THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 13 MARCH 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992527
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 13, 1971

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The President's Daily Brief
13 March 1971
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
13 March 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS.
Demirel has been asked to stay on as head of a care-
taker government while political leaders seek a
formula for satisfying the military and still pre-
serving a democratic framework. (Page 1)
Moscow and Peking have both recently reiterated
their support for Souvanna's leadership in Laos.
(Page 2)
North Vietnamese forces are preparing moves to coun-
ter South Vietnamese troops in the Tchepone area of
Laos, while apparently trying to shift some of their
supply operations to routes farther west. (Page 3)
At Annex, some of the factors which led to the down-
fall of the Demirel government in Turkey are examined
in greater depth.
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TURKEY
Demirel, after tendering his resignation as
prime minister, has been requested by President
Sunay to head a caretaker government until a new
one can be formed. Sunay and various political
leaders are now seeking a formula that will both
satisfy the demands put forth by the military com-
manders in their ultimatum yesterday and keep the
government within the bounds of the democratic sys-
tem provided by the constitution. The lower house
of Parliament met briefly but inconclusively yester-
day and the Senate is scheduled to hold an extra-
ordinary session today.
Sunay and the parliamentary and party
leaders apparently hope these consulta-
tions will turn up a political figure
who can organize a national coalition gov-
ernment and assure passage of the polit-
ical, social, and economic reforms needed
to satisfy the military establishment and
to put an end to extremism.I
After the military's initial show of force in
Ankara yesterday, during which copies of the ulti-
matum were provided for broadcasting by the radio
station, the armed forces are remaining in the back-
ground. All military units in the capital area have
been placed on alert, however, and full security
measures have been implemented
Now that the die is cast, the situation
should remain relatively quiet until the
national coalition gambit is played out.
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COMMUNIST CHINA - USSR - LAOS
During a conversation with a US Embassy offi-
cial in Moscow on 9 March, the deputy chief of the
Soviet Foreign Ministry's Southeast Asian division
flatly stated that the Soviets still view Souvanna
as prime minister of Laos despite their official
position that the tripartite coalition government
has collapsed.
Last fall, the Chinese chargg in Vientiane pro-
vided the first of several recent indications of
Communist China's position on Souvanna when he said
China wanted ?to see Laos return to "strict neutral-
ity," with the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) participating
in the government. He also stated he was doing
everything he could to persuade the NLHS to nego-
tiate with the Royal Lao Government./
/Other Chinese officials in Vientiane have
also made it known that Peking is solidly behind
Souvanna and that China will support Laos' neutral-
ity and all provisions of the 1962 Geneva Accords
that concern it.
Thus, despite Souvanna Phouma's acquies-
cence in the South Vietnamese incursion
into the Laos panhandle, both Moscow and
Peking have recently reiterated their sup-
port for his leadership. Both countries
have made it clear that they still regard
Souvanna's presence in Vientiane as cru-
cial to maintaining political stability
and keeping alive the possibility of a
future political settlement under the um-
brella of the Geneva Accords. Their po-
sition is a clear sign that while the Com-
munists may doubt the efficacy of Sou-
vanna's "neutrality" as a restraining in-
fluence on allied operations in Laos, they
are reluctant to see the 1962 agreement
become a dead letter. The Communists see
the agreement as legitimizing the Commu-
nist movement in Laos and affording it a
position in a coalition government.
Moscow's expressions of support for Sou-
vanna also seem designed to prevent possi-
ble challenges to him from Laotian right-
ists. Like the Chinese, Moscow clearly
thinks Souvanna's continued rule is far
more desirable than the uncertainties that
would attend his fall.
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VIETNAM LAOS
The North Vietnamese appear to be weighing the
impact of the recent South Vietnamese push into the
Tchepone area and to be preparing countermoves.
Intercepts indicate that the enemy is especially
concerned with defending the Route 914 network south
of Tchepone where South Vietnamese forces have re-
cently arrived in some strength. Additionally, a
North Vietnamese artillery unit west of Tchepone
has sent out an order for "large-scale" attacks dur-
ing the next few days.
The North Vietnamese are continuing to move
supplies through the Mu Gia Pass and the Binh Tram
32 area northwest of Tchepone. The status of sup-
ply movements on Route 914 south of Tchepone is not
clear; there appears to be some northward withdrawal
of enemy vehicles on Route 914 away from the South
Vietnamese forces, but south of this area enemy sup-
ply units near Ban Bac claimed on 9 March that they
were more than meeting their quotas.
There are signs that the North Vietnamese may
have begun to shift some of their supply movements
to Route 23, the corridor that runs south through
the panhandle well to the west of current South
Vietnamese operations. The force of Laotian irreg-
ulars operating in the Muong Phine area along this
route reportedly destroyed several enemy trucks on
11 March with the help of air strikes.
The North Vietnamese have improved an old road,
Route 233, that connects Route 23 with the tradi-
tional main trunk of the supply-infiltration complex
far to the south of the current area of South Viet-
namese operations. Putting this road into shape to
carry heavy truck traffic could enable the North
Vietnamese to bypass the part of Route 914 where
the South Vietnamese units are now present.
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Pakistan:
Mujibur Rahman told an intermediary sent by Presi-
dent Yahya that the only way out of the present im-
passe is to let Mujib govern East Pakistan while
Bhutto forms a government in West Pakistan. The
two leaders would then negotiate a new constitution--
or separate constitutions for the two parts of the
country. Yahya is unlikely to see in Mujib's re-
marks much hope for compromise; the West Pakistanis
would presumably view the proposal as a device for
setting East Pakistan irretrievably on the path to-
ward independence. Nevertheless, the President ap-
parently still plans to fly to Dacca in a last-ditch
effort to find a peaceful solution.
NOTES
USSR:7
Yemen (Sana) - US: Yemen has d
pone its plan
ecided to post-
to approach the US
restoration of diplomatic relations.
regarding a
The political
situation in Yemen is in a state of flux following
the recent resignation of the prime minister, and
legislative elections are under way.
any approach to the US will
await the installation of a new government, probably
sometime after 1 April.
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TURKEY
Pressures within the military establishment for in-
tervention in the Demirel government began to build
up late last year against a background of political
uncertainty, fiscal difficulty, and social unrest.
Current developments have their origin in the revo-
lution of 1960, in which the military ousted the
Democrat Party regime of President CeZaZ Bayar and
Prime Minister Adnan Menderes.
Following a series of weak and ineffective coalition
governments operating under close military scrutiny,
DemireZ's Justice Party formed the first postrevolu-
tion majority government in October 1965. His party
was the acknowledged heir to the banned Democrat
Party, however, and even though Demirel succeeded in
dispelling much of the antagonism of the top mili-
tary leadership, the Justice Party remained under a
lingering shadow of suspicion that it might try to
reverse the revolution and ultimately act against
those officers primarily responsible for carrying
it out.
Realizing that his party must govern circumspectly
in order to nurture the tenuous goodwill he had so
painstakingly cultivated, Demirel during his first
four years in office concentrated on consolidating
his leadership within the party, within the govern-
ment, and throughout the country. He went to great
lengths to avoid any hint of reverting to repression
or arbitrary rule in the Menderes pattern, and re-
fused to be provoked by opposition politicians into
acts that might raise the military's hackles.
DemireZ's legislative record was not impressive.
From the beginning his efforts in Parliament en-
countered obstructive tactics, including lengthy
filibusters, by the opposition Republican People's
Party for essentially partisan reasons. The Con-
stitutional Court, largely controlled by the oppo-
sition, often rejected legislation on technicalities
and forced its return to Parliament for a new run
through the political gauntlet. Thus the govern-
ment was unable to pass significant economic and
social legislation, and desired constitutional
amendments have not stood a chance.
(continued)
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At the same time, the incipient forces of the left
became more active in the atmosphere of political
permissiveness which emerged from the revolutionary
period. Of basic importance was government toler-
ance toward the spread of leftist influence in the
universities, among youth groups in general, and
among significant segments of Turkey's press.
As the political left gained coherence, extremist
elements and factions began to appear. For a time
these groups pinned their hopes on the Marxist-
oriented Turkish Labor Party, formed in 1961 as the
spearhead of a new socialist movement. When the
party failed to gain popular support, especially
among the peasantry and organized labor, and when
the extremist elements perceived that they had little
chance of gaining influence through normal democratic
procedures, they turned to direct action often marked
by violence. At the same time, the leftist press un-
leashed a barrage of bitter attacks on the govern-
ment, pointing to the country's economic and polit-
ical woes.
The leftist student movement exploited legitimate
grievances against the archaic academic system and
ultimately gained control of several major youth
groups. The Turkish Revolutionary Youth Federation
became the principal student organization and pro-
moted massive demonstrations against visits by units
of the US Sixth Fleet, against Turkey's role in NATO,
and against the Demirel government for allowing the
spread of foreign economic and diplomatic influence
in Turkey. Violent clashes with extreme rightist
students and with the police often resulted, thus
fostering a growing and almost persistent crisis at-
mosphere. One product of this climate was the minus-
cule "People 's Liberation Army of Turkey" which
staged the kidnapings of the four US airmen.
In recent months the government had become progres-
sively weaker, primarily because of action taken by
Demirel himself following the 1969 elections. At
that time, with his party holding a comfortable mar-
gin of 256 of the 450 seats in the lower house, Dem-
irel purged his cabinet of dissident elements that
had remained in the Justice Party. The purge Zed to
an erosion of his strength in Parliament and, as a
result, stagnation began to set in. By early this
month, the Justice Party's strength in the lower
house had dwindled to a plurality of 224 seats.
Charges of corruption against Demirel also tarnished
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his personal prestige. Only the fragmentation of
the political opposition into several widely diverse
parties covering the entire spectrum from the far
left to the far right kept his government from fall-
ing.
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