THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 2 SEPTEMBER 1971

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0005992839
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
12
Document Creation Date: 
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 24, 2016
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Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 2, 1971
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900020001-6 1 The President's Daily Brief 2 September 1971 4 6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900020001-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900020001-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 2 September 1971 PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS On Page 1 we comment on the unusual number of foreign trips that top Soviet leaders will be making over the next few months. The latest satellite photography of the Soviet mis- sile test center at Sary Shagan showed what appears to be a new ABM canister mounted on a new type of support vehicle. (Page 3) Removal of Ky's name from the ballot means that the South Vietnamese presidential election will in ef- fect be a referendum on Thieu's leadership. (Page 4) South Vietnam's Lower House elections went fairly well for Thieu, but he still faces some rough polit- ical sledding against opposition elements. (Page 6) The latest international economic developments are discussed on Page 6. Lanusse is dispatching a personal envoy to Washing- ton to discuss Argentina's desire for massive finan- cial assistance. (Page 7) /South Korea I (Page 8) FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900020001-6 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900020001-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY USSR Top Soviet leaders will be making a number of foreign trips over the next few months. --Gromyko will visit the UN in mid-September. According to Ambassador Dobrynin, Gromyko has no firm dates in mind since he would like to "coordinate" his stay in New York with Secretary Rogers' plans. --Gromyko is coming to Washington 29-30 Septem- ber. --Brezhnev will go to Yugoslavia in late Septem- ber. --Podgorny is to visit Hanoi in early October, and will attend the Shah of Iran's gala in Teheran on 14-15 October. --Kosygin will be in Canada from 18-26 October; this trip will also take him to other countries, among them Algeria. --Brezhnev and Podgorny will go to France at the end of October. --Kosygin is slated to visit Norway in the first half of December. Most of these trips have been in the plan- ning stage for several months and reflect a wide variety of policy objectives. Sev- eral apparently are related to a Soviet effort to inject new life into their di- plomacy as? a means of countering Peking's growing international stature. There are, in fact, reports that several of the coun- tries on the Soviet itineraries will also be hosting delegations from Peking soon. The last time we observed a similar pen- chant for travel was in January 1966, when Brezhnev, Kosygin, and SheZepin were re- spectively in Ulan Bator, Tashkent (to mediate the Indo-Pakistani crisis over Kashmir), and Hanoi. Their common goal at that time was to strengthen Moscow's position in countries near China. (continued) 1 FOR THE PRESIDENT' ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900020001-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900020001-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Related to the Soviet desire to counter the Chinese is Moscow's interest in demon- strating an ability to pursue various mat- ters of substance with the US while imply- ing that such matters outwei h Sino-Ameri- can issues. In the course of their visits the Soviet leaders will certainly try to line up sup- port for various Soviet proposals relating to European security matters. They have been quick to conclude their travel plans after progress was achieved on Berlin?the problem which in the past has blocked the forward movement of Soviet policies in Western Europe. 2 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900020001-6 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900020001-6 50X1 50X1 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900020001-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900020001-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY USSR The latest satellite photography of the Sary Shagan missile test center showed what appears to be a new ABM canister mounted on a new type of ABM support vehicle. The canister and vehicle were pho- tographed at a facility where testing of a new large ABM has been under way since last fall. 50X1 50X1 50X1 3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900020001-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900020001-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY SOUTH VIETNAM The removal of Vice President Ky's name from the presidential election ballot means the election will in effect be a referendum on Thieu s leadership. 50X1 /Thieu may clarify his intent in a national television appear- ance in the next day or so. 50X1 4 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900020001-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900020001-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY SOUTH VIETNAM The government, which weathered last Sunday's Lower House elections fairly well, still faces some rough political sledding against opposition eZements. It seems likely that, as in the past, Thieu will be able to muster enough support in the House to secure passage of all but the most controversial of his legislative requests. Thieu says that about 60 per- cent of the deputies will support him. Only a minor- ity of the incumbents won re-election, however, and the political affiliation of about a fifth of the new deputies is unclear. Hence, the actual politi- cal Zine-up will not be certain until after the House reconvenes in the fall. Political opposition in the Lower House centers on about 25 deputies associated with the An Quang Bud- dhists and may be somewhat larger and more cohesive than in the past. Some of the militant Buddhists charge that Big Minh 's withdrawal from the presiden- tial race discredited the entire election process and justifies demonstrations and other extralegal antigovernment activities. 5 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900020001-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900020001-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS The slowly appreciating yen closed about six percent above the old yen-dollar parity in relatively stable trading yesterday. Japanese financial author- ities have imposed stringent new controls on the for- eign exchange operations of commercial banks to limit fluctuation in the foreign exchange market. Moscow is maintaining the ruble-to-dollar rate, making it necessary to take account of the changing rates of exchange between the dollar and other for- eign currencies. This adjustment of the ruble against other major hard currencies announced yesterday will not affect either the international monetary situation or Soviet foreign trade. The ruble, a nonconvertible currency, is essentially a bookkeeping device. As such, its devaluation will serve only to trans- late correctly into rubles the value of Soviet trade conducted in hard currencies. The deputy finance ministers from five European Community (EC) countries and the US, UK, Canada, Japan, and Sweden will convene tomorrow to discuss multilateral currency realignment prior to the plan- ned meeting ?of the Group of Ten's finance ministers in London in mid-September. The EC Monetary Committee will meet in Brussels today to prepare for the deputies' meeting, but bi- lateral talks between West Germany and France have failed to bring agreement and this will inhibit progress toward a common position. 6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900020001-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900020001-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY ARGENTINA President Lanusse is dispatching a personal envoy to President Nixon in an apparent effort to present his case for US support of his government in the form of $500-600 million in financial as- sistance. Lanusse ?has requested such assistance through embassy channels on several oc- casions in the past two months but has dismissed suggestions that he turn to multilateral sources--such as the Inter- national Monetary Fund--apparently in the belief that he need only present his case strongly enough to obtain what he wants. His rationale is that Argentina serves US interests in the southern part of Latin America where it is a force for stability in an area that includes the Marxist-governed ChiZe, an unsettled Uruguay, and chronically unstable Bolivia, and that the US should, therefore, be willing to help bail the Lanusse govern- ment out of its current economic diffi- culties. The envoy, Dr. Ismael Bruno Quijano, a well- known international lawyer, would tell Ambassador Lodge only that the message he carried was of "transcendental" importance. He said that Lanusse was approaching a decisive period that will deter- mine Argentina's future orientation and interna- tional alignment and that he wanted President Nixon to be fully apprised of these vital decisions. Other matters that Quijano may hope to discuss in Washington are Argentina's request for exemption from the ten-per- cent import tax and the China problem. 7 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900020001-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900020001-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY NOTES South Korea - USSR;/ Pakistan: By appointing A. M. Malik, a Ben- gali a7TITEF, as governor of East Pakistan, Yahya clearly hopes to improve prospects for Bengali co- operation with the government and to lessen foreign criticism of his East Pakistan policy. The out- going governor and martial law administrator, Lieu- tenant General Tikka Khan, is a West Pakistani who has been the focus of charges of army brutality. His successor as martial law administrator, how- ever, is the army commander in the east who has had even more direct authority over the troops. Yahya, in any event, will retain ultimate control. Pakistan:( 8 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900020001-6 Declassified in Part-?Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900020001-6 _ Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900020001-6