THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST 18 OCTOBER 1961
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0005991993
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
September 16, 2015
Document Release Date:
September 16, 2015
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 18, 1961
File:
Attachment | Size |
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DOC_0005991993.pdf | 125.83 KB |
Body:
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/05/04: CIA-RDP79T00936A000300140001-8
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THE PRESIDENT'S
INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST
18 OCT 1961
"T-CP-5E-GREI_
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/05/04 : CIA-RDP79T00936A000300140001-8
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/05/04 : CIA-RDP79T00936A000300140001-8
1. Congo situation
2. Violence in Algeria
a) UN authorities in Leopoldville
and New York are said to be dis-
concerted over terms of the Katanga
cease-fire and Adoula regards it
as a damaging blow to prospects
50X1
for reintegration. They are
troubled by the provision that
Tshombe is free to defend himself
if Katanga is invaded by the central
government;
b) although Tshombe has indicated
his readiness to begin negotiations
with the central government, his
"victory" over the UN is not likely
to make him more tractable;
c) Gizenga, who is virtually AWOL
from his post in Leopoldville, is
attempting to put together a new
"Lumumbist" coalition in Stanley-
vile 50X1
50X11
Moslems have so far been fairly
restrained in the face of the
European mob attacks of the last
few days--probably inspired by the
Secret Army Organization. The 50X1
likelihood of a worsening in the
situation is strong, however,
particularly in view of the nation-
wide Moslem demonstrations schedulqam
for 1 November which will probably
provoke widespread clashes.
50X1
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3. Brazilian financial
difficult' s
4. South Vietnamese assess-
ment of Viet Cong
rural strength
Faced by a deteriorating short-
term financial position, the govern-
ment would like to get a speed-up 50X1
in the flow of US aid under commit-
ments made to the Quadros government.
Goulart is quoted as saying that
President Kennedy thought he might
be ?a Cohmunist but this wasn't so
and he would prove it, by changes
in his government if necessary.
Pro-American Finance Minister Salles;
on Goulart's urging, may come to
Washington to outline Brazil's
position and problems. 50X1
OUAI
50X1
the Viet Cong 50X1
fully controls 10 percent of the
country's 2700 villages; 30 percent
of the villages back the DiQM
regime; and the remaining 60 percent, 50X1
though generally anti-Communist,
are susceptible to economic,
political and propaganda pressures
from the ...VietCong. We have no
comprehensive check on this estimate,
but feel the figures 50X1
are probably fairly close to the
mark. 50X1
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NOTES
A. The South Vietnamese government today declared a state of
emergency, in effect until further notice.
B. Our UN delegation believes that .a. Security Council meeting on
Outer Mongolia can be postponed until next Monday or Tuesday.
The Chinese Nationalist delegate has indicated that such a
schedule is suitable to him.
D.
Soviet nuclear test t Semipalatinsk yesterday
50X1
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cnyi
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E. Anti-Castro elements in Argentina have lost ground in their 50X1
efforts to force a break with Havana. Frondizi's case has beer50xi
strengthened by the refusal of Cuban exiles to allow the
Argentine government to examine the documents which they
claim prove Castro-directed subversion.
F. Neither Moscow nor Kabul has announced a figure for the credit
agreement which they signed on. Monday, but we expect the Afghans
to receive at least $300 million spread over the 5-year term
of their economic plan.
50X1
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/05/04 : CIA-RDP79T00936A000300140001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/05/04 : CIA-RDP79T00936A000300140001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/05/04 : CIA-RDP79T00936A000300140001-8
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