THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 28 AUGUST 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992829
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: August 28, 1971

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009800240001-3
The President's Daily Brief
28 August 1971
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Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009800240001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009800240001-3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
28 August 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Satellite photography shows two additional ICBM
silos of the smaller type and five of the larger
type at Soviet operational complexes. (Page 1)
In Cambodia, new strains on government unity will
require Sink Matak's immediate attention when he
returns to Phnom Penh this weekend. (Page 2)
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\Havana has sharply re-
duced its aid to insurgents in Latin America.
International economic developments are reported
on Page 4.
The Soviets are preparing another unmanned lunar
landing mission. (Page 5)
Satellite photography does not show any Soviet mil-
itary activity that could be construed as an immi-
nent threat to Romania. (Page 5)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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USSR
Preliminary analysis of photography
confirms two additional new
ICBM silos of the smaller type and five of the
larger type at operational complexes. There are now
66 of the smaller type and 25 of the large type un-
der construction in the USSR. None were detected at
complexes where they had not been identified earlier.
The smaller silos are at Derazhnya where the
SS-11 is deployed with the SS-4 MRBM, and at Pervo-
maysk where the SS-11 is deployed with the SS-5
IRBM. The larger silos have been identified at five
of the six SS-9 complexes..
Each of the five SS-9 complexes now has five of
the large silos; Derazhnya and Pervomaysk each have
33 of the smaller silos.
Construction continues at a Tyuratam test-facil-
itT which is believed to be involved in the develop-
ment of a. missile for at least one of the new type
of silos. The latest photography of the facility--
where all. versions of the SS-9 were initially tested--
showed what appear to be missile transporters some
80 feet in.length. This is about 20 feet shorter
than transporters seen.there previously. The differ-
ent size suggests a new missile, rather than another.
version-of the SS-9, will be involved.
Analysis of. the photography is continuing and
further details may become available.
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CAMBODIA
A rift between Lon Nol and Chief of State Cheng
Heng is putting a new strain on government unity.
Lon Nol thinks Cheng Heng is the leader of a "third
force" seeking to compromise with Hanoi and Peking.
For his part, Cheng Heng is upset, as are a number
of other officials, over the arbitrary manner in
which Lon Nol has conducted governmental affairs in
Sink Matak's absence.
Matak will have to devote immediate attention,
too, to the dispute between the National Assembly
and? the government? over the regime's lackluster
economic polities:. Lon Nol is trying to avert a
possible no confidence vote by the Assembly against
Finance Minister Sok Chhong or perhaps the entire
government.
If the Assembly should call for Sok
Chhong's resignation, the.rest of the
cabinet would probably favor resigning
also. Matak's influence.would be needed
to dissuade the cabinet from such a
course.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CUBA
Havana has sharply reduced its aid to guer-
rilla-oriented revolutionary movements in
Latin America. The defector's reliability
has not been established and he remains
under study.
training in guerrilla warfare
and other paramilitary subjects is now given only to
small, select groups. Logistical support still con-
tinues to be given to some rebel groups but it is
restricted to very small amounts of arms, ammunition,
and communications equipment. According to the of-
ficial, the turning point in Cuban support to guer-
rillas occurred in early 1968 after Cuban-assisted
rebel groups suffered several reverses. The govern-
ment, thereafter drastically reduced its
aid to national liberation movements and concentrated
on Cuba's pressing domestic problems.
Chile, Peru, Uruguay, Bo-
livia, and Guatemala?in that order--as the most im-
portant Latin American countries to Havana's foreign
policy. Fidel Castro has issued in-
structions to maintain complete cooperation with
Chile at all costs. In Peru no operations are to
be undertaken for fear of upsetting the favorable
trend of events. Cuba considers subversive groups
in Nicaragua, Colombia, and Venezuela too disorgan-
ized, undisciplined, and untrustworthy to merit more
than token support. Except for Mexico, all other
Latin American countries are considered unworthy of
Cuban attention. Mexico is a special case because
it has always been a base for Cuban operations against
other countries; Castro has prohibited operations
against the Mexican Government and assistance to any
Mexican subversive group.
[Castro reassessed
his policy of supporting rebel groups in
early 1968, following the Che Guevara
fiasco in Bolivia the previous year, and
chose to adopt a more realistic foreign
policy. Castro's speeches over the past
two years show clearly that he has empha-
sized the building of special ties with
Chile, Peru, and Bolivia (before the re-
cent coup), and that he is currently more
interested in ending Cuba's isolation than
in "exporting revolution."
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INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
First reports from the Japanese exchange market
this morning indicate the newly floated yen appreci-
ated by 5.2 percent. The governor of the Bank of
Japan told the press that the bank would support the
dollar if the yen appreciated too much. He did not?
indicate at what point the bank would intervene but
private Japanese bankers are predicting that the yen
will be allowed to appreciate by 6 percent. Japa-
nese official reserves now stand at about $12.5 bil-
lion after purchases of $1.8 billion on Thursday and
Friday.
Large gold sales by speculators in European
markets yesterday drove the free market price down
to $41.12 per ounce. This represents a decline of
$1.87 in the past two weeks. Speculators apparently
are beginning to conclude that there is little like-
lihood of an early increase in the official price of
gold. Moreover, the floating of many major curren-
cies favors the chances for a permanent, general re-
alignment of foreign currencies, and this reduces
pressure for an increase in the official dollar
price of gold.
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NOTES
USSR: Preparations are under way for a Soviet
unmanned lunar landing mission using the SL-12
booster; the launch from Tyuratam appears to be
planned for the first week in September. This will
be the first Soviet lunar probe this year. The
mission, like earlier ones, could involve the re-
turn of soil samples or the landing of a sensor-
equipped lunar rover vehicle. Newer and more ad-
vanced scientific experiments are also possible.
Warsaw Pact: Satellite photography through
strengthens the conclusion that there
is no military activity in western USSR that could
be construed as an imminent threat to Romania.
The photography shows no signs of troop concentra-
tions or, alerts. At military installations, there
was no massing of civilian trucks indicative of..
mobilization, nor were there any concentrations Of
military transport aircraft similar to those pho-
tographed prior to the Czech invasion of 1968.
Photography showed preparations then
under way for the exercises now taking place in
'Bulgaria, but there was nothing unusual near the
Bulgarian-Romanian border, and military activity
appeared normal elsewhere in Eastern Europe, in-
cluding Romania.
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Top Secret
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