THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 19 APRIL 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992594
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 19, 1971

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The President's Daily Brief
19 April 1971
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
19 April 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Lon Nol is reported ready to step down in the next
few. days for reasons of health. (Page 1)
In Laos, sharp fighting continues around three tac-
tically important hilltop positions north-of Long
Tieng. (Page 3)
Moscow is sending military equipment to Ceylon to
aid the Bandaranaike government's struggle against
the insurgents. (Page 4)
On Page 5 we comment on the formation of the Union-
of Arab Republics.
In Pakistan, government forces are pressing attacks
against Bengali separatists. (Page 6)
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CAMBODIA
Chief of State Cheng Heng has told the US am-
bassador that he understands Lon Nol intends to re-
sign in the nekt..few days for reasons of health.
Heng said the decision is Lon Nol-'s though the
thrust of his remarks suggests that there issome
behind the scenes pressure for the prime minister's
resignation. Heng referred to "drift, and ineffi-
ciency" in the present situation andimplied that
acting prime-minister Sink Matak and his ministers
were ready to quit if changes were not made. Heng
criticized Lon Nol's-performance even before,his
stroke last February, -arguing that the prime min-
ister had relied too heavily on.a,small coterie of
advisers. He said he personally approves of Lon
Nol:'0-stepping down .and views Matak as his logical
successor.
(continued)
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LAOS: Plaine des Janes
61
t-
,
Nara Kha
'
j
0-'
1663A
? eBan Na
aEn
Thon
,Phou Long Mat
Tha Tam EtIedng
A Hill 662
3
o
551333 4-71 CIA
20 Mite
2.0 Kilometers
?, ?
?Government-held location 50X1
? \ 1
? Communist-held location
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LAOS
Sharp fighting continues around three tactically
important hilltop positions north of Long Tieng, even
though neither side has made significant gains for
more than a week. At Hill 1663, located about three
miles northwest of the former government., artillery
base at Ban Na, heavy enemy mortar fire is causing
substantial losses:among the irregular defenders;
ten troops were killed and four wounded in one mor-
tar attack on 16 April. At:Phou Long Mat, .a hill
mass about four miles north of Tha Tam Bleung, ir-
regular strength'waS augmented over the weekend by
about 300 troops from Long Tieng.- The government_
has been trying to oust a determined enemy force
from an outpost the Communists occupied on 11 April,
but has SO: far been stymied. North Vietnamese forces
have also dug in at Hill 1662, located about,live:
miles northeast of Long. Tieng, and continue tore-
sist all
efforts to'dislodge them.
The effort being extended by the Commu-
nists to contest these positions indicates
their strong desire to keep within strik-
ing distance of Long Tieng. It is possi-
ble that the North Vietnamese, who have
recently shifted the bulk of their forces
into the areas north and east of Long
Tieng, are preparing for a major push be-
fore heavy rains make cross-country move-
ment difficult and place additional bur-
dens on their supply lines. A North Viet-
namese rallier stated this week that the
Communists are busy prepositioning sup-
plies 'for an offensive against Long Tieng
in early May.
An all-out drive would be a switch in tac-
tics for the Communists, who so far have
avoided frontal assaults by large units in
favor of attacks by mortar fire to wear
down government forces. The Communists
have taken heavy losses in the three-month
Long Tieng campaign, and they are now out-
numbered by government defenders who also
enjoy the advantage of air support. The
irregular troops, however, are also feel-
ing the strain of protracted fighting and,
even if the Communists do not pull out all
the stops, there is the danger that--as in
the case of Ban Na--government units will
cave in under the continuing pressure.
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USSR-CEYLON
Moscow is sending at least two KA-26 helicop-
ters--a six-passenger utility craft--to aid the
Bandaranaike government's struggle against the in-
surgents. It has apparently also offered Ceylon
five MIG-17s
Department cable armored personnel carriers.r
The Soviets are also re-
ported to be sending an advisory team--perhaps as
many as 60 men--to train the Ceylonese in operation
and maintenance of the equipment.
Moscow's limited comment on the Ceylonese
situation has been clearly slanted in
favor of the government, branding the in-
surgents as criminals "organized by reac-
tionary forces." The USSR supports Cey-
lon's united front government, which in-
cludes the Ceylonese Communist Party/Mos-
cow. Another possible factor in the de-
cision to extend aid may have been concern
in the Kremlin that it was vulnerable to
charges of complicity with the insurgents
because some of the "Che Guevarist" lead-
ers had studied in Moscow. The extension
of military aid no doubt also is intended
to ensure that the West not get sole credit
for supporting the Bandaranaike government.
Mrs. Bandaranaike will probably welcome
Soviet equipment as helpful in maintaining
Ceylon's image as a nonaligned country.
Internally, acceptance of Soviet aid may
increase the influence of leftists within
the cabinet.
Meanwhile, security forces are in control of
the main towns, but a high-ranking Ceylonese Army
officer claims that there are eight major pockets
of resistance which the army cannot get to because
of lack of personnel, and that there are other
small clusters of insurgents all over the island
as well.
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ARAB STATES
The formation on Saturday of the Union of Arab Re-
publics-under one president and a federal govern-
ment meets the varying requirements-of its members'.
Libya's Prime Minister Qadhafi sees the proposed
union as the first step toward building an "Arab
nation," a goal to which he is firmly committed.
President Sadat views Cairo's participation as an
earnest of Egypt's desire to be the cornerstone of
Arab unity. He no doubt hopes to deflect Arab crit-
icism, particularly that of the Libyans, of Egyptian
tactics in the Middle East negotiations and to put
pressure on Tel Aviv to be more flexible about a
settlement. President Asad may view Syrian partici-
pation as demonstrating his intention to break away
from the previous regime's isolation in the Arab
world. Perhaps the overriding consideration for
both Sadat and Asad is that closer cooperation with
Libya wiZZ provide easier access to Tripoli's oil-
rich treasury.
The conspicuous absence of Sudan, which had joined
with Egypt. and Libya to form an "alliance" in Decem-
ber 1969, is-symptomatic Of the divisions in the
Arab,world that preclude comprehensive political.
unification, President Numayri's regime is already
somewhat shaky, and he was apparently unwilling to
exacerbate Sudanese fears of Egyptian hegemony by.
joining the union. The Benghazi declaration did,
however, leave the door open for Sudan's accession.
The late scheduling--1 September--of a referendum
on the question in the three ,countries suggests
that the leaders anticipateproblems in agreeing
on the specifics of a federal constitution. The
failure of the union of Egypt and Syria, established
in 1956 and disbanded in 1961, is well remembered,
and there is likely to be a protracted timetable
for structuring apolitical entity.
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NOTES
USSR: The Soviets orbited an unmanned space-
craft from the Tyuratam space center last night
using the SL-12? their largest operational space
booster. TASS announced the vehicle as "Salyut"
and described it as an orbital scientific station
designed to conduct research and experiments in
space. Launch of a manned Soyuz spacecraft is ex-
pected within the next few days and the Soviets
probably will attempt to rendezvous and dock the
two vehicles.
Pakistan: The government has demonstrated: its
ability to move into almost any part of East'Paki-
stan, and Bengali separatists have yet to hold a po-
sition against a determined army attack. Army con-
trol, however, will still be limited to major towns
because there are not enough troops to occupy the
countryside and exert direct control over 75 million
people. Resistance forces apparently are fading
into the villages and could sustain a guerrilla war
through the monsoon season, which does not end until
October.
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Top Secret
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