THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 20 NOVEMBER 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977808
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: November 20, 1970

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The President's Daily Brief
20 November 1970
48
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
20 November 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Monday's private meeting in Paris shows that Hanoi
still regards bilateral discussions with the US as
the ?way to get the talks moving. (Page 1)
On Page 3 we summarize the positions taken by the
Soviet delegation in yesterday's SALT talks.
Egon Bahr has provided a report of his latest meet-
ing with Soviet officials in West Berlin. (Page 4)
On Page
Chil
Latin America
Egypt/
//(Page 6)
Saigon's cabinet has vetoed recent trade agreements
with Cambodia. (Page 7)
We report on the current military situation in north-
ern Laos on Page 8, and on Page 9 note the increas-
ing activity of Chinese Communist antiaircraft units
against US aircraft in the roadbuilding area.
The Soviet submarine tender left Cienfuegos yester-
day. (Page 9)
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VIETNAM
The one thing that emerges clearly from
the private meeting in Paris on 16 Novem-
ber is that Hanoi still views bilateral
discussions with the US as the way to get
the talks off dead center. This was ap-
parent when Xuan Thuy, in response to Am-
bassador Bruce's statement that the US will
not negotiate the political future of South
Vietnam without the full participation of
the Saigon government, asked whether Bruce
could "discuss anything about political
problems." The North Vietnamese are likely
to hold to this view, at least until they
get a better reading of US/GVN terms for a
political settlement. If they see any room
for negotiations on terms they might find
acceptable, we would expect them to bear
down even harder on specific issues, as
Xuan Thuy did when he asked for US views
on how general elections should be organ-
ized in South Vietnam.
In our view, such issues, and not the Com-
munists' insistence on changes in the lead-
ership in Saigon, are at the heart of Hanoi's
intransigence in Paris. Although there is
no doubt about the seriousness of their de-
mand for the ouster of Thieu and Ky or of
their long-term goal of achieving full po-
litical power in South Vietnam, their basic
demand regarding a negotiated political
settlement is that there be a new govern-
ment in the South in which they have a
share of power. Therefore, there is at
least a possibility that Hanoi's refusal
to deal with the present government is a
tactic and not a bedrock policy position.
(continued)
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Of interest in this connection is a recent
broadcast by the Viet Cong!s:Liberation
Radio, which touchedon some of the trou-
bles Communists and Communist sympathizers
in South Vietnam might have following a'
ceasefire if American forces were still
on the scene and the present government
were still in power. The most arresting
passage in the broadcast concerned what
would happen if, in such circumstances,
"our people should temporarily recognize
the Thieu-KyKhiem administration as a
legal administration." A number of spe-
cific questions posed'were similar to
those we might expect the Communists to
surface somewhere down the line in the
event of any serious negotiations.
The broadcast also recalled-how anti-Com-
munist campaigns were launched by the Diem
regime after the 1954 Geneva Agreements,.
asserting that "resistance fighters could
expect even,worse treatment if they would
lay down their arms under present circUm-
stances." It called on' President.Nixon
to provide some "appropriate'answers" to
these questions iAllegedly a commentary
on President Nixon's five-point peace
plan, this broadcast could merely be:try-
ing,to make a more persuasive case against
the President's proposals and to undercut
the appeal they may have in South Vietnam.
Even so, it leaves-the impression that ac-
ceptable answers' to these questions might
have an impact on Communist'attitudes to-
ward a settlement and even on' Communist .
willingness to deal with the Thieu govern-
ment.
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SALT
Soviet delegation chief Semenov devoted yester-
day's,meeting to a discussion of verification, ad-
vancing for the most part positions that coincide
with the US proposal of 4 August. Endorsing reli-
ance on "national means" of verification, he agreed
to several supplementary features that Washington
had already suggested. These include an agreement
to exchange--on a voluntary basis--information re-
lating to the fulfillment of mutual obligations, and
undertaking not to hinder national means of verifi-
cation, either by interfering with their operation
or by employing special means of concealment. He
also accepted the creation of a standing consulta-
tive commission to examine future ?questions concern-
ing compliance with and modification of the agree-
ment.
Not all was sweetness and light, however. Sem-
enov did not mention, for example, "selective direct
observation," a concept the US had proposed as a,
possible verification measure. (After the meeting,
Soviet delegate Grinevsky stated that the USSR was
not prepared to consider such a measure.) Moreover,
Semenov continued to insist that mobile ICBMs not be
banned as the US proposes. He labeled "artificial"
the US argument that if these were permitted, na-
tional means could not verify that allowed weapons
totals were being honored. In addition, during
private conversations the Soviets continued to in-
sist that US forward-based systems be discussed at
SALT.
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WEST GERMANY - USSR
In the latest of Egon Bahr's meetings with So-
viet officials in West Berlin on 13 November, the
Soviets urged Bonn to abandon its position that it
would ratify the West German- Soviet treaty only
after a satisfactory Berlin agreement is reached.
On the question of resuming East -West German talks,
Bahr claimed that he had some impact in arguing that
the Germans can negotiate arrangements on access to
Berlin only under a four-power agreement, and that
any results must be covered by a four-power under-
standing.
This is Bahr's first direct report to the
Allies of his conversations2
and he did not men--
tion his earlier meetings. The series
started in early June after the draft West
German - Soviet treaty had run into heavy
flak in Bonn, and may initially have con-
cerned revisions the West Germans wanted
before signing it.
After Bahr conducted intensive talks in.
mid-October, the West Germans proposed to
the Allies a form of Berlin agreement that
in some ways resembled the Soviet position,
and the East Germans offered to negotiate
access directly.
The Russians likely judge their contacts
with Bahr as having already been useful
in their effort to shift the focus of
talks on Berlin to an East - West German
forum. Presumably, Moscow's satisfaction
at Bonn's response to the East German in-
itiative on 29 October weighs heavily in
Soviet attempts to avoid any substantive
concession at the four-power talks. The
Soviets doubtless feel that inter-German
talks on Berlin are more likely to create
the kind of pressures on the Allies that
could lead to some kind of agreement favor-
able to Soviet interests.
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LATIN AMERICA
In the wake of Chile's resumption of diplomatic
relations with Havana last week, Uruguayan Foreign
Minister Peirano Facio is worried that other Latin
American countries may also recognize Cuba unless
an OAS majority reaffirms the 1964 resolution that
resulted in the isolation of Cuba, by member-states.
He expressed the opinion that Chile's action threatens
the "credibility of all inter-American obligations."
Colombian Foreign Minister Velasquez has also sug-
gested that the OAS review its resolution.
Mexican Foreign Minister Carrillo Flores, on
the other hand, is pleased with Chile's move, and
has implied that his Country would vote to seat Cuba
in the OAS if the matter comes up. Mexico is the
only country that refused to comply with the 1964
resOlution.
Unless Havana publicly renounces its role
as an "exporter of revolution," a majority
of OAS members would uphold the 1964 reso-
lution if it ever came to a vote. A num-
ber of countries, however, prefer to avoid
a public re-examination of Cuba's revolu-
tionary role, fearing it would aggravate
divisions within the organization.
Cuba has indicated a willingness to con-
sider bilateral relations with those coun-
tries that publicly disavow the OAS sanc-
tions, but has vehemently rejected resump-
tion of participation in the OAS as long
as the US retains membership,
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EGYPT
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VIETNAM-CAMBODIA
The South Vietnamese cabinet has withheld ap-
proval of trade agreements reached in recent talks
with Cambodia because the negotiators had failed to
adopt an acceptable piaster-riel exchange rate. It
approved agreements on other matters, such as land
routes and the delineation of the border for customs
purposes.
Saigon's hard-nosed economic bargaining
will not sit well with the Cambodians,
some of whom are already hypercritical
of their South Vietnamese allies. How-
ever, another effort probably will be
made to find a compromise solution to
the tougher issues if the two countries
proceed with :a previously planned, but
still unscheduled, second round of talks.
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LAOS: Plaine des Jarres
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AREA OF
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P AINE
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Xieng
Khouangville
ang Vieng
10
20 M
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2b Kilometers
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Government-held location.-
Communist-held location
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LAOS
Elements of the North Vietnamese 148th Regiment
have abandoned an important hilltop position two
miles north of Ban Na that has changed hands several
times during the cast week.
At Muong Soui, the action has been character-
ized by light skirmishing and occasional mortar and
? rocket attacks. On 17 November the neutralist gar-
rison of about 1,200 there was reinforced with two
75-mm. guns.
The North Vietnamese have become concerned that
Vientiane may be about to launch a major offensive
of its own in the near future. One intercept re-
ported that five government battalions from the Long
Tieng area would be used to attack enemy supply
lines in the vicinity of Xieng Khouang.
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CHINA
AREA OF MAP
BURMA
pri NORTH
VIETNAM
THAILAND
CAMBODIA
SO.
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Northern Laos: Communist Chinese AAA Activity
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Contested territory
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NOTES
Communist China - Laos: Chinese Communist-an-
tiaircraft units in northern Laos have been increas-
ingly active against US aircraft in the last few
months as Chinese road construction has pushed into
an area of US air operations. Construction north-
eastward from Muong Sai has reached Route 19 in the
Sop Kai area, and intercepts say that Chinese units
east of Sop Kai are suffering casualties from air
strikes. The Chinese are augmenting their antiair-
craft units in the area? At the other end of the
road to the southwest, there has been no extension
of the road south of Muong Houn,
South Vietnam/
USSR-Cuba: The Soviet submarine tender that
arrived in Cuba in early September left Cienfuegos
at noon yesterday and is heading to the east. A
rescue tug, which had accompanied the tender in its
cruise around Cuba last month, remained in port.
9
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Top Secret
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