THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 16 NOVEMBER 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992976
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: November 16, 1971

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010100150001-8
The President's Daily Brief
16 November 1971
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010100150001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010100150001-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
16 November 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
On Page 1 we discuss the initial reaction noted in
Hanoi radio broadcasts to the President's announce-
ment of further US troop withdrawals.
Cambodian forces along Route 6 have been ordered to
reorganize and consolidate positions they now hold.
(Page 2)
The French are preparing to launch a third nuclear-
powered ballistic missile submarine in early Decem-
ber. (Page 3)
Two more Soviet TU-16s have flown to Egypt and have
been identified as missile configured. (Page 4)
The West Germans
(Page 5)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010100150001-8
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010100150001-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NORTH VIETNAM
Initial reaction from Hanoi radio broadcasts to the
announcement of further US troop withdrawals suggests
that the Communists may have expected the President
to change US policy. There was a note of disappoint-
ment in the North Vietnamese broadcasts, which al-
leged that the President failed to offer any "deci-
sive change.. .at all." The Communists charged that
the US plans to continue indefinitely its Vietnam-
ization program, its air war, and its support of the
Thieu government. They implied that the US could
not expect the Communists to agree to any restraint
on the level of their military operations in South
Vietnam in exchange for a further reduction of the
US military effort.
The broadcasts emphasized that the Vietnamese Commu-
nists' seven-point proposal remains the cornerstone
of their demands for a negotiated settlement. In an
apparent reference to the President's plans to visit
Peking and Moscow, they complained that the US
planned to carry out the "dirty trick" of conducting
"diplomatic activities" through other channels aside
from Paris.
The Communists reiterated their contention that the
US must agree to points one and two before a nego-
tiated settlement is possible. As usual, the broad-
casts were vague on the other five, however, implying
they may be negotiable. Point one calls for the
withdrawal of all US and allied military personnel
and materiel from Vietnam and the cessation of mil-
itary action by these forces within Vietnam. Point
two demands an end to US military aid and political
backing for Thieu so that a coalition regime can be
established.
There was no hint in the Communists' broadcasts that
they plan to make any concession on the matter of US
prisoners of war. In fact, the broadcasts left the
impression that Hanoi believes US prisoners may be-
come even more important as a negotiating card in
any future arrangement on ending the US role in
Vietnam.
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010100150001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010100150001-8
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010100150001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010100150001-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CAMBODIA
Prime Minister Lon Nol, after meeting with his
field commanders, has ordered the forces along Route
6 to reorganize and consolidate positions the gov-
ernment still controls.. The two columns of the?
Chenla II task force--each'with about 100.00 troops--
will become two separate operational commands.
Chenla-north is to hold anddefend the towns of
Baray and Rompong Thmar, and Chenla-south will be
responsible for the security of Tang ..1