THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 16 OCTOBER 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992922
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: October 16, 1971

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010000150001-9
The President's Daily. Brief
16 October 1971
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
16 October 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
North Vietnam has not yet commented on President
Nixon's planned visit to the USSR, but recent visits
to Hanoi by top Chinese and Soviet officials may
have given the North Vietnamese some reassurance
regarding Peking's and Mosdow's intentions. (Page 1)
Moscow has begun to hint that a warming of Soviet-
Japanese relations could lead to Soviet concessions
on disputed islands seized from Japan after World
War II. (Page 2)
Kosygin's visit to Canada reflects Moscow's efforts
to cultivate the more independent-minded nations.
(Page 4)
Controversy over China is expected to dominate the
Japanese Diet session starting today. (Page 5)
In Chile, a number of military officers are said to
be expressing discontent with Allende's government.
(Page 6)
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NORTH VIETNAM - USSR - CHINA
Hanoi has so far failed to comment on President
Nixon's planned visit to the Soviet Union. The only
response has come from a Viet Cong spokesman in Paris,
who minimized the trip's importance by claiming that
it was a matter between the US and the Soviet Union.
Hanoi has never commented directly on the President's
China trip, but for several weeks following the an-
nouncement its propaganda was filled with statements
indicating suspicion of a Chinese sellout.
The Vietnamese currently may well feel some measure
of reassurance concerning both Peking's and Moscow's
intentions as a result of recent visits to Hanoi by
a Chinese politburo delegation and by President Pod-
gorny. Both visits produced substantial aid grants
as well as pledges of support for Vietnamese terms
for a war settlement. The new Chinese aid commit-
ment could amount to at least the $225 million sup-
plied in the peak year of 1967--a considerable in-
crease from the estimated 1970 total of $180 million.
Soviet comments suggest that Moscow's aid for 1972
will at least match this year's $400-million commit-
ment.
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?
Northern
Territories
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PACIFIC
STATUTE MIT 370
551986 10-71
?
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR-JAPAN
Moscow has begun to hint that a warming of So-
viet-Japanese relations could lead to Soviet con-
cessions on the disputed Northern Territories--the
islands which the USSR seized from Japan after World
War II. Japan's claim to these islands has been a
major stumbling block to improved relations with
the USSR.
The hints which have persuaded some Japanese
that Moscow is serious include:
--The assertion by the chairman of the Japanese
Communist Party, following a trip to Moscow
last month, that Soviet politburo member Suslov
promised to give "serious consideration" to the
territorial problem.
--A comment by a Japanese Embassy official in
Washington that Suslov's remarks were only the
latest indication of a possible change in the
Soviet position.
--The statement of a Soviet Foreign ministry
official in mid-September to a Western diplomat
in Moscow that the USSR was prepared to go a
"long way" to solve the problem.
There are other signals from Moscow, however,
which suggest that these hints of flexibility are
?not to be taken at face value. Last August polit-
buro member Mazurov invoked Moscow's traditional
position that the issue "already had been solved,"
and Gromyko took a similar position in his recent
discussion at the UN with a former Japanese foreign
minister.
There is indeed reason to question Soviet
willingness to return the islands. The
Soviets are very reluctant to surrender
any territory, in part because they fear
that this would encourage nations such as
China to press their, own claims against
the USSR.
Soviet maneuverings on this issue most
likely reflect Moscow's desire to exploit
the current strains in US-Japanese rela-
tions over economic difficulties and deal-
ings with China. They follow a series of
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
approaches by Soviet diplomats to Japan
last August suggesting that closer ties
between Moscow and Tokyo could counter im-
provements in US-China relations.
Further efforts to entice Japan by hints
of territorial concessions are likely.
The Soviets could, for example, allude to
a deal regarding the islands of Habomai
and Shikotan, most desired by Japan and
not geographically part of the Kurils.
Or they could suggest economic concessions
on the islands that would not involve re-
nunciation of Soviet sovereignty.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR-CANADA
Kosygin's visit to Canada on 17-25 October reflects
Moscow's effort to cultivate the more independent-
minded nations. This, in the Soviet view, includes
Canada, in light of Trudeau's well publicized desire
to diversify Canada's foreign ties. Another factor
is Moscow's interest in balancing the impact of the
Chinese Communist presence in Canada.
The trip is likely to produce agreements of a gen-
eral nature calling for exchanges in economic, cul-
tural, and scientific fields. The Canadians, how-
ever, are expected to reject a friendship treaty
which the Soviets may propose as a follow-up to the
consultation agreement signed during Trudeau's visit
to the USSR last May.
Kosygin will meet with businessmen in several Cana-
dian cities. The Canadians have indicated that Mos-
cow is also pressing for a separate economic agree-
ment, but Ottawa is resisting this idea. Neverthe-
less, Trudeau emphasized in a press conference yes-
terday that both the USSR and Canada are interested
in expanding trade.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
JAPAN-CHINA
The China question will pervade the Diet ses-
sion starting today--formally called to consider
the Okinawa agreement--as factions of Sato's Lib-
eral Democratic Party attempt to manipulate this
issue to enhance their own prospects. Sato has
assumed personal responsibility for support of US
strategy on China's UN seat, and this has increased
his vulnerability to critics seeking a rapid rap-
prochement with the mainland.
At the same time, according to press reports,
a Sato-appointed commission of Diet members has
drafted a resolution that calls for recognition of
the Peking regime as the legitimate government of
China and asserts that Taiwan is part of China.
This proposal is now before the party's leadership.
This resolution would seem to have gone
beyond what Sato had in mind when he
named the commission nearly a year ago
to review Japan's policy toward China.
Th&-members, all of whom are Liberal
Democrats and. generally responsive to
Sato, apparently considered such a de-
parture necessary in order to pre-empt
a stronger multi-party resolution pre-
pared by advocates of. close ties with
Peking.
Communist China, for its part, has been trying
to stimulate domestic pressures on Sato. Early
this month Peking for the first time invited two
prominent Liberal Democrats to visit, and its com-
ment on Sino-Japanese problems has taken an in-
creasingly moderate tone.
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NOTE
Chile: A number of recent reports indicate
?that many military officers are expressing discon-
tent with the Allende government. Some complain
over the effects of current social and economic
programs, while? others object to the latitude given
the Communists and more extreme leftists /
/ Allende
is well aware of the dissatisfaction and almost cer-
tainly will blunt it with such devices as pay raises
and changes of assignment.
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50X1
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Top Secret
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