THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 11 MAY 1971
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0005992653
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
16
Document Creation Date:
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 24, 2016
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 11, 1971
File:
Attachment | Size |
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DOC_0005992653.pdf | 355.88 KB |
Body:
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The President's Daily Brief
11 May 1971
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
11 May 1971
1:TINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
The Soviets appear to have begun developing hard-
ened ABM facilities. (Page 1)
Comments
the situation in Cambodia are presented
on Page
2_,
In southern Laos, unit-size defections by Pathet
Lao troops have occurred for the first time in the
war. (Page 4)
At Annex
the Persian Gulf
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USSR_
The latest satellite photography of the Sary
Shagan missile test range suggests that the Soviets
have begun development of hardened ABM facilities.
What appears to be .a missile silo is under construc-
tion in a newly identified launch site, along with
a hardened bunker. ?The site also contains five other
excavations, but construction is not yet far enough
along to reveal their purpose.
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CAMBODIA
In a review of the current situation in Cambodia.
--The prospects for political stability for the
remainder of 1971 are good, but the longer-term
outlook depends heavily on the emergence of a
popular leader around whom the country can rally.
--The chances are good that Sink Matak will at-
tempt to get a new constitution adopted. If
elections are to be held this year, however, the
government must make a greater effort to win
over contested areas in the countryside.
--To maintain its present widespread backing,
the government must show that it can at least
hold its own on the battlefield. Simultaneously
it must persist in its efforts to reduce corrup-
tion and inefficiency within army ranks. It
must also try to deal more effectively with in-
flation.
--The government should be able to cope mili-
tarily with the Communists, provided the enemy
does not dramatically increase the scope and
tempo of the fighting. Such an increase does
not seem 'likely to occur during the coming rainy
season.
--Although FANK troops are becoming better
trained and organized, and command discipline
is improving, government forces will continue
to need allied air support to help keep the
Communists in check.
--The morale of major FANK units, particularly
those which are or have been in combat, is still
high. In some of the less experienced units,
however, there has been a noticeable erosion of
morale and discipline.
(continued)
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LAOS
Unit-size defections have occurred among Pathet
Lao (PL) troops in southern Laos for the first time
in the war. In the past two months, over 200 PL
troops have gone over to the government at Pakse.
The latest group of 55, which rallied on 10 May,
included field-grade officers and political cadre.
The ralliers have helped locate North Vietnamese
troop and supply concentrations for air strikes and
have provided useful information on the strength
and composition of NVA units in the area.
The ralliers' decision to switch sides ap-
parently stems from what they view as North
Vietnamese mistreatment and increased
levies on Lao villagers, as well as their
belief that the North Vietnamese were re-
sponsible for the death of a widely re-
spected Pathet Lao general. The latter
story was trumped up by the government.
It is too early to tell whether these de-
fections are a local problem or are a sign
of wider disaffection in the Communist
ranks. Communist propaganda reflects a
sensitivity to the problem, however, and
the North Vietnamese, who depend on the
PL for logistic and rear security support,
will probably redouble their efforts to
keep their restive allies in line.
Communist forces in the panhandle have continued
to move westward on Route 9 following their capture
of Muong Phalane in early May. Elements of three
North Vietnamese regiments plus support units are
now active near Dong Hene. Government units in that
area--one battalion of irregular troops and three
regular army battalions--probably are not strong
enough to stem a heavy, enemy attack.
The government's strength in this region
has been weakened somewhat with the tem-
porary assignment of units to northern
Laos. The Communists may be trying to
take advantage of this situation to extend
their control along Route 9; they may also
hope to force the government to return the
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LAOS
ctal(A--7
22-
GULF
OF
TONKIN
, Communist-controlled territory
Contested territory
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MARCATION
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TNA A 4,
THAILAND
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551402 5-71 CIA
CAMBODIA
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? Communist-held location
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southern-based units that have been active
in the Luang Prabang and Long Tieng areas.
An offensive along Route 9 will keep gov-
ernment forces off balance and hamper gov-
ernment harassment operations against the
western portions of the Communist infiltra-
tion corridor.
? Intercepts indicate
that the Communists are planning new attacks on the
Bolovens Plateau to the south. Ban Houei Sai, the
principal government base on tlie northern approaches
to the plateau, may be their first objective. ?
In past years, the Communists have managed
to maintain military pressure near the-
Bolovens well into the rainy season.
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NOTE
6
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PERSIAN GULF
(continued)
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