THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 3 AUGUST 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977604
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: August 3, 1970

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The President's Daily Brief
3 AUGUST 1970
47
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
3 August 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
The Cambodian situation is discussed on Page 1.
Nasir is trying to solidify Arab support for his
acceptance of the US peace initiative. (Page 3)
The lull in the fighting in northern Laos is broken.
(Page 5)
Thieu again indicates his willingness to consider
accepting a standstill cease-fire prior to an over-
all political settlement, but stresses the need to
negotiate the conditions for such a cease-fire.
(Page 6)
The Soviets are unyielding on substantive matters
in talks with the West Germans. (Page 8)
Uruguay has not yet responded to ransom demands
for kidnaped foreigners. (Page 9)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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Cambodia: Current Situation
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99486 8-70 CIA
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CAMBODIA
Communist forces yesterday pressed their efforts
to retake Kompong Thom- Government forces are said to
have regained control of many of the city's. buildings,,
but the Communists continued to-make a strong ground
and mortar assault on the city's .southern portions.
Two, government battalions in the northern part of the
city were pinned down by enemy fire, and efforts by
another battalion to link up with'them were unsuccess-
ful.
The US defense attache in Phnom Penh reported
on 1 August that government troops at Kompong Thom
were running low on food and ammunition and that
their morale was declining. Continuous allied air
strikes probably are the main reason the enemy has
not been able to overrun the city. Phnom Penh has
not yet made any plans to send reinforcements, de-
spite urgent requests from the local commander.
In adjacent Kompong Cham Province, contrary to
earlier reports, the Cambodians apparently have
failed to retake the town of Skoun. The Communist
occupation of Skoun may have been the first step in
an enemy effort to increase pressure on Kompong Cham
city. According to intercepted government messages,
large numbers of enemy troops still are located east
and west of the city.
In the west, the government offensive to retake
Kirirom is still stalled pending the arrival of five
more battalions of reinforcements from Phnom Penh.
Elements of a brigade that was to spearhead the
counterattack refused to participate in the opera-
tion, claiming they lack proper. equipment. South-
east of Kirirom, an intercepted Cambodian Army mes-
sage reported that the enemy ambushed several gov-
ernment vehicles near Sre Khlong on 1 August. Gov-
ernment clearing operations and air strikes in the
Sre Khlong area apparently have not been effective,
but the situation is reported to be calm.
(continued)
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2
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY '
ARAB STATES - ISRAEL
Nasir is trying to solidify Arab support for
his acceptance of the US peace initiative. The semi-
official Al Ahram has reaffirmed Cairo's intention
to explore the US proposal and has fired off volleys
of criticism at Arab states not in support of Egypt's
effort. Cairo, according to Al Ahram, accepted the
US proposals because it thought there was a greater
chance now of achieving total Israeli withdrawal.
This line will presumably be pursued at today's
meeting of representatives of the Arab states in
Libya. Although Iraq and Algeria--strongly critical
of Egypt's move--have formally declared they will
not attend, Syria is sending a delegation, as are
the fedayeen.
Moscow continues to manifest its strong polit-
ical and military support for the UAR. Pravda minced
few words on 1 August in condemning IraqTF?TiiTgative
stand" with regard to Nasir's "peace initiative."
The
US Embassy in Amman reports that those favoring peace
now clearly have the initiative. It states that the
fedayeen position is not arousing significant sup-
port, and describes the fedayeen anti-peace demon-
stration on 31 July as "unimpressive." The Beirut
embassy reports in addition that pro-peace sentiment
in Lebanon has induced a note of caution among fed-
ayeen leaders there.
In Israel, a cabinet committee continued to
work"on a formal reply to the US proposals. The
right-wing Gahal party makes its decision tonight
on whether or not to quit the government. Its de-
parture would leave Mrs. Meir with a governing ma-
jority of 76 out of 120, which would not require a
cabinet shakeup.
(continued)
3
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On the military front, Israeli aircraft continued
to attack Egyptian targets along the Suez Canal. No
further encounters with Soviet-piloted MIG-21s have
occurred.
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The dispatch of the com-
mander of the Soviet Air Force, Marshal
Kutakov, to Cairo on 1 August is probably
intended to provide a new general assess-
ment of Soviet military involvement in
Egypt, particularly in view of last week's
Soviet pilot losses to the Israelis.
Kutakov's rank will lend authority to his
mission, which seems also aimed at reas-
suring the Egyptians and underscoring Mos-
cow's support for Nasir.
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\,
/Lull in-Fighting Broken on the PI:AltiE DES)ARRES I
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY '
LAOS
The communique released shortly after Souk
Vongsak arrived in Vientiane Friday did not contain
any of the usual polemics and made no reference to
the customary demand for a US bombing halt as a pre-
condition for talks. Souk only noted the "numerous
efforts" of the Lao Patriotic Front to reach a
peaceful settlement and expressed the hope that his
mission would end in success.
Shortly after his arrival, however, the ex-
tended lull in the fighting in north Laos was
abruptly broken by an assault by 200 to 300 North
Vietnamese troops against a Lao guerrilla battalion
manning the perimeter defenses at Tha Tam Bleung.
The enemy force overran all of the battalion's
positions, wounding 59 of the guerrillas and leav-
ing an unknown number dead.
It is possible that the Communist attack
near Tha Tam Bleung had no connection
?with the opening of preliminary talks be-
tween the Pathet Lao and the government.
The Communists have periodically made a
show of strength southwest of the Plaine
des Jarres to forestall any effort by
General Vang Pao's forces to return to
the offensive in this critical area. But
the severity, as well as the timing, of
the Tha Tam Bleung raid suggests that
this was more than a routine military
maneuver precipitated by local tactical
considerations.
5
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOUTH VIETNAM
In his broadcast to the.nation-on Friday, Presi-
dent Thieu again indicated that he would be willing
to consider accepting .a standstill-cease7fire-before
an over-all political settlement is negotiated. He
strongly stressed the need to negotiate the condi-
tions for such a cease-fire first, however, and
again asserted that there must, be a- tight control
apparatus to prevent the Communists from reinforc-
ing and resupplying their forces' andto prevent ter-
rorist activity. Thieu also stressedthat a. stand-
still ,cease-fire would not involve ceding political
control of areas where enemy forces might be strong',
but would be a way to. stop the killing until an
over-all, settlement is arranged that would allow
the Communists to participate in internationally
supervised elections. A ceasefirecould only be
justified; Thieu said, if there were real progress
ilLthe negotiations.- He made it amply clear, how-
ever, that he expects no such progress soon.
Thieu clearly wished to reassure the
armed forces and the people in general
that his. government is not about to drop
its guard. He probably also wanted to
head off any, tendency among' security
forces to avoid' battle with the enemy in
the belief that ?a cease-fire was imminent.
Some of his language seems to have' been
intended to caution political leaders,
including candidates in' the upcoming
Senate elections, against playing' to the
war-weariness of. the population by devel-
oping a peace campaign.
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USSR
7
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR -WEST GERMANY
Initial West German attempts to alter the Bahr-
Gromyko draft agreements on a reconciliation treat
have run into a stone wall. )
Gromyko
specifically ruled out any mention in a Soviet - West
German treaty of four-power rights, and rejected any
attempt to link the German-Soviet talks and the four-
power sessions on Berlin. The Soviets also voiced
strong opposition to any changes in the paragraph
which relates to the border question.
All these points were raised by Scheel in
an effort to make the draft agreement more
acceptable to domestic critics who feel
German and Allied interests are not suf-
ficiently protected. The Soviets were
polite in tone and showed some flexibility
on certain nonessential matters, such as-
including specific mention in the treaty
of a desire to coo erate in economic_
cultural areas.
lit might be ne--
cessary for the West German cabinet to take
another Zook. at Bonn's substantive approach
some time this coming week.
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NOTE
Uruguay: The government- has not yet- responded
to demands by .the extreme leftist Tupamaros for the.
release of all. political prisoners as the price for
freeing a wounded American AID official--and a- Bra-
zilian diplomat abducted on 31 July. An impasse
could easily develop if. President Pacheco sticks to
his position of "no negotiations with kidnapers .t' ?
A legal' obstacle to the release of the government! s -
prisoners is the division; of jurisdiction overthem
between the executive and judicial branches. Those'
already convicted are controlled by the iudicial
branch and the.
Supreme Court is-determined not_to release prisoners-
in . exchange for-the kidnaped foreigners..
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