THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 14 OCTOBER 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977739
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: October 14, 1970

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The President's Daily Brief
14 October 1970
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THE PRESIDENT S DAILY BRIEF
14 October 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
The agreement between the Jordanian Government and
the fedayeen is discussed on Page 1.
viets
So-
/Singapore
(Page
The French-Soviet communiqug, issued at the conclu-
sion of Pompidou's viAit, is discussed on Page 4.
Brandt appears to have recovered from hi disappoint-
ment last week over the Soviet hard line on Berlin.
(Page 5)
/North Vietnam. (Page 6)
\ Chile,/
(Page 6)
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JORDAN
The Jordanian Government and fedayeen signed a
detailed agreement late yesterday as a follow-up to
the Cairo cease-fire accord of 27 September. A
three-man committee, consisting of Tunisian Prime
Minister Bahi Ladgham or his representative and mem-
bers from the government and fedayeen, is charged
with implementing the new agreement. A military
subcommittee, including observers from Arab coun-
tries with forces in Jordan, has also been set up,
presumably to help prevent a renewal of fighting.
The government has made some gains in the
new agreement. Although the actual Loca-
tion of fedayeen bases has not been made
public, the government has been promised
that they will not be near cities and vil-
lages. The Palestinian Liberation Organi-
zation's central committee has been made
fully responsible for enforcing its obli-
gations on all fedayeen groups.
Other government objectives have also been
realized, but they are somewhat weakened
by vaguely worded except,ions. One article,
for example, subordinates freedom of feda-
yeen action to Jordanian law but then
waters down the point by speaking of un-
specified exceptions. The fedayeen are
barred from carrying weapons in towns,
but again, provision is made for "certain
exceptional cases." Commandos are appar-
ently answerable to the civil courts for
ordinary crimes, but the fedayeen command
seems to have been made responsible for
general discipline.
The fedayeen, however, have obtained con-
cessions that the government earlier
seemed determined not to grant. The Amman
headquarters of the central committee will
be protected by fedayeen guards and is ap-
parently free to conduct a full range of
activities, including military. No one is
to be detained or suspended because of the
recent incidents, although the government
had earlier intended to exempt from amnesty
those holding official government positions.
(continued)
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The fedayeen have also been promised that
the government will not establish or oper-
ate organizations "contrary to the inter-
ests of the Palestine revolution."
As with the earlier cease-fire accord,
much may depend on the effectiveness of
the three-member committee. Neither the
government nor fedayeen can claim a vic-
tory from this agreement and maneuvering
by both sides will continue. Husayn and
the moderate fedayeen have had the upper
hand since the end of the fighting, but
as disputes inevitably develop over the
agreement they will be under pressure
again from the hard-Liners in the two
camps.
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SINGAPORE
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FRANCE-USSR
Pompidou's week-long visit ended yesterday with
an official communique endorsing a "properly prepared"
all-European conference aimed at East-West detente.
The two countries also signed a protocol calling for
regular political consultations, and emergency con-
sultations when there is a threat to peace.
The French have been skeptical about a
Conference ?on European Security and have
been adamant in reserving support until
the Soviets made positive 'concessions on
Berlin. There were indications in July
that Paris was changing its attitude, but
Pompidou's endorsement in the communiqug
is the first public?and most positive--
affirmation of French support to date.
Both the French and Soviets probably. see
the protocol on consultations as largely
symbolic. For the French, it symbolizes
closer links with Moscow' and demonstrates
Pompidou's ability to strengthen.the ties
established in 1966 by De Gaulle. Moscow
has accomplished one of its main objectives
in' the visit--preventing.deterioration in
Franco-Soviet relations because of its
closer contacts with West Germany,
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WEST GERMANY - BERLIN
Brandt has told Ambassador Rush that he sees
no reason for "great discouragement," despite the
hard line taken again by the Soviets at the ambas-
sadors' meeting on 9 October. He thought the So-
viets were engaging in standard pressure tactics
and he appeared to attach little significance to the
details of Soviet positions at this stage. Brandt
said he was in no hurry; the talks could go on as-
long as next April. Brandt also said--going a step
further than Foreign Minister Scheel--that he be-
lieved there could be no movement on a Conference
on European Security until there was not only a Ber-
lin settlement but also an agreement with East Ger-
many.
Brandt was Les& negative than after the
four-power working-level meeting last week.
(See The President's Daily Brief, 10 Oc-
tober 1970.) He probably believes that it
is too early to judge the reasons for the
Soviets' present hard line, and that at
any rate there will be little movement for
a few weeks while Gromyko is talking in
New York and London.
It is unlikely, however, that Brandt wants
negotiations to drag out to next April.
The momentum of Ostpolitik could suffer
from such a delay. Brandt needs further
progress on this front soon in order to
ease his increasing domestic problems.
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NOTES
North Vietnam.
Chile;/
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Top Secret
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