THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 11 SEPTEMBER 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992856
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: September 11, 1971

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900110001-6
The President's Daily Brief
11 September 1971
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
11 September 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
The latest information on the floods in North
Vietnam is on Page 1.
Cambodia's elitist military force, the Khmer. Krom,
is moving toward a semiautonomous status within
the army, reversing earlier government policy aimed
at its integration. (Page 2)
\Turkish-)
Cyprus. (Page 3)
British/
Persian Gulf7
/ (Page 4)
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NORTH VIETNAM
Photography of 3 September shows flood waters
receding from the region northeast of Hanoi, but-
much land is still inundated.
rail traffic from Communist
China to Hanoi resumed about 1 September, after
approximatelyten days of inactivity due tothe
high:Waters.: Despite public acknowledgment that
further flooding could take place this month-?a
period of usually heavy rains, the Council of Min?
isters has ordered that crops be replanted imme-
diately after the floods recede. The government
has said that the "majority!' of rice fields have
been washed out, and there is concern about. the
sufficiency of seeds for replanting Stockpiles
of. materials for:repairing levees are running
short; however, this problem may be relieved with
the arrival, of supplies now en- route from North
Vietnam's allies
The army has ordered all but combat units to
repair dikes and dams, to assist the people in mak-
ing their homes habitable, and to take preventive
steps against disease. Meanwhile, military supplies
continue to be moved south in preparation for the
usual dry-season efforts to supply enemy forces in
South Vietnam.
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CAMBODIA
Lon Nol has authorized the formation of a high-
level "committee" to coordinate and oversee the op-
erations of the Khmer Krom--the elitist military
force which is built around ethnic Cambodians from
South Vietnam. The committee is headed by a promi-
nent Khmer Krom civilian, but all other key positions
are held by Khmer Krom commanders.
The committee evidently is meant to be the
staff organization for some 14 Khmer Krom
infantry brigades in Cambodia and brings
those units toward a semiautonomous status
within the Cambodian Army, reversing ear-
lier government policy aimed at their in-
tegration. The committee apparently was
set up to alleviate the concern of Khmer
Krom officers over alleged serious short-
comings in Cambodia's use of their units,
including Zack of operational planning,
poor logistic support, and the failure to
clamp down on corruption.
Lon Nol presumably believes that by giving
Khmer Krom units such a wide measure of
military independence he is ensuring that
he will retain their political support.
These units are the government's most ef-
fective fighting force and could strengthen
Lon NoZ's hand if he should decide to re-
sist pressure on him to give up an active
role in the government.
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TURKEY-CYPRUS
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UK - PERSIAN GULF -
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NOTE
Finland-Germany: The four-power agreement on
Berlin, though not yet consummated, may already have
encouraged Finnish President Kekkonen to rethink his
government's position on recognizing East Germany.
The Finnish ambassador to the US has indicated that
Kekkonen will in a speech today announce "a proposal"
concerning recognition of both German states. The
Finns are particularly sensitive to Soviet wishes
and are anxious to host a Conference on European Se-
curity. A precipitous action by Helsinki would have
its effect on other Nordic and neutral states that
may already be leaning in the direction of recog-
nizing East Germany. Any important Finnish move,
moreover, would place pressure on the Brandt govern-
ment to reach a rapid accommodation with East Germany,
enhance the credibility of the domestic opponents of
Brandt's Ostpolitik, and thus increase the vulner-
ability of the Social Democratic - Free Democratic
government.
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Top Secret
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