THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 6 AUGUST 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992791
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: August 6, 1971

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The President's Daily Brief
6 August 1971
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THE PRESIDENT'SDAILY BRIEF
-
6 August 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
On Page 1
Soviets/
The Soviet SALT delegation now says it wants the US
to table a zero-level ABM proposal, a reversal of
Moscow's previous position on the subject. (Page 2)
On Page 4, we comment on some of the objectives Cam-
bodian Prime Minister - delegate Sink Matak may have
in mind as he begins his official visit to the US.
Jordan)
(Page 5)
Islamabad intends to bring East Pakistani leader
Mujib to trial soon. (Page 6)
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USSR
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SALT
Recent remarks by members of the Soviet
SALT team indicate that the Soviet dele-
gation wants the US to table a zero-level
ABM proposal, but that there are sharp
differences of opinion on this subject
among the Soviet delegation members and
probably in Moscow as well.
? Semenov informed Smith on 25 July that he had
come to Helsinki authorized to say that the Soviet
Union would be interested in discussing zero-level
ABM in greater detail to ascertain "if it was a
realistic prospect." On the same day Semenov's dep-
uty, Timerbaev, reiterated Soviet interest in the
zero-level prospect to a member of the US delegation
and suggested that the US introduce a zero-level
proposal.
These approaches constituted a complete
about-face on the subject.. The Soviets
turned down the concept of zero-ABM when
the US advanced it at the last SALT round
in Vienna.
Early this week the Soviet delegation's ranking
military member in Helsinki, General Trusov, told
his American counterpart, General Allison, that an
ABM agreement should not require destruction of ex-
isting systems, and added that the Soviets do not
intend to destroy their Moscow defense. He then
decried the "inequality" of a 3-for-1 or 4-for-1
Safeguard-Moscow trade-off, but said that an offer
to limit US sites to the two "northernmost" at Grand
Forks and Malmstrom would not be as objectionable.
The next day, two senior members of the Soviet
delegation disavowed Trusov's remarks, calling them
"personal" views. They declared that the views and
instructions of the Soviet Government were as con-
veyed by Semenov to Smith, and specifically that the
Soviet delegation expected and awaited a new zero-
level ABM proposal. The Soviets said that within
both delegations and in both capitals there were
"differing views" on such questions as an ABM ban,
and that it was important not to be misled by "par-
allel conversations." The talk indicated that while
the two Soviets were aware that Trusov had been neg-
ative about zero-level ABM, neither of them seemed
to know of Trusov's remarks that a 2-for-1 Safeguard-
Moscow proposal might be negotiable.
(continued)
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This sequence provides added evidence for the point,
made in The President's Daily Brief of 16 July, that
SALT policy is a disputed matter among the Soviets.
It is plausible to suppose that the military is
highly averse to tearing down the Moscow system,
and General Trusov's remarks on a 2-for-1 deal may
represent the fallback position of those who want
to avoid this.
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CAMBODIA
US Charge' Enders in Phnom Penh has reported
some of the objectives Sink Matak has in mind as
he begins his official visit in the US today.
--Enders believes Matak will in all probability
renew Lon Nol's request for US support for put-
ting an additional 50,000 men under arms. The
Cambodians evidently are giving serious thought
to pushing to recapture Kratie city, some 100
miles northeast of Phnom Penh and the most im-
portant urban center in the northeast region.
He may request. US air support for this under-
taking.
Matak and others in the Cambodian Govern-
ment believe that a peace settlement in
Indochina now Zooms as a real possibility.
They are in favor of this (and have in
fact established a high-level committee
to plan for Cambodia's eventual involve-
ment in negotiations), but they fear that
the northeast, which has been in enemy
hands since the summer of 1970, may end
up permanently in communist hands.
--On the economic side, Matak may want to dis-
cuss steps that both governments can take to
speed up Cambodian use of US aid, including
the possibility of untying some more AID funds.
Just before his departure, Matak received
the bad news that Cambodian currency re-
serves dropped precipitously last month.
It may cause him to press his points on
the economy with more urgency.
--Matak probably counts on his visit to help
him strengthen his position.
Although Matak is the nation's most 'able
and decisive administrator, his political
future is still dependent on Lon Nol.
The prime minister, who has had some un-
kind things to say about Matak lately,
appears to be reasserting his position
as the principal spokesman for the gov-
ernment in an increasingly turbulent po-
litical scene.
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JORDAN
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NOTES
Pakistan: Islamabad will_soon bring imprisoned
East Pakistani leader MUiihur Rahman to trial for
treason The case
will be heard by a military court, perhaps as early
as next week. President Yahya told a British news-
man last month that he was determined to go ahead
with an early nonpublic trial. Mujib's martyrdom
would further reduce chances for a political settle-
ment in East Pakistan.
Malta: Prospects appear favorable for an eco-
nomic agreement with Libya following Mintoff's visit
to Tripoli Wednesday. A few days earlier another
Maltese delegation had failed to conclude a pact
when some last-minute hitch appeared. A member
stated that Libya had
requested retueiing rights tor its military aircraft
and naval vessels. Meanwhile, the North Atlantic
Council yesterday made substantial progress toward
putting together a cash package for the British to
offer to Mintoff, although the proposal falls far
short of his demands.
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Top Secret
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