THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 9 APRIL 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992578
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 9, 1971

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The President's Daily Brief
9 April 1971
48
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
9 April 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Mrs. Bandaranaike has expressed fresh alarm over
theceylonese insurgency, and her government is
.pressing its :requests for foreign aictin combating.
it. (Page 2)
On Page 4 we report on the inconclusive fighting in
East Pakistan
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at Annex we take a broader 50X1
look at the import of the past two weeks' events
for the :future of Pakistan.
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CEYLON
High-level Ceylonese officials including Prime
Minister Bandaranaike now view the government's po-
sition as "desperate." have com-
mented that they are dealing witn a -rui-blown,
well-organized insurgency" and that there is no
chance that the situation can be brought under con-
trol in the next few days. Mrs. Bandaranaike now
claims she is up against a rebel force of from
50,000 to 100,000.
Earlier estimates had put rebel strength
at 25,000, which seems closer to the mark.
So far, the rebels have concentrated their
efforts in the countryside and have stayed
away from the larger cities. They may be
expanding their field of operations, how-
? ever, as attacks now have been reported
in the northern and southern reaches of
the island. Police stations and personnel
continue to be the prime targets of the
rebels, who, according to the government,
now have obtained a significant amount of
rifles and automatic weapons and have
gained some popular support.
The US Embassy reports that the public appears
dissatisfied with the government's performance in
the crisis to date. Long distance trains are not
running, food distribution has been disrupted, and
prices have doubled, while the government is refusing
to issue any credible information on the seriousness
of the situation.
The government seems to be waiting while
security forces try to re-estabZish con-
trol rather than taking any initiatives
to develop popular support for its posi-
tion.
the 7,000-man volunteer reserve force,
which is being mobilized, is poorly trained
and there is a lack of ground transport,
especially the small vehicles needed to
move troops into areas of insurgency.
Helicopters, which are also in short sup-
ply, have become the chief means of troop
transport and of locating and attacking
the insurgents.
(continued)
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The Ceylonese Government is still hoping to
make do with its own nationals, but will ask for
"personnel" from India or the United Kingdom as a
last resort, It
has formally approached India and the US to furnish
arms assistance, including' helicopters which they
say they will take as a gift, a loan, or on hire.
The British, who were :as first for helicopters,
have stated that they. are Unable to supply them.
They have shipped in some arms and ammunition from
Singapore, however. Mrs. Bandaranaike yesterday
told Ambassador Strausz-Hupe that the Soviets had
offered to supply helicopters, but said she pre-
ferred US equipment because her air force was ?famil-
iar with it.
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PAKISTAN
Reporting on the fighting continues to be frag-
mentary. 1 /Comilla, east of
Dacca, /the army met no resist-
ance there, although some press reports had indi-
cated that the army was hard pressed.
"freedom fighters" in Jessore
to the west are completely disorganized, but fight
on out of fear that they will be killed if they
give in./
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PAKISTAN
President Yahya Khan's decision on,24 March to order
the armyinto action in East Pakistan was the..climax
of a.gradual.slide into civil war--that.in-hindsight
seems to-have been preordained at the country's.in-
ception. The eastern and western sectors-are sepa-.
rated by 1,000)nileS of-Indian territory.and were
united only by,faith;in.Islam. West Pdkistanis.tra-
ditionally have dominated the country's. military .
forces and to a large degree its-economy and govern-
ment. East Pakistan, however, has had the major
portion of the population-and until-recently has,
earned_the bulk of Pakistan's foreign exchange:
East Pakistani .resentments have grown gradually over
the past few, years. They contributed to the agita-.
tion that brought:down.Ayub..Khan, and in the past.
few:months.frustrated efforts to.work:out a consti-
tution acceptable to both parts of' the country.
When Yahya made his move, he had reached the view
that the sort of solution Mujib demanded would make
Pakistani unity aZZ but fictional, greatly reduce
the country's ability to support a military estab-
lishment-and to defend itself from India, and en-
courage the breakup of West Pakistan into four sepa-
rate countries.
The army hoped that the Bengalis--in its view an un-
military race with little stomach for a fight?would
give up in the face of quick and overwhelming mili-
tary force. West Pakistani leaders are still hoping
fora collapse of resistance, but if this were going
to happen, it probably would have occurred by now.
The army's superior training and equipment, to-
gether with an ability?even though limited by the
extent to which Ceylon will permit transit rights--
to support and move troops by air, give it a clear
edge in any direct engagement with the poorly armed
and organized East Pakistanis.
the sheer magnitude of the problem of con-
trolling a hostile land of 75 million people, how-
ever, will make the army's job extraordinarily dif-
ficult as long' as the East Pakistanis have the will
to fight. The resistance put up by the East Pakis-
tanis to date has no doubt surprised the Westerners.
They still appear to believe that additional troops
can save the situation, but West Pakistan's esti-
mates have been notably overoptimistic in the past
two weeks.
(continued)
Al
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Pre-monsoon rains have already begun to fall, and
by June--with the rains in full force, bridges de-
stroyed, roads cut, and railroads torn up--ground
transport will be next to impossible. The govern-
ment is trying to get inland water transport going
again, but its success will depend in large part on
finding locals willing to carry army troops and sup-
plies. The army's ability to supply its forces
within ?the East by air is limited. Recent opera-
tions have already led to an aviation fuel shortage
in Dacca. With the ports out of operation?primarily
because dock workers have Left for the countryside,
with the Burmese refusing to supply more fuel, and
with transportation from the ports to Dacca very
difficult, the fuel shortage seems bound to get
worse. It is unlikely, therefore, that government
forces will be able to build up for extensive oper-
ations from outlying posts before the monsoon ends
next fall.
The strain of the civil war on West Pakistani lead-
ers is already exacting a toll. General Yaqub Khan,
a moderate army figure who until recently was com-
mander in the East, resigned last week.
A8 for the East, the Bengali forces--composed of a,
few.mutinous infantry battalions from the regular
army, paramilitary forces supported by ordinary po-
lice and. villagers, many armed' only with clubs and
spears--now control.the countryside and have isolated
many, army garrisons. The Easterners are' talking as
if their morale were fairly high, and' they appear
confident of ultimate success. Although Mujib and
some other Awami League leaders were rounded up
quickly., other leadership seems to.have come to the
fore to carry on the resistance.
In addition to their military weakness, the East
Pakistanis may have to contend with severe food
shortages and disease. With ports and transporta-
tion centers controlled by West Pakistanis, and the
internal distribution system disrupted in any case,
there is a good chance of famine ?in some areas.
With health services also disrupted cholera and
other epidemics could erupt.
(continued)
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An important factor in keeping Bengali resistance
alive will be Indian support.
the mere pros-
pect of such Indian help may be more important as a
stimulus to continued resistance than would be the
physical support itself. A steady flow of Indian
support would serve to keep the resistance alive in-
definitely.
Meanwhile, ?the current military operation has
strongly alienated the East Pakistanis, creating
new psychological divisions between East and West
greater than those before. The longer the fighting
lasts the greater the damage will be to the econo-
mies of both wings. In East Pakistan the disruption
of the transportation system, the expectation of a
great drop-off in industrial production, and the
difficulty of exporting jute--Pakistan's main money
crop?will cripple an already marginal economy. In
West Pakistan, the cost of the military operation
and the loss of foreign exchange earned by East Pak-
istani exports will be difficult to handle.
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