THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 23 OCTOBER 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992934
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: October 23, 1971

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The President's Daily Brief
23 October 1971
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
23 October 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Indian saber-rattling is continuing, apparently
still with the hope of pushing Islamabad toward a
settlement with the East Pakistanis. (Page 1)
The abrupt return of the Chinese charge d'affaires
in New Delhi to Peking has touched off speculation
about a possible warming of Sino-Indian diplomatic
relations. (Page 2)
(Page 4)
The more moderate fedayeen leaders may be moving
toward the view that they settle with Jordan on
King Husayn's terms. (Page 5)
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INDIA-PAKISTAN
In the last several days a number of high-
ranking Indian officials have clearly stated that
India will not withdraw troops from border areas
until Pakistan gives some indication of moving
toward a settlement with the Bengalis that will
permit a return of the refugees. New Delhi has
not accepted the US-originated proposal for a
mutual troop withdrawal from the border, claiming
that such a move is logistically simple for Paki-
stan but difficult for India, which normally bases
some of its key units hundreds of miles from the
border.
Lack of progress in finding a solution
to the crisis is causing Indian offi-
cials increasingly to view war as almost
inevitable, but New Delhi may still have
hopes that saber-rattling will force Is-
lamabad to seek a political settlement
with the East Pakistanis. The Indians
may also be waiting for the insurgency
in East Pakistan to gain momentum. Day-
light sabotage in Dacca this week is a
new development and may be a harbinger
of the anticipated fall offensive.
In a conversation on Thursday with Ambassador
Farland, the civilian director of Pakistan's Intel-
ligence Bureau, N. A. Razvi, said he had changed
his view, of the likelihood-of an outbreak of hos-
tilities. Two weeks ago, he said, he believed
there was a 50-50 chance; now he believes there is
a 60-percent-chance that "India's provocations"
will bring abouta war with Pakistan. Razvi/
observed that while it was
not in Pakistan's Interest to engage in war with
India, the Pakistanis would fight "to a man" to
defend their homeland.
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COMMUNIST CHINA - INDIA
The Chinese charge' d'affaires in New Delhi has
returned to Peking abruptly. His trip has touched
off a new set of rumors1
that Sino-Indian relations are?
about to be raised to the ambassadorial level for
the first time since the early 1960s.
The Indians have dropped several hints
during the past few months that they wish
to improve relations with China. They no
doubt hope that an improvement in rela-
tions will reduce Pakistani intransigence
over East Pakistan.
The Chinese have so far maintained a "cor-
rect" and largely hands-off attitude toward
events on the subcontinent, avoiding public
actions or statements that might exacerbate
the situation. They have been careful to
keep the door open to India. Subtle signs
that the Chinese were not averse to an im-
provement of relations with New Delhi were
apparent well before the East Pakistani
crisis erupted, and they have not been
absent in recent months. China has in-
vited an Indian ping-pong team to Peking
next month, and the Chinese have maintained
public silence on the Indo-Soviet treaty
signed last August,
China would weigh carefully the political
returns from improved relations with India
against the likelihood of Pakistani resent-
ment and the danger that a gesture toward
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India would be interpreted in New Delhi
as a "green light" for military measures
against Pakistan. Nevertheless, Peking's
handling of the crisis on the subcontinent
thus far suggests that it may well be re-
ceptive to Indian overtures, if they are
made. The Chinese may calculate ?that
better relations with New Delhi will help
them neutralize Soviet influence in India
while enabling Peking to counsel restraint
both to the Indians and to the Pakistanis.
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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS
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NOTES
Jordan-Fedayeen: Except for the most radical
groups, the fedayeen seem to be moving toward a
consensus that they must accept King Husayn's terms
if they are to survive as a movement. Pressed in
varying degrees by Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and
Lebanon to take such a position, they may be on
their way to being convinced that they must accept
a bad bargain now if they are ever to rebuild a
state-within-a-state in Jordan. We believe Fatah
leader Yasir Arafat is telling the Soviets something
along these lines during his current visit to Mos-
cow. We also believe he is asking for direct ship-
ments of arms for the reunified fedayeen movement
that he is predicting will emerge. The Soviets are
unlikely to change their policy of providing arms
to the fedayeen only through the radical Arab gov-
ernments.
Cuba-Chile:
France/
,L A reassessment of French polit-
ical, economic, and cultural interests in both North
and South Vietnam is now under way. Pompidou does
not seem to have abandoned the long-time Gaullist
aim of trying to play a significant' role in an In-
dochinese settlement and thus undoubtedly sees a
certain value in cultivating relations with both
sides. France has made no moves on the Vietnamese
question since its call in April 1970 for a recon-
vening of the Geneva conference.
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