THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 30 JULY 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977595
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: July 30, 1970

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The President's Daily Brief
30 July 1970
46
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
30 July 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
The current situation in Cambodia is discussed on
Page 1.
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tensions between Nasir and the 50X1
Palestinians continue to deepen. (Page 3)
Chilei
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/ (Page 5)
The present status of relations among Turkey, Greece,
and Cyprus is discussed at annex.
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Cambodia: Current Situation
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CAMBODIA
Four government battalions that withdrew from
Kirirom regrouped south of the town near Route 4.
yesterday. They have been reinforced by three bat-
talions, including some Khmer. Krom troops rushed from
Phnom Penh. These combined forces apparently have
launched a counterattack to retake Kirirom, but a
Cambodian officer participating in the operation told
?the press it would be "very difficult" to do so. The
Cambodians do not attach any strategic value to
Kirirom, but after more than two weeks of fighting
it probably has become a. point of military honor to
hold it.
South of Phnom Penh two government.battalions
withdrew from their position atBat:Rokar in Takeo-
Province4.following-am attack'by-an. estimated 800
Communist troops. No airsupport?was available to
helpdefend the. position. In the west, Cambodian:
Army positions in and near Siem-Reap city were'again.
harassed by enemy fire on. 29' July. The. Communists
also directed mortar fire onthe airport there, clos-
ing it at least temporarily.
Anti - South Vietnamese sentiments in Cambodia
show no signs of diminishing. A Cambodian student
leader in Phnom Penh has told US Embassy officers
that students are increasingly upset over reports
of looting and pillaging by South Vietnamese Army
troops. Some students apparently have spoken of
driving ARVN forces out of Cambodia even before the
Communists areS dealt with, and blame the US for
ARVN's presence. According to an embassy report,
two government sections dealing with psychological
operations do not wantS to undertake programs 'which
push the idea of popular cooperation with ARVN.
Light international commercial activity has re-
sumed at the port'of Phnom Penh after a three-month
interruption. A Panamanian-flag ship delivered a
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cargo of petroleum to the port last week, and an-
other Panamanian ship is scheduled to load more
petroleum in Singapore for Phnom Penh. Shipping
companies canceled all deliveries to the port in
late April after two Japanese freighters traversing
the Mekong were hit by small arms fire.
It remains to be seen whether other foreign
ships will attempt the still risky trip up
the Mekong. The recent Communist attack
on a refugee-carrying South Vietnamese
naval vessel on the Mekong, ten?miles north
of the Neak Luong ferry crossing, will not
allay fears of commercial shippers.
Truck shortages and interdiction of road
and rail routes continues to slow movement
to and from Cambodia's other major port at
Kompong Som (Sihanoukville).
2
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ARAB STATES
In Amman yesterday a spokesman for a radical guer-
rilla organization characterized Cairo's shutdown of
two Palestinian radiobroadcasting outlets as the first
shot to be fired against the fedayeen by the Egyptians
and the beginning of an attempt to liquidate the Pales-
tinian resistance movement. This organization has de-
clared that fedayeen groups now have complete freedom
to adopt independent policies. For their part, Egyp-
tian authorities are now requiring visas for all Arabs
traveling to Cairo.
The differences between Nasir and the feda-
yeen are deepening. Relations between the
two are the stickiest they have ever been.
The Egyptians' decision to deny the comman-
dos ?the use of Cairo radio facilities for
their inflammatory broadcasts--a step long
urged on them but never before taken--is a
measure of this.
(continued)
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The widely circulated press report claiming that
Iraqi troops.have been put under the command of the
Palestinian guerrilla organizations appears to be a
misunderstanding of a Baghdad radiobroadcast. Accord-
ing-to FBIS,-a broadcast yesterday dealt with Iraq's
record of support for the Palestinians, and noted
that Iraqi troops had been put at the disposal. of the
Palestinian Armed Struggle Command "during crises
faced by our people's struggle in Palestine," probably
a reference to the Jordanian crisis of June 1970. A
later Baghdad broadcast quoted .a fedayeen newspaper's
report that Iraq had "placed all its resources and
capabilities at the disposal of the resistance until
complete liberation."
These references are both sufficiently vague
to be probably rhetorical flourishes rather
than clear statements that Iraqi troops are
being subordinated to Palestinian guerrilla
orders. Coordinated action between the
Iraqis and fedayeen cannot be entirely ruled
out, however, although the Iraqis seem to
have steered clear of this in the past.
King Husayn is taking precautions against
the possibility of Iraqi-fedayeen trouble-
making in Jordan during the coming weekend.
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CH I LE
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TURKEY-GREECE-CYPRUS
Relations among Turkey-, Greece; and Cyprus have
remained unchanged on the surface since the attempted
assassination. of Cyprus President Makarios -last March
and the subsequent murder of his political enemy
Georkatzis.- At that time rumors of impending Greek
intervention onthe island alarmed the Turks and'
evoked bellicose' statements by Foreign Minister
Caglayangil. Greek Foreign Minister Pipinelis han-
dled the situation coolly, however; and his reassur-
ances to Ankara returned the tension to more normal
levels.
Beneath the surface, however, the relationships
among.. the three capitals have undergone significant
changes in. the last few years. Until the present
Greek Government came to power in 1967,.there had
been a clear sponsor-client relationship between
Athens and the Greek Cypriot-community,on the one
hand and Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot minority on
the other. Relations between Athens and Makarios
began to fray, however, after the coup of April 1967,
and become further strained during the crisis of No-
vember 1967 when the Athens government' appeared'to
back down in the face of Turkish threats to invade
Cyprus. The. Greek presence on the island has since
been.reduced,,but it is still considerable. A Greek
Army regiment is still stationed there under the
terms of the 1960 London-Zurich agreements, and Greek
Army officers make up practically the entire officer
corps above lieutenant rank in the Cyprus-National
Guard--the Cyprus Army.
The political arrangement in Cyprus, that of
side-by-side "communal" government based ona pro-
portional system, satisfied none of the parties in-
volved. It is a compromise which sought to balance
long-standing conflicting objectives: union of Cy-
prus with Greece (enosis) wanted by the Athens gov-
ernment and by .a majority of the Greek Cypriots--
but not by Makarios; 'and partition of the island,
or, failing that, .an independent, biracial republic
with ironclad guarantees for separate status for the
ethnic Turks-, wanted by. the Turks and' Turkish Cypri-
ots. Makarios himself accepts the side-by-side
"communal" arrangement, and seems willing to live-
with the system which leaves him as the unquestioned
leader ofCyprus.
(continued)
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These aims have become blurred, particularly on
the Greek'side, over the years. Although they pub-
licly espouse enosis, many Greek Cypriots,-whether-
for reasOns'of personal ambition or dislike of the
present regime in Athens, no longer.feel.much enthu-
siasm for it. The Greek Government contains-some
diehard'pan-Hellenists, but it realizes that it-can-
not achieve enosis without risking war with Turkey,
and it now publicly supports the idea of an independ-
ent-Cyprus.
The, Turkisovernment-continues to support the
Turkish Cypriots in- their insistence on separate
ministration of the areas they control. Ankara wishes
to avoid troubleHwithGreece, but it is committed to
preventing either enosis or- the- forcible- absorption
of the Turkish Cypriot enclaves by the Makarios re-
gime. Although Makarios is universally detested in
Turkey-, many Turks privately view his continuance in
office:withequanimity, realizing that-he is a dedi-
cated and wily foe of enosis. Finally, beset- with-
domesticdifficulties-and with its parliamentary ma-
jority shrunken to-a few votes, the Demirel govern-
menti .does- not-want?to become embroiled in another
crisis over Cyprus.
There-has been only barely perceptible progress
in-the intercommunal talks-now. going-into their third
year on Cyprus. Although the negotiators for the two
communities are responsibleand able- men, they have
been hampered in their efforts-to reach agreement by
their superiors. Makarios, .who apparently continues
to believe that time is on his side,- feels under-no
compulsion to make the talks succeed. The Turkish
Cypriotauthoritiesi having-no faith in the Makarios
government's desire to come-to a fair-settlement with
them, have allowed their spokesman to make almost no
concessions.
(continued)
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The Athens government was alarmed by leftist
gains in the 5 July Cyprus parliamentary election and
is strongly opposed to further increases in the influ-
ence of the Greek Cypriot Communist Party (AKEL). The
Greek Government may believe that Makarios secretly
connived with the leftists in order to stymie his se-
rious political rival,,Glafcos derides, the moderate
Greek Cypriot negotiator in the communal talks.
After the election Athens pressed Makarios hard
to come to an agreement with the Turkish Cypriots, to
clear, the decks for action against AKEL and its allies.
Just before his death Greek Foreign Minister Pipinelis
met with Cypriot officials and insisted that the Cypri-
ots begin work immediately on a plan that could serve
as a basis of serious negotiations with the Turkish
community. The death on 19 July of Pipinelis may
cause this campaign to lose impetus, however.
Makarios has shown no new interest in making com-
promises to the Turks, despite the Greek pressure.
The prospect is for the situation to simmer on. Ten-
sions could reach flash point anytime, as it appeared
they might in the aftermath of the assassination at-
tempt on Makarios. Both Athens and Ankara, however,
are presently disposed to using their influence to
keep tension low and would likely work to keep the
lid on, in the event of a serious incident on the
island.
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