THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 26 OCTOBER 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992938
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: October 26, 1971

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010000230001-0
The President's Daily Brief
26 October 1971
46
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010000230001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010000230001-0
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
26 October 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
The Indians and. Pakistanis have traded charges of
responsibility for incidents along the East Pakistan
border, while President Yahya is reported to have
asked U Thant to visit the subcontinent. (Page 1)
North Vietnam has made several major improvements in
its air defense system. (Page 2)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
INDIA-PAKISTAN
The tempo of activity along the East Pakistan
border appears to be increasing. The Indians con-
tinue to accuse the Pakistanis of shelling small
towns along the province's eastern border. Radio
Karachi, in turn, has alleged that the Indians fired
some 2,200 shells into East Pakistan border villages
yesterday.
President Yahya has asked Secretary-General
Thant to visit the subcontinent immediately and has
suggested that UNobservers oversee mutual troop
withdrawals in the border areas, according to press
reports.
This proposal is unlikely to generate much
enthusiasm in New Delhi. U Thant *last
week offered his good offices to mediate
the dispute, but initial Indian and Soviet
responses seem generally negative. India,
with Soviet support, has opposed any UN
activity that could be construed as placing
responsibility for the crisis equally on
the shoulders of New Delhi and Islamabad.
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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162
CHINA
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552022 10-71 CIA
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NORTH VIETNAM
North Vietnam has made several major improve-
ments in its air defense system in the past few
months. These include the establishment of ground
controlled intercept radar sites at Moc Chau west
of Hanoi and at Ba Don in the southern panhandle,
the partial rehabilitation of Dong Hoi airfield fur-
ther south, and an increase in fighter strength
through the return of 32 MIG-17s from China since
September. Hanoi has also sought to improve pilot
proficiency through numerous air intercept exercises
and has stationed additional surface-to-air missile
and antiaircraft artillery units in the panhandle.
Recent air activity has reflected these meas-
ures. The MIG-21 that attempted to engage a US B-52
bomber near Tchepone the night of 4 October used the
Dong Hoi field and guidance from a senior ground
controller at the Ba Don radar site. Although the
mission was unsuccessful it was well executed. A
MIG-19 operation against a US aircraft near Samneua
on 13 October similarly made use of the Moc Chau ra-
dar site. On 19 October the six MIG-21s that moved
to Bai Thuong, Quang Lang, and Vinh airfields were
put on standby for another mission, according to in-
tercepts. Like the mission on the 4th, this one may
be aimed at engaging a B-52 over southern Laos.
All of these measures may well point to
more aggressive activity during the up-
coming dry season. With the transfer of
the MIG-17s from China, North Vietnam now
has over 200 MIGs, the highest number ever
present. The movement from China appears
intended to free the more advanced MIG-21s
to be sent to the more active southern
area.
The AAA and SAM buildup in the panhandle
is also unprecedented in scope. There are
now elements of six SAM regiments between
Thanh Hoa and the DMZ and 17 AAA reaiments
in Quana Binh Province alone.
part of this force will pro-
ceed into Laos--one SAM unit has already
moved through the Ban Karai Pass. The re-
cent creation of a new air defense divi-
sion in Quang Binh Province, with author-
ity extending into adjacent areas of Laos,
should improve command over these AAA
and SAM units and ensure closer coordina-
tion with other North Vietnamese elements
in the area.
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010000230001-0
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Top Secret
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