THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 5 NOVEMBER 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992956
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: November 5, 1971

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A610100-050001-9
The President's Daily Brief
5 November 1971
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
5 November 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS '
In Indochina, the movement of North Vietnamese
troops through the infiltration pipeline increased
in October. (Page 1)
The French
(Page 2)
In Chile
(Page 3)
North Vietnam is reinforcing its troops in north
Laos in preparation for the coming dry season
offensive. (Page 4)
The Chilean Army High Command reportedly has de-
cided to reject a Soviet military credit. (Page 4)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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North Vietnamese Infiltration Starts*
40,
30,
20,
10,
DUO
000
000
DR Y
1
SEASON
.
I
I
DRY
I
SEASON
I
II
DRY SEASON
'I
..
i ' 1
I i
i
I
1
,I
,
,I
Totals
bou
,
for 1968
7d for South
and
Vietnam
1
II
1969
II.
'nclude
only; those
I
troops
fori I '
1 ;
. .
I
.
1970
South
Lao
and 1971 include troops bound
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Southern
.
, , I
1
for
... .,
I
11
000
,
i 1
I
; ' I
South Vietnam,
Cambodia, and '?
L
Southern Laos ...??
0
i; '1 '
;
1
,i
1
, I
I
I(I
[i
p
II ,
,
1
So Laos
NE Camb
ia
1968
1968 SVN
1969 SVN
1969
1970 SVN, So Laos/
Cambodia, NE Cam
and Southern
Laos
1970
1971 SVN,
Cambodia,
and Southern
Laos
1971
So Laos/
NECarr1
JAN
21,000
19,200
13,700 100
1,000
1,700
FEB
18,900
25,000
11,700
5,000
8,400
MA A
32,600
17,100
10;600 ---
3,000
----
APR
38,900
2,300
3,600 700
12,500
800
MAY
32,800
1,100
4,900 700
12,500
1,300
JUN
23,500
100
2,100 900
1,500
--
JUL
21,800
100
4,100 700
--
AUG
11,000
600
4,400 3,300
100
-
SEP
2,200
600
1:3;800 10,200
100
100
OCT
2,800
4,500
17,100 3,700
:2,500
1,900
.
iNOV
5.,200
7,800
18,400 2,600
DEC
30,100
6,200
11,400 2,800
*Because most infiltrating personnel moving south after January 1971 were detected outside of North Vietnam, these
data .have been adjusted to reflect probable starting Oates into the system.
552074 11-71 CIA
?
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
INDOCHINA
North Vietnamese intercepts indicate that at
least nine infiltration groups including as many as
2,500 men started south in October. Of these, ap-
proximately 600 are bound for South Vietnam, most
to an area just below the Demilitarized Zone. The
remaining 1,900 troops are headed for southern Laos
and northeastern Cambodia to augment logistic and
combat forces along the infiltration corridor.
It is likely that the number of men bound
for duty in the corridor is greater than
that reflected in communications. The
group numbering system suggests that an-
other seven groups, totaling up to 4,000
troops, have already started south, bound
for this area. This movement is contin-
uing into early November with one new
group of 500 men entering the system thus
far.
The flow of infiltrators resumed later
this year than in 1970, when large num-
bers of troops began moving south during
September. Most of those, however, were
combat troops sent to southern North
Vietnam to bolster forces there in antic-
ipation of allied attacks into Laos. The
location of three Communist divisions
just north of the Demilitarized Zone makes
a similar move unnecessary this year.
This force could respond quickly to any
threat in southern Laos or northern South
Vietnam.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
FRANCE
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CHILE
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HE P ESIDENT ONLY
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LAOS
ARCA TION
\LINE'
52075 11-71
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTES
Laos: Intercepts show that at least nine North
Vietnamese.infiltration,groups are entering north
Laos in. preparation for the coming dry season,offen-
sive. When the new personnel (a minimum of 1,700
men and probably considerably more) arrive, the North
Vietnamese forcearound the Plaine des:Jarres is ex-:
pected to total two divisions plus two. or three sup-
port regiments. Last year, when the North Vietnamese_
held.the Plaine, they did not begin sending.rein-
forcements until January, and then only one regiment.
The departure of reinforcements now suggests that
Hanoi plans.to begin an offensive earlier than last
year. It also suggests that the North Vietnamese
realize that Vang?Pao's forces are stronger and bet-
ter deployed and supported than they were when the
Communists pushed them off the Plaine in February
1970.
Chile-USSR:
the Chilean Army High Command has decided to reject
the $50-million Soviet military, credit
Tne generals are said to base their rejec?
tion on difficulty of obtaining spare parts and on
the grounds that the government's political orien-
tation could change. President Allende may in ef-
fect have scotched the deal when he publicly denied
on 18 October that a Soviet military credit had been
offered.
USSR-Cuba:
The Soviet naval
task group now visiting Cuba remains in port in
Havana.
Pakistan: President Yahya has told Ambassador
Farland that he expects the treason trial of Paki-
stani leader Mujibur Rahman to run for "some time
yet." Yahya said the prosecution had already pre-
sented 66 witnesses and still had many more to call
before the defense begins its case.
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Top Secret
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