THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 10 JULY 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992743
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: July 10, 1971

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The President's Daily Brief
10 July 1971
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
10 July 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Peking is showing no flexibility on the UN representa-
tion issue, and backers of the Albanian resolution are
planning to inscribe it on the UN agenda
(Page 1)
? Photography shows many permanent facilities on the
Chinese side of the border near disputed Chen-pao
Island. (Page 2)
Cambodia is seeking rice from the US and elsewhere in
response to public pressure. (Page 3)
A Romanian party directive calling for intensified
orthodoxy seems linked to uncertainties over relations
with Moscow (Page 4), while the Yugoslays are making
some overtures to the West in view of similar concerns.
(Page 5)
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CHINA-UN
Lcosponsors'of the Albanian ?resolution calling
for the seating of Peking and the expulsion of Taipei
indicate there will be no flexibility in Peking's po-
sition. The? group decided in addition to seek more
cosponsors and to inscribe the resolution on the UN
agenda The Albanian
chairman, apparently relaying Peking's instructions,
rejected a proposal to conduct an intense lobbying
effort against the Important Question resolution,
presumably on the grounds that this stands little
chance of passage in the coming session.
a Japanese UN representative
told US officers there that Tokyo's soundings on-var-
ious "dual representation" resolutions had shown that
such a motion is unlikely to pass. There are indica-
tions that several other countries interested in pre-
serving Taipei's seat in the General Assembly are
equally gloomy.
The inflexibility of Peking and its support-
ers has clearly reinforced the initial pes-
simism of many countries over the chances
of an alternative to the traditional Chinese
representation motions. In any event, sup-
port for Taipei has steadily eroded since
last year's vote, and further slippage
prior to next autumn's vote is a virtual
certainty.
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Chinese
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COMMUNIST CHINA - USSR
A large number of permanent military facilities
on the Chinese side of the border near disputed Chen-
pao (Damanskiy) Island have been seen in recent sat-
ellite photography. There are as many as 400 small
buildings, numerous bunkers, vehicle revetments, and
antiaircraft and artillery positions within 11 miles
of the island, in addition to five helicopter pads.
Most of these facilities were built during
1968 and 1969 but could not be clearly iden-
tified in photography of that time. Chinese
forces near the border were reinforced fol-
lowing armed conflict over boundary delineation
in March 1969. They now maintain a permanent
presence in support of their claim to Chen-
pao. Photography since the clash showed
that the Chinese had established defensive
positions on the island; whether these
facilities are currently occupied cannot
be determined in the recent film.
The Soviets maintain well-equipped border
guard units close to Chen-pao, and have at
least four divisions within 100 miles of
the island.
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CAMBODIA
The government is under considerable public pres-
sure to ease the country's serious shortage of rice
and has formally requested the immediate shipment of
32,000 tons of US rice under the PL-480 program and
the shipment of 150,000 tons after June 1972. Phnom
Penh is also trying to buy rice from Tokyo and Taipei.
The US Embassy believes that at present
consumption levels current stocks will be
exhausted by mid-November. Merchants, how-
ever, tend to conceal the size of their
rice holdings, and official figures on the
amounts in private hands are likely to be
underestimated. The removal ?of price ceil-
ings in Phnom Penh, which the government
is considering, might shake loose enough
privately held rice to carry Cambodia
through into the next harvest beginning in
January. In addition, armed convoys are
making a major effort to transport Large
amounts of rice on a daily basis from Bat-
tambang Province.
With regard to next year's needs, the size
of plantings in Battambang is said to be
well behind schedule because of early flood-
ing, labor shortages, and Zack of incentives
stemming from relatively low prices for
paddy. rice.
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ROMANIA-USSR
The Communist Party's call on Wednesday for intensi-
fication of ideological and cultural orthodoxy ap-
pears to stem from uncertainty over relations with
Moscow following Ceausescu's recent Asian tour. The
new directive comes down particularly hard on Roma-
nian youth, some of whom are termed "parasites."
The statement is more dogmatic and regressive than
a similar directive issued last February, when on
the surface at least Bucharest's relations with Mos-
cow appeared to be moving toward an acceptable modus
vivendi.
Since neither youth nor intellectuals represent a
threat to Romania's internal stability, the new di-
rective seems designed to remove grounds for any So-
viet questioning of Ceausescu's commitment to Commu-
nism. The Bucharest press continues to publish en-
dorsements of the tour in a manner intended to dem-
onstrate firm Romanian popular support of Ceausescu.
More expressions of solidarity can be expected as
Bucharest holds out against participation in Warsaw
Pact exercises in Bulgaria later this summer.
A desire to avoid saying anything that might even
indirectly further disturb Moscow may account also
for the reluctance of Romanian officials to discuss
details of Ceausescu's travels with Western diplomats.
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YUGOSLAVIA
Belgrade has recently been mounting a low-keyed
effort both at home and abroad to deal with the
Possibility of an inorease in Soviet pressure.
Always suspicious of Moscow, Tito is concerned
over his repeated failure to reach a post-Czech-
oslovakia understanding that would defuse the
threat of the Brezhnev doctrine. Plans for War-
saw Pact military exercises in Bulgaria have
further stirred Yugoslavia's long-range suspicions
of Soviet intentions.
In the past few weeks, along with cultivating
warmer state relations toward Peking, Belgrade
has made several bids for military cooperation
with NATO members. In late June a deputy defense
minister broached the possibility of expanded
military ties with the US, including arms pur-
chases. /
I TheXugoOlavs_have alsO:.87,.4-
gested the possibility of ccjoint defense .of the
Adriatic.
Tito realizes -
that such overtures risk further antagonizing
Moscow,.., but .evidently feels that a package of:
real and symbolic'deterrents will have some value.
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NOTE
East-West Germany: The Honecker regime, in a
concrete move to underline its contention that West
Germany is a foreign country, has abolished its State
Secretariat for West German Affairs.
questions regarding west
Germany are now to be handled by the Foreign Ministry.
It is unclear whether the Foreign Ministry will assume
responsibility for West German affairs immediately or
after the current series of East-West German talks
has concluded.
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Top Secret
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