THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 24 MARCH 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992545
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 24, 1971

*z: .
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The President's Daily Brief
24 March 1971
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
24 March 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
At yesterday's SALT session the Soviets proposed a
separate treaty on measures to reduce the danger of
war by accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear
weapons. (Page 1)
The Pakistani disputants offer some sharply conflict-
ing public statements on the state of their talks,
but some behind-the-scenes progress appears to have
been made. (Page 2)
The Argentine junta has begun naming its cabinet.
(Page 3)
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SALT
At yesterday's session the Soviets tabled yet an-
other proposal for an early agreement limited to one
topic discussed at SALT. This time Semenov pushed for
a separate treaty on measures. aimed at reducing the
danger of an outbreak of war between the US and USSR
caused by accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear
weapons. Semenov cOntended that the substantive
views of.both sides on this matter. already "coincide
to a great degreei". and he termed it "unjustifiable"
to link agreement on this subject with the solution
of other questions at SALT.
The text of the new Soviet proposal shows
that Moscow's views do, in fact, closely
parallel US provisions tabled on 4 Decem-
ber at Helsinki. At that time, however,
the US made it very clear that it was pro-
posing inclusion of such provisions on ac-
cidental or unauthorized incidents in a
wider limitations agreement encompassing
offensive and defensive weapons.
The rationale served up with this new over-
ture echoes that voiced by Semenov in
arguing Moscow's brief for an early ABM-
only agreement. Both proposals appear
aimed in part at deflecting attention away
from topics the Soviets would plainly rather
not discuss at present--in particular, of-
fensive strategic systems. Moreover, the
Soviets presumably see some merit in push-
ing for limited, separate agreements, both
in an effort to accustom the US to accept
a piece-by-piece approach to the issues at
hand, and as a possible way of achieving
some show of progress at SALT.
In a post-plenary conversation with Semenov,
Ambassador Smith broached the third US alternative
on ABM limitations,-which would limit the US to
de-
fense of four Minuteman complexes, and the USSR to
its present system around Moscow. Semenov'S initial
reaction was that the US proposal was aimed at ob-
taining unilateral advantage,'and he said he could
state "even now" that it was not acceptable to the
USSR. He promised a more detailed. response later.
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PAKISTAN
The disputants appear to have made some progress be-
hind the scenes toward apolitical agreement, de-
spite their sharply conflicting public statements.
Bhutto says he is examining an "agreement" reached
by Mujib and President Yahya. Presumably this is
the one noted in The President's Daily Brief yester-
day calling for an end to martial law, the start of
civilian governments in the provinces, and the for-
mation of an interim central cabinet.
Bhutto may be overemphasizing the progress made thus
far in an attempt to enhance his own role and to
forestall other West Pakistani leaders now in Dacca
from eroding his position. Mujib, for his part,
denies the existence of any agreement. However far
the discussions have gone, Mujib may believe that
unsettled matters such as? the division of powers
between the provinces and the central government
are more important than any of the agreed points.
At least until this is settled, he would be loath
to admit to agreeing to anything short of full pro-
vincial autonomy.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTES
Argentina: The country remains generally calm
and apathetic following the assumption of power by
a three-man junta. As the cabinet-forming process
begins, the junta has retained Minister of Economy
Ferrer and at least one other holdover, according
to press reportsvindicating a desire at the moment.
to avoid abrupt changes. An early announcement is
likely that steps will be taken to hold elections,
but the timetable will probably be so long that lit-
tie
-
tle popular support, will-be attracted to the new
government.
Communist China - USSR: Chou En-lai called in
Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov and chief border negoti-
ator Ilichev for four hours of talks on 21 March--
a move that may have been designed to soften the
hostile impression created by Peking's polemic
against Moscow issued on 17 March. TASS reports
merely that "questions of interest to both sides"
were discussed. A number of issues--such as the
border question or Indochina--may have been reviewed,
but Chou's primary aim may have been to attempt to
separate problems arising out of continuing ideologi-
cal differences between the two parties from those
involving improvement of state-to-state relations.
Singapore-USSRY
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