THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 1 MARCH 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992505
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 1, 1971

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The President's Daily Brief
1 March 1971
46
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
1 March 1971 50X1
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
IVietnam
Laos\
(Page 1)
Both sides have sustained fairly heavy losses in
weekend actions in Cambodia. (Page 2)
A Soviet demarche records MOSCOW'S concern over al-
lied activity in Laos and possible action against
North Vietnam. (Page 3)
Jordan/
/ (Page 4)
The Africans have reacted calmly to Britain's deci-
sion to sell helicopters to South Africa. (Page 5)
\Soviet / Cuba/
I (Page 6)
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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Operation LAM SON 719 Situation Map
-'General location of ARVN forces
551 6 6 2-71 CIA
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VIETNAM-LAOS
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The main tactical goal of a major North Viet-
namese counterattack is control of the crossroads at
Ban Dong, where Routes 9 and 92 intersect. Inter-
cepts of the past few days continue to reflect enemy
plans to launch assaults against the crossroads and
nearby hills that command the two routes. On 27 Feb-
ruary, for example, an intercepted North Vietnamese
message reported that Communist forces were in the
process of encircling the area. The message included
orders, said to be straight from Hanoi, that the main
ARVN force at Ban Dong was to be cutoff, surrounded,
and destroyed.
Fighting has slackened in the high ground north
of Route 9, where ARVN airborne and ranger positions
have borne the brunt of the enemy thrust. The situa-
tion is fluid, however, and control of Hill 31 is un-
certain. Losses are heavy on both sides. Enemy
tanks have been spotted around Hill 30 and a Commu-
nist regiment is not far from another strongpoint
farther east:
South toward Muong Nong, Communist resistance
continues to ebb and flow, although it generally has
stiffened over the past few weeks, and there are
signs that sharp fighting may break out soon. In-
tercepts of the last several days suggest that North
Vietnamese infantry and artillery are maneuvering to
step up pressure on South Vietnamese field positions;
one unit radioed on 27 February that it had encircled
an ARVN strongpoint some ten miles northeast of Muong
Nong.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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stung Chhat
.hhlong
4t/ Enemy mortar attac
Fightingt
SnuoI
.1Dambe
12- Kornpong Chem. z
ighting
hup 75 *Enemy mortar atta
Plantation
PHNOM PENH
sPrey Veng
Hqs., Communist
88th Regt.
thleak-Luong
SAIGO
VIETNAM
551064 2-71 CIA
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CAMBODIA
Fairly heavy losses were sustained by both sides
in weekend actions in central Kompong. Cham Province.'
Most of the fighting occurred in the vicinity of the
village of Dambe on Route 75. The main encounter in-
volved a clash between 4 South Vietnamese ranger bat-
talion and a battalion of enemy troops just south of
the village on 26 February. The ,rangers claimed 250
enemy killed, primarily as a result of air strikes.'
On the same day, two heavy enemy .mortar barrages
near Dambe killed several South Vietnamese soldiers,
wounded 123, and destroyed seven vehicles. There
were several actions around Dambe again on 27 Febru-
ary but casualties on both sides werelighter.
To the east, Communist harassing attacks were
reported against South Vietnamese positions near
Snuol, in southern Kratie'Province, but casualties
were light. A possible Communist threat to the
South Vietnamese base at Neak Luong, southeast of
Phnom Penh, apparently has eased. Direction finding
shows that the headquarters of the Communist 88th
Regiment, which was located near the base on 25 Feb
ruary,.has returned to its normal area of operations
east of Prey Veng city.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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USSR-US INDOCHINA
Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov has presented
Ambassador Beam with an oral demarche on the allied
incursion into Laos. Kuznetsov underscored the se-
riousness with which the USSR views allied activity
in Laos, and warned against any action aimed directly
at North Vietnam. In addition, Kuznetsov raised the
specter of Chinese intervention by noting that "other
members" of the socialist commonwealth "would not
remain indifferent."
The manner in which the demarche was made
suggests that Moscow does not really ex-
pect the US to support an allied incursion
into North Vietnam. Press speculation
about such a possibility and the incur-
sions into Laos and Cambodia, however,
have raised some doubts in the Soviet
Union and Moscow wants to be firmly on
record against such a move.
Kuznetsov also expressed his government's
doubts about carrying on negotiations with Washing-
ton in the face of US activities in Indochina.
The Russians made similar statements last
year in the wake of the US incursion into
Cambodia and again in December after the
US increased the bombing of North Vietnam.
There have been no indications thus far,
however, that the Soviets actually intend
to use current US activity in Indochina
as an excuse to stall any ongoing negotia-
tions with the US.
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JORDAN-FEDAYEEN
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UK-AFRICA
African reaction to the Heath government's an-
nouncement that it will sell helicopters to South
Africa has been muted. Even Tanzania and Zambia,
which led the opposition to such sales, have decided
not to react strongly at this time. They recognize
that they cannot bring much leverage to bear on the
British, and that precipitate action would exhaust,
What little influence they have. The Organization
of African Unity foreign ministers meeting now in
Addis Ababa can be expected to issue a strongly,
worded denunciation, but most black African Common-
wealth states are waiting to see if there will be
further sales.
The British argue that they are obliged to
sell seven Wasp antisubmarine helicopters
and spare parts under a 1955 agreement
that provides for joint British - South
African defense of the sea lanes around the
Cape of Good Hope. London also views the
sale of maritime arms to South Africa as
a way of offsetting a growing Soviet pres-
ence in the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless,
the British will probably gauge the wind
carefully before deciding whether to sell
Pretoria more naval equipment.
5
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NOTE
USSR-Cuba
FOR
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L._
Top Secret
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