THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 20 JULY 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992761
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: July 20, 1971

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700180001-1
The President's Daily Brief
20 July 1971
14
?Tor5rrt.et-
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700180001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A609700180001-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
20 July 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Hanoi has expressed deep misgivings over the implica-
tions for Vietnam of recent developments in Sino-US
relations. A hard-hitting editorial by the party
daily Nhan Dan serves notice on Peking and Washing-
ton that the North Vietnamese are prepared to go it
alone if necessary and that relaxed tensions between
the two powers will not influence Hanoi to compromise
its position. (Page 1)
Initial Soviet comments on President Nixon's planned
trip to China indicate Moscow's concern that Peking
and Washington are seeking to gain leverage in their
dealings with the USSR. (Page 2)
The military coup in Sudan appears to signal another
turn to the left in that country's volatile political
scene. (Page 4)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700180001-1
50X6
50X6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T0-0936A609700180001-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NORTH VIETNAM
Breaking a three-day silence on last week'S de-
velopments-in Sino-US relations, the North Vietnam-
ese party daily-Nhan Dan yesterday published an un-
usually hard7hitting'e-artorial which sharply criti-
cized "socialist"- nations that respond to Washington
overtures and fall in with the Nixon doctrine. Al-
though it did not. directly mention China or President
Nixon's coming visit, the editorial inveighed against.
?big powers thatgang_up to make small countries do
their bidding.
Hanoi's statement asserted that the Vietnamese
Communists would hold to their present-course and
would not be bound by pacts or arrangements concluded
behind their-backs. The editorial reiterated that
the US could disengage from Vietnam only by coming to
terms with the Vietnamese and no one else: "Nixon
has been running..in search of away out But he
has gone to the wrong place: The exit door has been
opened (i.e., the seVen7point proposal), yet he has.
tumbled into an impasse:"
The statement implied that the Vietnamese are
prepared to go it alone if necessary. It recalled
that through history the Vietnamese by themselves
have defeated successive foreign "imperialists,"
leaving unsaid that the Chinese have been prominent
among them.
North Vietnam's strong reaction and blunt
language probably reflect a reawakening in
Hanoi of latent fears that Vietnamese Com-
munist interests in Indochina could become
enmeshed in big-power politics, as they
were under ,Zess favorable circumstances for
the Viet Minh in 1954. Hanoi may think
that by forcefully and quickly weighing in,
it can deflect any notions the Chinese have
that Vietnamese Communist interests can be
sacrificed to their own. Perhaps more im-
portantly, Hanoi may also hope to make it
clear that Washington cannot count on re-
laxed tensions with Peking to lead Hanoi
into compromises it would otherwise not
make. Moreover, Hanoi probably views last
week's announcements in Washington and Pe-
king as taking the play away from its own
seven points and removing a good deal of
the pressure it felt the Viet Cong proposal
had generated on Washington.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700180001-1
ti
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T0-0936A609700180001-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR-CHINA-US
Initial Soviet comment on President Nixon's planned
visit to China has been sparse, reflecting Moscow's
stunned surprise at a move which it presumably views
as an attempt by both countries to gain leverage in
their dealings with the USSR. The Soviets have not
taken public note of the President's statement that
the development is not directed against any other
nation. We expect soon to see comments along lines
already taken by some of Moscow's East European al-
lies--that the planned visit has "anti-Soviet" over-
tones.
Some Soviet propaganda comments have sought to fan
apprehensions in Hanoi that Washington and Peking are
dealing at North Vietnamese expense. Moscow has sug-
gested that Washington will use the development to
avoid replying to the new Vietnamese Communist nego-
tiating proposal, and has implied that a sellout of
Hanoi's interests is in prospect.
Such attempts to score propaganda points at Peking's
expense, however, cannot obscure a more fundamental
apprehension about the trend of Sino-US relations.
The visit to China this spring of the US table ten-
nis team made a strong impression on the Kremlin,
but Moscow apparently concluded that development of
political contacts would be slow in coming. Moscow
must now be concerned that the new Sino-US move por-
tends an eventual US-Chinese collaboration detrimen-
taZ to Moscow's interests.
The projected visit is unlikely to have any immediate
dramatic impact on Moscow's position on such issues
as arms Zimitations, Berlin, and the Sino-Soviet bor-
der dispute, which have a logic and history of their
own. The Soviets may, however, feel a need to adopt
a firmer stand on contentious issues in order to dem-
onstrate that Sino-US tactics cannot force conces-
sions from the USSR. Over the longer run, Moscow
may begin to feel under increased pressure to be
somewhat more forthcoming in its dealings with either
or both of its rivals in order to forestall a US-
Chinese accommodation.
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700180001-1
c.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700180001-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
JAPAN
50X6
50X6
50X6
50X6
50X6
50X6
50X6
3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700180001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700180001-1
20
?20
LIBYA
lAbeche
-/
CENTRAL
AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
congo DEMO
-0
20
MILES
?
551676 7-71
r-
Al Fashir
-
- Nyala
1ASWAN HIGH DAA4 Aswan '-
UNITED ARAB.RE BUD
Lake
Nasser
350 CATARACT
7- 4T
0
?
-"---Administrative
I boundary
I
urayinah
6
SUDAN ?
' 6T4 CATARACT
Omdurman
I.,- ?
AI 1.1b,aty id?.
Babanusah
\\.Waw.
aBondo ,
'11
RATIC. REPUBLIC
THE
-Kisangani
CONG
200
?
_
5TH CATARACT 1
. 40
/SAUDI
ARABIA
.Jidda,,
'Mecca
Red
Port Sudan
Sawakin
?? Sea
hartoum KU
\
2
? ?d...
?k\
Asmara,.
,
Gondar',
A Lake
Taria
I
E 0 ,.IA
.Gore
? /
10-1
Addis.Abasi?
*X_44-11
/
1002
j
?a2V6i
e ?
LakeAlbel
..1
'---'1 KLyaokgea
. Kampala ,--
.-.
D'o
,
Lake
. i a pr-
---7 Victoria
Ap
'?
I
Lake
Rudolf
1,
G-ANDA
J. KENYA
/
(
Nakuru
Nairobi :tr
40
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19: CIA-RDP79T00936A009700180001-1
C
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00916A009700180001-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SUDAN
A group. of military officers led by a former
member of the ruling Revolutionary Command Council
(RCC), Major Hashim al-Atta, , has overthrown the gov-
ernment. Atta as president of.a new ruling council
announced over the Sudanese radio yesterday that
the former regime had been ousted because it was
dictatOrial. He said that the coup leaders would
cooperate with all democratic and nationalist ele-
ments and create a new government that would "lib-
erate Sudan from an alliance between foreign and
local capitalism." He spoke favorably.ofcontinued
relations With the Soviet Union and indicated Sudan
would strongly oppose Israel and support the cause
of the Palestinian resistance.
The ousted regime of RCC Chairman Numayri
had been in difficulty almost from the
moment it took over in a May 1969 coup.
Frictions between conservative military
officers and left-leaning nationalists
Zed to periodic purges of Communists.
Atta himself, at one time an organizer
for the Sudanese Communist Party, was
purged from the government in late 19703
despite his record as a brilliant officer
and talented technician.
In a bid to gain strong support for the new
government, Atta promised to tackle some of Sudan's
more plaguing problems. For example, he proposed
eventual home rule for southern Sudan, thus holding
out hope for an end to the costly military campaign
to maintain Arab hegemony over the Negro tribes in
that area.
Following Atta's radio address, the Sudan
radio broadcast messages of support from political,
social, and military groups in northern Sudan, and
Radio Baghdad announced Iraqi recognition of the
new government.
4
?
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700180001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700180001-1
SAUDI ARABIA
Kassala
_Asmara
YEMEN
(Sane)
*SANA
YEMEN
(Aden)
'Assab
?.???????.%
T.A.I.
of
LI
JIBOUTI
Dired .w.a
ADDIS ABABA
Hargeisa
etbera
? Lake/
J?ucko1f
V alarm
? \ ?
NAIROBI
,Chisimaio
V
551675 7-71
Mombasa
MOGADISCIO
INDIAN
OCEAN
200
MILES
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700180001-1
Declassified in Pa - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A609700180001-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTES
Lebanon-Fedayeen: The mauling taken by feda-
yeen units in Jordan last week should also make it
easier to keep them in line in Lebanon. Early last
week, the Lebanese Government--which presumably knew
of the imminent Jordanian drive--warned that hence-
forth the army would fire on any local fedayeen who
failed to obey regulations.
Beirut has ordered the guerrillas to
stop at checkpoints, turn over their weapons upon
demand, follow the orders of the southern military
commander, and do nothing that would provoke the
army. With their movement in disarray and with sup-
port waning elsewhere in the Arab world, the guer-
rillas have little choice but to comply.
Communist China - Somalia: Peking will provide
substantial new economic aid to Somalia, perhaps
amounting to as much as $110 million, under an agree-
ment reached in Peking early last month. As much as
half of the new credit may be devoted to building a
600-mile road between Mogadiscio and northern So-
malia. The rest is to be used for agricultural and
light industrial projects. Other Communist countries
have given little economic aid to Mogadiscio since
the leftist military coup of October. 1969, and this
latest deal would make China the most active Commu-
nist aid donor in Somalia.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700180001-1
50X1
Declassified in Part-Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007-0-0180001-1
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700180001-1