THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 30 APRIL 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992615
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 30, 1971

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The President's Daily Brief
30 April 1971
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
30 April 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Sirik Matak is reported to have been given responsi-
bility for forming a new Cambodian Government fol-
lowing Lon Nol's abrupt decision yesterday to bow
out. (Page 1)
?A new military recruitment and conscription drive
is under way in North Vietnam. (Page 3)
The Laotian Government has welcomed a Pathet Lao
proposal to resume discussions looking toward peace
talks. (Page 4)
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CAMBODIA
A government communique has announced that Cheng.
Heng has designated Sink Matak to try to form a new
government, according to late reports. This develop-
ment follows Lon Nol's abrupt decision yesterday not
to stay on as prime minister. Lon Nol met with Matak
yesterday for the first, time in over a week, but the
substance of theirdiscussions is not yet-known.
Lon Nol's latest maneuver may have come
as a result of Matak's'unwillingness to
serve in a reduced capacity as one of a
troika of deputy prime ministers. With
Cheng Heng's choice'boiling down to.
Matak, Son Ngoc Thanh, or some eventual
dark hOrse, Matak has probably been given
the first crack because he has been act-
ing prime minister and has had the sup-
port of Lon Nol.
Matak has indicated he would be willing
to become prime minister provided allpo-
litiCal factions close ranks behind him.
He is dealing.from a fragile power base,
as he is not overly popular and is some-
thing of an.old'guard symbol to students
and certain elements in the National As-
sembly. Matak, however, is capable and
energetic and has established rapport
with a_number of senior military officers.
All of the country's top military command-
ers pledged support to Matak earlier in
the week when it looked as if Lon Nol would
be remaining as prime minister, but whether
this support will hold with Lon Nol step-
ping out is another matter.
If Matak can not or will not put together
a government, Son Ngoc Thanh 's prospects
will improve considerably. He is clearly
interested in the prime ministership, and
he would appeal in this role to younger
elements who have been pushing for.a
thorough housecleaning at the top of. the
government. Moreover, Thanh may have an
active supporter in Lon Non, Lon Nol's
brother, who seems to find Thanh more con-
genial than Matak.
(continued)
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Thus far, the political maneuvering in the capital
has been notably free of tension or a sense of
crisis. Further indecision or prolongation of the
current impasse in forming a new government, however,
will begin to strain nerves and increase the poten-
tial for serious trouble.
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NORTH VIETNAM
A new military recruitment and conscription
drive is under way. Since around mid-March, there
have been numerous articles in the North Vietnamese
press of the kind noted during past induction drives.
These accounts have described large numbers of
youths--more than 10,000 from Haiphong and a handful
of rural provinces alone--"enthusiastically volun-
teering" for service.r
Not all the fresh inductees into the reg-
ular army are raw recruits; some are to
be shifted from the local self-defense
and militia forces. This upgrading process
long, has been an important source of par-
tially trained personnel for the army.
The current drive will in part make up for
Communist losses in eastern Laos and Cam-
bodia during the dry season. It also
could signal Hanoi's intent to increase
its military, effort in the South later
this year. The recent articles indicate
that many of those now entering the army
are earmarked for duty outside North Viet-
nam. Because of normal training require-
ments and the condition of the infiltra-
tion trails during the oncoming rainy sea-
son, the presence of the bulk of the new
troops is unlikely to be felt in South
Vietnam or Cambodia before the second half
of this year.
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LAOS
Preliminary negotiations between the two
sides last year were largely concerned with
procedural questions, in which both sides
tried to gain the advantage before begin-
ning substantive talks. The Communists
proved fairly flexible in their tactics,
avoiding sweeping demands for a total bomb-
ing halt as a prelude to talks and accept-
ing a face-saving formula on the question
of whether Souvanna's negotiator represents
him as "prince" or as "prime minister."
The preliminary talks broke down in January
of this year, however, when Souvanna re-
scinded his earlier agreement that the
talks would be held in the Communist-held
town of Khang Khay on the Plaine des Jarres
The Communists presumably are still seeking
the same goals as in previous exchanges:
to lay the groundwork for a future polit-
ical settlement that will enable them to
play a political as well as a military role
and, more immediately, to gain a bombing
halt or some other diminution of the war
that would be to their advantage.
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NOTE
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Top Secret
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