
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Chinese G-Class Ballistic Missile Submarine
at Hsiao-ping-tao
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COMMUNIST CHINA
Recent photography of the Hsiao-ping-tao naval
base in northeast China shows that new missile tubes
have been installed in China's G-class ballistic mis-
sile submarine.
China assembled its only G-class submarine
between 1962 and 1964 from components sup-
plied by the USSR. No missiles for the
submarine have ever been observed and the
original missile tubes--presumably designed
for Soviet missiles--were removed between
late 1968 and early 1969. Observation of
the G-class early this year suggested that
additional modifications were under way.
The installation of new missile tubes in-
dicates that Peking is seeking to develop
a submarine launched ballistic missile sys-
tem, and suggests that the 0-class sub-
marine is intended to serve as a test plat-
form for such a missile.
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Increased Truck Activity
Ban Karai
Pass
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NOTE
Indochina: The Communists have begun their an-
nual logistics push in the Laotian panhandle1
of truck traffic doubled in the pas
week, reaching the highest level since the end of
the last dry season. Most of the traffic currently
is concentrated from the passes where the roads enter
from North Vietnam southto Tchepone. With the pan-
handle roadnet?generally in excellent condition, and
with good weather continuing, we should expect to
see truck activity increase and spread southward
during the coming weeks. Last year the logistics
"offensive" also began about this time.
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108 110
Demilitarized Zone
Tri
a Nogg
MR 1
THAILA
WarM Chamrap ?
ng Ngai
ui Nhon
Tonle
Sap
K pong Cham
ARVN
offensive
MR 2
rang
4AA7.1 H
KMN
TUONG
VINH
ONG
ho
K 8hi
ung Tau
Capital Special Zone
GULF OF
AN
XUYEN
104
MR 4
MR 3
116 ig
SOUTH
CHINA
% SEA
SOUTH VIETNAM
MILES
16-
14-
12-
10 ?
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COMMUNIST INTENTIONS IN INDOCHINA
(WINTER 1971-1972)
The beginning of the dry season finds the Indochi-
nese Communists concerned about their declining
ability to expand international support of their
cause. They have lost the propaganda initiative to
the US with President Nixon's announcement of
planned visits to Peking and Moscow. They are now
continually in need of reassurance of the loyalty
of the USSR and China and edgy about the possibil-
ity of a great-power settlement of the Indochina
war "behind their backs." The seven-point peace
plan they offered last summer not only has so far
failed to put the US on the defensive, but, to
Hanoi, it appears that pressures on the US for an
accommodation on Communist terms have actually de-
clined. In the military sphere, the Communists
have been unable to exploit the large-scale with-
drawals of US troops from Vietnam.
The Communists are not without resources, however.
Their building of ,a major military threat to Phnom
Penh strengthens our belief that the Communists
intend to try for some signficiant psychological
gains during this dry season. They would hope to
project an image of strength, capability, and de-
termination to fight in Indochina, regardless of
US air and material support for their enemies.
They clearly would use the impact of any spectacu-
lar victory to press their cause for total US with-
drawal from the area.
Cambodia: The First Thrust
Hanoi may believe Cambodia will yield the most lu-
crative psychological and military gains in the im-
mediate weeks to come. The North Vietnamese seem
to reason that a series of defeats inflicted on
friendly forces in this theater, where operations
are still relatively easy for the Communists and
where world press coverage is plentiful, would im-
pact hard against US policy not only on Cambodia
but also on Vietnam.
Battlefield reports during the recent Communist at-
tacks on the Chenla forces north of Phnom Penh
indicated that enemy troops were fighting with :a
ferocity inconsistent with the military objective
of inhibiting future' Cambodian advance toward Commu-
nist base areas and supply routes in northeastern
Cambodia. The Communist troops may have been trying
to administer a serious drubbing to their opponents
in order to shatter the Cambodian Government's mo-
rale while simultaneously drawing a press reaction
that would play up their continued strength and
prowess.
(continued)
Al
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The subsequent movement of at least two--and pos-
sibly three--enemy main force regiments into a posi-
tion directly threatening Phnom Penh smacks largely
of a move designed for psychological effect. The
Communists really have little to gain militarily
from an assault on the city, but for public impact
penetration of the capital or even an extended siege
would almost certainly attract much attention from
the world press. The chances of a successful Com-
munist attack into Phnom Penh will decline the
longer the Cambodians have to prepare defenses.
Nonetheless, the Communists still appear to be in
a good position to maintain for some time a credi-
ble threat to the capital, at a relatively cheap
military cost. Aerial observers report the enemy
is preparing fortified positions not far from the
city.
In the immediate future at least, the offensive of
South Vietnamese units in eastern Cambodia around
Route 7 will not relieve the Communist pressure on
Phnom Penh. Enemy units near the city were not
drawn from areas of eastern Cambodia where the ARVN
will be operating. It is possible, however, that
the South Vietnamese attack will draw to the east
the 9th North Vietnamese Division from its opera-
tions against Cambodian troops in the Chenla II
area. Some Cambodian units could then be freed for
use around Phnom Penh.
South Vietnam: A Harder Nut to Crack
The Communists probably anticipated that the South
Vietnamese would move into Cambodia to help take
the pressure off friendly forces. There is some
evidence that the Communists
believe this move will open opportunities for them
to attack in the Military Region 3 area around
Saigon. Such opportunities are restricted, however,
to the border areas of Military Regions 1, 2, and 3.
Communist elements, moving mostly from border sanc-
tuaries, can still concentrate in multiregimental
strength and enjoy the advantage of short, relatively
secure supply lines for limited operations. In the
past, Communist operations in the border areas--pri-
marily sieges of friendly military strongpoints--
have often been depicted by much of the world press
as reflecting continuing enemy strength and resolute-
ness, without regard for the fact that such opera-
tions have had little enduring impact on the secu-
rity of South Vietnam. A Communist campaign in the
border sectors should be expected again during the
coming dry season, particularly in the early months
of 1972 when the weather favors such military opera-
tions in Military Regions 1 and 2, and when supplies
and replacements coming through the Lao panhandle
will be in place.
(continued)
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? Government-held location
? Communist-held location
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MILES
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The allies received a foretaste of the border foray
strategy last month when the enemy attacked with
two divisions in the Krek - Tay Ninh Province bor-
der area. They hoped, according to a wide variety
of sources, to score a victory over reacting South
Vietnamese forces that would severely undercut
claims of success for Vietnamization. Instead, the
Communists took a notable beating and the South Viet-
namese seem to have emerged from the fray with in-
creased confidence. These two divisions must now
hold off the new South Vietnamese venture into Cam-
bodia.
Aside from military actions, a terrorist action of
low cost but high psychological value against a
target such as the US Embassy or MACV military head-
quarters cannot be ruled out at any point.
Laos
The North Vietnamese regard control of the Plaine
des Jarres as the keystone of ?their strategy in
north Laos, and they have expended considerable ef-
fort to prevent permanent erosion of their control.
Since the Communists do not now hold the Plaine
they will almost certainly attempt to recapture it.
The Communists are now moving men and supplies to-
ward this area. The build-up is considerably larger
this ?year than last, probably because the govern-
ment has more forces at its disposal in stronger
positions and because in contrast to the last dry
season the North Vietnamese must regain the Plaine
before they can push toward Long Tieng.
The chances are better than even that the Commu-
nists will also hit hard in the next few months in
the BoZovens area of south Laos. The government
has made substantial gains there during the rainy
season, retaking Saravane, Paksong, and now the
logistics center at Ban Phone, The Communists will
almost certainly try to get these towns back, both
to forestall further government inroads into the in-
filtration corridor and to open an alternate suppZy
route along the eastern edge of the BoZovens. In
the eastern panhandle there is evidence that Hanoi
fears another substantial' ground incursion into the
corridor this year by allied ground forces and is
strengthening its forces in the area to meet such a
challenge.
The Balance Sheet
However much Hanoi may be convinced that it must
show Communist military muscZe, its means for doing
so are slimmer than in the past. Troop replace-
ments for Communist forces in Cambodia and South
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Vietnam have not fully kept pace with attrition
during the past year. Overall, the enemy faces the
coming dry season with troop strength perhaps five
to ten percent below last year when its operations,
by military standards, failed to make significant,
lasting gains in South Vietnam. Communist forces
are still feeling a severe supply pinch. US ground
force strength is of course rapidly declining but
by contrast, the supplies, manpower, morale, and
combat readiness of friendly forces in Indochina,
on the whole, are slightly improved over last year.
If Hanoi does achieve some sort of military victory,
the North Vietnamese will want to exploit it in the
political sphere. With Le Due Tho heading back to
Paris it seems certain that the North Vietnamese
plan to try to refocus Western attention on their
demands. We have noticed some hints that a new
political formula might be forthcoming in Paris,
but recent propaganda statements from Hanoi so far
leave the regime committed to the seven points. In
public, the North Vietnamese have recently been more
explicit about their demands for a complete termina-
tion of every type of American military involvement
in Indochina--a position that takes them back to
some of their harder-Zine periods of the past. If
they could pull off a few ostentatious military
successes, there would be even more reason to ex-
pect them to continue to hold a hard negotiating
position.
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