THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 22 APRIL 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992600
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 22, 1971

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The President's Daily Brief
22 April 1971
46
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
22 April 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
In appealing to Lon Nol to form a new Cambodian
government, Chief of State Cheng Heng has bowed to
pressure from the prime minister's brother. (Page 1)
Communist forces are preparing for another "high
point" in South Vietnam in the immediate future.
(Page 2)
(Page 3)
(Page 4)
Pressures for a full military takeover are again
building within the Turkish armed forces. (Page 5)
At Annex, we discuss further steps Peking may take
in following up its "ping pong initiative" toward
the US.
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CAMBODIA
Cheng Heng has appealed to Lon NoZ to form a new
government, apparently bowing to pressure artfully
organized by Lon Non, Lon NoZ's brother. Lon Non
has been keeping his campaign alive by circulating
petitions in favor of Lon NoZ, and by hinting to
the press that elite Khmer Krom units will be sent
back to South Vietnam if, the prime minister is re-
placed.
Although Heng has indicated that he does not plan
to press Lon Nol for an immediate decision, there
is evidence that the prime minister has already de=
cided to stay on. If he does indeed remain in of-
fice, his initial task of selecting a new cabinet
is likely to be a difficult one. He must not .only
ensure that it represents all political factions,
but also that it excludes the corrupt "old guard"
elements responsible for much of the opposition to
his outgoing government. This is a tall order,
since Phnom Penh has more professional critics than
it has talented technicians willing to assume the
thankless jobs of running ministries.
Over the longer run, however, Lon NoZ's main prob-,
Zem will be his limited physical and emotional ca-
pacity to govern. His personal physician has told
the US ambassador that the prime minister is quite
concerned over his health and that he wanted more
time to recuperate before trying again to play an
active political role. It thus seems likely that
he will continue to rely heavily on Sink Matak
and other leaders to conduct the government's
business. Lon Non has indicated that his brother
has already delegated to Matak the task of putting
together a new cabinet.
1
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SOUTH VIETNAM
scattered evidence
indicate that the Communists intend to launch another
round in their "spring campaign" before the end of
the month. A frequently mentioned date is 26 April.
Communist units have been noted making preparations
for combat, particularly in the coastal regions of
the northern provinces, but also to some extent
elsewhere.
Communist seasonal campaigns usually follow
a cyclical pattern in accordance with the
phases of the lunar month. The last "high
point" began at the end of March, under
cover of lunar darkness, and the next phase
is evidently timed for a similarly dark
period. It is likely that allied, outposts,
refugee centers, and isolated district
towns will again be the primary targets,
although major cities and military bases
may also come under attack from Communist
artillery or terrorist squads.
2
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V. V ft
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NOTE
Turkey: Pressures may again be building up
within the armed forces for a full military takeover.
In the wake of a recent bleak report on the economy
by Turkey's deputy prime minister, many middle- and
senior-level officers have become highly critical of
the parliament as well as of former prime minister
Demirel.
There is also some sentiment for dissoiving the en-
tire parliament--in which Demirel's Justice Party
holds about half the seats--if it tries to block the
reform legislation soon to be introduced by the new
,Erim government.
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LATE ITEM
Haiti: Ambassador Knox was personally summoned
to the palace about midnight last night to receive of-
ficial notice of Duvalier's death from his son and
designated successor, Jean-Claude Duvalier. In the
presence of other top officials and his sister, Marie
Denise Dominique, young Duvalier read the ambassador
a statement requesting that the US provide naval sur-
veillance to prevent any Cuban invasion of Haiti and
act to forestall attacks by any external groups--pre-
sumably meaning Haitian exiles in the US.
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COMMUNIST CHINA - US
As it reviews the initial response to its American
initiative, Peking must be quite pleased. World re-
action has been favorable?even euphoric--in practi-
cally all quarters; where the response has been
negative, in the case of Taipei and Moscow for ex-
ample, row-key growls were undoubtedly expected and
even desired by the Chinese. Concern over relations
with China has been heightened in Japan, where the
Sato government must consider the possibility that
it will be left behind in a general improvement of
Sino-US relations. The atmosphere in which Peking
conducts its quest for additional recognitions and
for additional votes on the UN issue has undoubtedly
been improved by this dramatic sign of Chinese
reasonableness." The consensus appears to be that
Peking's chances for admission this year have been
enhanced./
While the Chinese clearly see a wide range of bene-
fits flowing from their new attitude toward relations
with Washington, they have taken a number of risks
in the attempt to achieve these benefits. Although
Soviet displeasure was undoubtedly discounted in ad-
vance, the Chinese have probably been unpleasantly
surprised by Fidel Castro's quick disavowal of any
Cuban move toward rapprochement with the United
States, with its implied rebuke of Peking's current
diplomacy. More importantly, Chinese gestures to-
ward the United States are bound to strain relations
with North Korea and North Vietnam, which Peking has
laboriously cultivated in the past year and a half.
There have already been reports?albeit from such
self-serving parties as the Soviets and the French--
that Hanoi is "concerned" about the implications of
Peking's initiative.
(1
Al
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The Chinese will almost certainly also permit the
entry of a number of US scholars. Groups of ordi-
nary tourists might also be admitted, but this move
probably has a lower priority in Chinese eyes.
there is no
sign that Peking has yet relaxed its longstanding
regulations excluding US businessmen from entering
China; it seems unlikely that Americans will be al-
lowed to visit the Canton trade fair now in progress.
Nevertheless, Peking will almost certainly wish to
make some move in this area in the next four months--
before presidential review of the results of the re-
cent relaxation of US restrictions on trade with
China. Peking's initial gestures in this field are
likely to be fairly small, however; a dramatic up-
surge in trade does not appear to be in the cards.
China in any event already has been able to buy
most of the technically advanced goods it needs from
Europe and Japan.
the Chinese invitation to US table
tennis players involved "no change in policy toward
the US Government," but this ought not be taken
literally. The Chinese are well aware that "people-
to-people diplomacy" cannot be fully separated from
bilateral state-to-state relations; indeed, many of
the moves they now appear to have in mind have long
been under discussion in Warsaw. We think Peking
may want to resume the talks there well before next
autumn's vote in the UN General Assembly. When the
Chinese broke off the talks last year they carefully
fudged the issue of which side would call for the
next meeting, and in fact the bal./ appears to be
resting on the net rather than in either court.
When the discussions resume, the Chinese, as always,
will have Taiwan on their mind. They undoubtedly
hope for some progress on this thorny problem, but
there are many signs that they recognize that it
cannot be "solved" ver
the Chinese will be probing
or in ica ions the United States will adopt'a
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position that would arrest movement toward a "two
Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" idea in the UN
and in the wider international sphere. This is a
cause of major and immediate concern to Peking, but
the Chinese will also be interested in how the Nixon
Doctrine applies to Taiwan and, in particular, to
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