THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 23 APRIL 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992602
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 23, 1971

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The President's Daily Brief
23 April 1971
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
23 April 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
South Korean,
Cambodia
Vietnam. (Page 1)
(Page 2)
The Soviets launched a Soyuz spacecraft which appar-
ently will attempt a docking maneuver with the -
Salyut craft launched on 19 April. (Page 3)
The transfer of power in-Haiti has been orderly thus
far. (Page 4)
Jordan's successful campaign against the fedayeen is
likely to end their threat ?to Husayn. (Page 5)
Page 6,
At Annex, we assess the situation in East Pakistan
after four weeks of fighting.
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SOUTH VIETNAM - SOUTH KOREA
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CAMBODIA
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USSR
? The Soyuz spacecraft and its three-man crew
that were orbited last night are apparently func-
tioning normally. TASS announced the spacecraft as
"Soyuz 10" and stated that it was manned by Cosmo-
nauts Vladimir Shatalov, Aleksey Yeliseyev, and
Nikolai Rukavishnikov.
ShataZov, the commander of Soyuz 10, and
Yeliseyev have participated in two previous
Soyuz missions together, including Soyuz 8
in October 1969 on which both were crew
members. This is the first space flight
for Rukavishnikov.
The TASS statement said Soyuz 10 is in-
tended to conduct joint experiments with
the Salyut spacecraft that was launched
from Tyuratam on 19 April. Reports from
Moscow earlier this week had indicated
that the Salyut would be joined with a
Soyuz spacecraft to form a prototype
manned space station. The Soyuz space-
craft apparently is equipped for docking
and probably would be the active partner
in a docking attempt between the two ve-
hicles.
One of the objectives of the Soyuz mission
may be to perfect rendezvous and docking
techniques. The last Soviet attempts to
dock manned spacecraft involved Cosmonauts
ShataZov and Yeliseyev aboard Soyuz 8
which failed in several attempts to dock
with Soyuz 7. Another mission objective
may be to investigate means of combating
post-flight effects of prolonged weight-
lessness on Soviet space crews.
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HAITI
The public announcement yesterday morning of
Francois Duvalier's death and the succession to the
presidency of his son, Jean-Claude, have not pro-
voked disorders so far. The military, including the
National Security volunteers, ?are on full alert, but
there is no sign of an increase of the security
forces in Port-au-Prince.
One of Jean-Claude's first official acts was
to name a new cabinet, including two men upon whom
former president Duvalier is believed to have de-
pended.
The new President's tenure is jeopardized
by his youth, Zack of preparation, and the
probable development of factions involving
people both within and outside the govern-
ment. Personal ambition is almost certain
to surface within the ranks of the suppos-
edly faithful who are now freed of Papa
Doe's restraining presence. For the pres-
ent, the appearance is one of concentra-
tion on an orderly transfer of power.
Exiles and oppositionists within the coun-
try are believed to be too few, weak, and
disorganized to act immediately. Further,
there are no indications that a Cuban-sup-
ported exile invasion is contemplated.
Fear of an invasion from abroad, however
unfounded, could serve to inhibit an im-
mediate struggle for power within the
government.
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JORDAN
The Jordanian Army sweep of hostile areas in
Amman has proceeded successfully for the last ten
days and is expected to be concluded by the end of
next week. The clean-up, accompanied by the volun-
tary and generally peaceful evacuation of the city
by the fedayeen, has resulted in seizures of consid-
erable quantities of armament and military equipment.
Large areas of the capital, occupied by Palestinians
and generally denied to Jordanian authorities for
more than a year., have now been taken over by the
army with only minor and sporadic clashes. The Am-
man operation is scheduled to, be followed by a series
of sweeps through the towns in northern Jordan.
These tactics will almost certainly end
the current fedayeen military threat to
the Husayn regime, although with:the quan-
tity of weapons evacuated from Amman the
commando forces still possess a consider-
able nuisance potential.
The fedayeen military threat was in fact
severely crippled during the heavy fight-
ing in September 1970. An attempted come-
back after Christmas failed to rally wide-
spread support, either within Jordan or
among the vocal commando supporters in
other Arab states. The Jordanian Govern-
ment's decision to enforce the cease-fire
agreements and its success in cleaning up
Amman have shown that the fedayeen groups
no longer have the unity, the resolve, and
the resources to confront the army.
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PAKISTAN
It is now four weeks since the outbreak of fighting
in East Pakistan, a period during which the army
built up its strength and then moved out against the
Bengalis. Government troops now control many of the
major towns and are able to move, seemingly at will,
along most major roads. Some large areas of East
Pakistan are still controlled by the separatists,
but the army--as soon as it can spare the men and
the time?should be able to go into these areas as
well.
In fighting so far, the badly Zed, ill-equipped,
poorly trained, and disorganized East Pakistanis
have tried to hold some towns and strategic points,
or in a few cases attack government positions. In
some places they fled when fighting began, and even
in those engagements in which they did not panic,
Bengali forces have been routed.
The army is able to raid into the countryside, but
it has insufficient strength to exert effective con-
trol over the 62,000 villages in which most of the
province's 75 million people live. For the time
being, the army will have to rely on its control of
transportation--and hence food distribution--and on
fear of reprisals to deter antigovernment activities
in the countryside.
To control the cities, Pakistan will require a mili-
tary force at least as large as the 42,000 to 49,000
we currently estimate to be in the eastern wing.
Far more would be required in the event of more than
minimal resistance.
Bengali forces who had intended to contest the West-
ern army have largely faded into the villages or
fled to India. Most have decided they have had
enough of war for a whiles many had no idea what it
meant to come up against well-armed professional
troops.
Looking ahead through the summer, the government can
count on several important advantages:
--The army has the training, the organization,
and the equipment?including tactical air sup-
port--to win any direct fire fight.
--Army morale is high and the troops are confi-
dent that they can defeat any Bengali resistance.
(continued)
Al
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--The government controls the towns, ports,
transport facilities, local press, and radio and
is working to organize some semblance of local
political support.
--It will control the distribution of food, em-
ployment in government, industry, and major
businesses, and all economic development activ-
ity in the province.
Countering these favorable factors are certain dis-
advantages:
--Small bands of insurgents will be able to at-
tack when and where they wish, taking refuge
among the rural civilian population, which is
overwhelmingly hostile to the government.
--Most West Pakistani troops have had no train-
ing in counterinsurgency operations.
--With the monsoon, logistics will become dif-
ficult. The army should have no trouble keep-
ing itself well supplied, but could face urban
disorder if it is unable to feed those Bengalis
under its control.
--Preventing clandestine Indian shipments to
insurgents across the 2,500-mile border will
be almost impossible.
--There may well be international pressure lim-
iting the government's ability to use its eco-
nomic leverage and control of food supply to
full advantage.
--Military priority must still go to the India -
West Pakistan border, thus limiting the number
of troops the West can send to the East.
--President Yahya promised civilian government
to the West Pakistanis, and some politicians--
such as Bhutto--are already hinting that a re-
bellion in the East is no excuse for leaving
the army indefinitely in charge in the West.
Agitation will build up slowly, but the army,
nevertheless, may have to worry increasingly
about unrest in West Pakistan.
--The loss of foreign exchange from East Paki-
stani exports and the cost of the military oper-
ation have put further strains on a West Paki-
stani economy that was already stagnating.
(continued)
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A key factor, of course, in anticipating East Paki-
stan's immediate future is the will of the Bengalis
to continue to resist. Given the limits on army con-
trol and assuming some help from India, the Bengalis
could stage a large-scale guerrilla war which the
army would find very hard to suppress. On the other
hand, the terrain generally is not well suited to
guerrilla warfare and the Bengalis have a reputation
for talk rather than action. Guerrilla operations,
if mounted, are likely to be small-scale. It is not
in the cards for the Bengalis to resort to guerrilla
warfare along lines of the Algerian or Viet Cong mod-
els.
One danger inherent in a prolonged insurrection is
that it may. well strengthen the radical leftists in
the East. The moderate, pro-Western Awami League
politicians now in command are not well suited to
lead a guerrilla movement. Failure of the moderates
to show early progress may well turn the people to-
ward more radical leaders.
Concern over preventing a leftist (pro-Chinese) take-
over of the separatist movement is a primary reason
for Indian assistance to the Bengalis, and Indian
help will probably continue as long as the movement
remains viable.
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