THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 31 DECEMBER 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977877
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: December 31, 1970

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009000260001-9
The President's Daily Brief
31 December 1970
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
31 December 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Foreign Minister Thanat is continuing to promote the
idea of closer Thai relations with Communist coun-
tries. (Page 3)
Indonesia is planning informal talks on defense co-
operation with several Far Eastern governments.
(Page 4)
At Annex, we discuss some of the threats faced by the
new government of President Torres in Bolivia.
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JORDAN
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TURKEY
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THAILAND
Foreign Minister Thanat used the occasion of
the recent signing of the Thai,-Soviet trade agree-
ment to play up Bangkok's interest in an accommoda-
tion with Moscow. He also took advantage of several
year-end foreign-policy reviews with the Bangkok
press corps to reaffirm his desire for better rela-
_tions.with Communist China and North Vietnam-. For
the first time he publicly characterized North Viet-
nam's dispatch of a. delegation to:Thailand-to dis-
cuss refugee repatriation as a favorable development.
in.Hanoi's-foreign policy, and Bangkok's acceptance
of the delegation as-a "sign of our goodwill."
Thanat's statements about improving relations
with the Communists have been accompanied by expres-
sions of concern over the steadfastness of the US
commitment to Thailand. He told the press, for ex-
ample, that there had been some deterioration in US-
Thai relations over the past year, and implied that
the fault lay in-Washington.
Some of Thanat's public statements are
probably calculated to give Bangkok addi-
tional leverage with the US. He recognizes
that Thailand remains dependent on the US
for its security as long as it faces a
credible Communist threat and is incapable
of defending its territory with its own
resources. In addition, it is-question-
able that there is much support from the
military leadership for Thanat's idea of
important changes in the country's foreign
policy.
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INDONESIA
General Sumitro, Indonesia's top internal se-
curity officer who has also undertaken diplomatic
tasks for President-Suharto, expects to begina
month-long tour on 2 January to. Singapore, Malaysia,.
Thailand, Cambodia, the Philippines, Australia, and
Japan. Sumitro wants to discuss Indonesia's.mstra-
tegic thinking" on the "potential threat to South-
east Asia" and to explore defense and security coop-
eration "of a.nonpact character,"
seminars on common. Asian problems.
Indonesia has devised a ten-year strategic plan
to meet Chinese Communist subversion in Southeast
Asia. The plan includes regional cooperation and
Indonesian assistance--mainly advice and training--
to individual governments. The Sumitro talks are
a step in this direction.
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the
Philippines are members with Indonesia in
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
Australia and Japan
are
inc u ed -1,12 Sumtro's tour presumably
because Indonesia considers them potential
sources of economic assistance and diplo-
matic support.
Indonesia continues to insist that it is
not interested in a regional defense pact
and is carefully avoiding any such impli-
cation in the upcoming talks. Djakarta
is highly interested in area security,
however, and is ambitious for an active
area role as well. For example, last May
it sponsored a regional conference to
Zook into a solution of the Cambodian
problem.
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BOLIVIA
President Torres seized power last October with the
backing, though not the full support, of several dis-
parate groups. This support in some instances was
conditioned on the acceptance of various demands that
have since been sidestepped for the most part by Tor-
res. As a result these special interest groups have
become restless and are increasingly resorting to
force to achieve their objectives. In the coming
months Torres will face a major threat to the exist-
ence of his government, and Bolivia could be thrown
into anarchy and bloodshed.
Torres' takeover was possible because the military
group which overthrew President Ovando could not con-
solidate its power. The basic institutional unity
of the military was damaged in those tumultuous days
and they have not regrouped behind Torres.
Bolivian leftists are dissatisfied with Torres be-
cause he has not acted on any of his vaguely stated
"revolutionary" programs, especially the progressive
nationalization of foreign companies. The backing
of leftist student and labor leaders was another
critical element that allowed Torres to declare him-
self President. In return these groups expected
some prestigious portfolios in the government, the
scheduling of free elections, wage increases, and
other concessions. These concessions have not mate-
riaZized, however, and the attitudes of labor and
students now range from wary suspicion to outright
opposition.
Businessmen, too i are dissatisfied that the govern-
ment has not enunciated any clear statement of its
economic policies. They complain that it has been
spineless in the face of leftist seizures of the
largest cattle ranch in the country, the leading La
Paz newspaper, and other private property. Even the
limited support Torres had from the peasantry has
dissolved and most of the campesinos have reverted
to their normal apathy.
(continued)
Al
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For maintaining power in the short run Torres must
depend on the disorganization of his opposition. At
present, no opposition group has the strength, organ-
ization and determination to replace him with a
strong regime.
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