THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 16 JULY 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992755
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: July 16, 1971

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700150001-4
The President's Daily Brief
16 July 1971
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
16 July 1971'
:P.RINC1PAL DEVELOPMENTS
The Kremlin apparently decided with some difficulty
to pursue seriously an arms control agreement with
the US, and there are still some who are unhappy
over this course of action. (Page 1)
The Chinese Communists have let it be known they will
welcome an expansion of indirect trade with the US.
(Page 3)
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SALT
Recent evidence suggests that Moscow's decision to
pursue seriously an arms control agreement with the
US was reached only with some difficulty in the
Kremlin, and that there are still those who are un-
happy with Moscow's course of action as advanced in
the US-Soviet announcement of 20 May.
The Soviet ?official Zine on SALT since 20 May has
been moderate and optimistic. Brezhnev's speech of
11 June, which stressed the "increasing significance"
of the talks, is now being cited as a basic text by
Soviet officials and media. The opening of SALT V
in Helsinki was greeted with an uncharacteristically
moderate and balanced Pravda editorial which an-
nounced that there were signs of a positive shift
toward accommodation on both sides. This was fol-
lowed by an Izvestiya article stressing the optimism
accompanying the current round.
On 13 July, however, the military newspaper Red Star
presented an article?said to be the first of a
series--which adopted a more strident tone, casting
doubt on US motives and intentions. Red Star's ap-
proach suggests a Zack of enthusiasm on the part of
some in the Soviet defense establishment for Moscow's
present course.
Moreover, an article in the current edition of the
Soviet Communist Party theoretical journal Kommunist
painstakingly and defensively justifies Moscow's cur-
rent policy on SALT. It quotes Lenin on the wisdom
of dealing with the US and criticizes leftist ele-
ments whom Lenin called "masters of the revolution-
ary screech" for not understanding the current So-
viet approach. The article's defensive tone and the
attack on those criticizing from the left add to the
conjecture that Moscow's current disarmament policy
was not arrived at easily. Indeed, Soviet SALT dele-
gate Shchukin told an American counterpart that there
had been a high degree of nervous strain in the work
of preparing for SALT V "because of tense disagree-
ments within the Soviet Government."
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COMMUNIST CHINA - PAKISTAN
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COMMUNIST CHINA - US
Since the US relaxation of restrictions on
trade with Communist China last month, the ?Chinese
have told that they will
welcome an expansion of indirect Sino-US trade. Al-
though Peking has made it clear that because of US
relations with Taiwan direct trade with US-owned
firms is impossible, the Chinese recently have in-
creased their imports of US goods through foreign
firms and have approached foreign exporters with
the US market in mind. In both instances China has
maintained that such trade is desirable as long as
Peking is not officially informed of the US origin
or destination.
Peking's commercial representatives in Hong Kong
have been advised to establish companies to trade
with the US on an unofficial basis. It is not clear,
however, whether Peking has finally approved the
start of this type of activity. China is also said
to be considering allowing a small number of Ameri?
can company officials to attend the Canton trade
fair this fall; however, they may not be permitted
to engage directly in trade.
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NOTES
Laos: North Vietnamese resistance to the ac-
tions of yang Pao's irregular forces on. the eastern
portion of the Plaine-des Jarres is beginning to
increase somewhat. The North Vietnamese are regroup-
ing their forces to try to block any further ad-
vances by Vang-Pao's forces into the high ground
east of the Plaine. Four, or possibly five; North
Vietnamese regiments are taking up essentially de-
fensive positions in an arc around the. eastern edge
of the Plaine, an area they presumably want to pro-
tect not only for its tactical significance but also
because it contains numerous storage.facilitieS.
Because many of these enemy units'appear-to be under-
strength and short of supplies and ammunition, their
ability to launch, a sustained counterattack atthis
time is open to question. For the present, they
probably will continue their harassing and shelling
attacks,
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Top Secret
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