THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 16 JULY 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977569
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: July 16, 1970

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500150001-7
The President's Daily Brief
16 July 1970
50
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500150001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500150001-7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
16 July 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
In Cambodia, the fight for Kirirom continues. (Page 2)
Recent press accounts evidently have exaggerated
North Vietnam's interest in any new talks with the
US at this time. (Page 3)
On Page 4 we offer comments on the Supreme Soviet's
statement on the Middle East.
The postponement of the Soviets' 24th Party Congress
seems less a setback for Brezhnev than a recognition
that more time is needed to prepare for the session.
(Page ?5)
Communist troops in parts of South Vietnam and Cam-
bodia may be planning increased activity to mark
the Geneva accords anniversary on 20 July. (Page 7)
West Germany's foreign minister plans to arrive in
Moscow late this month for further talks on a non-
aggression pact. (Page 7)
In the United Kingdom, striking dock workers are
posing the first domestic test of the Tory government.
(Page 7)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500150001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500150001-7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOUTH VIETNAII - CAMBODIA - THAILAND
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500150001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500150001-7
Cambodia: Current Situation
THAILAND
Sam rongo
0 D
M ANCHEY
Rovien
BATTA
'Bottom bang
IgZIng\
.1).7
ornphat
47/4i ?
"0/14,14,444.'.
S'enrn:Onor'e
0;1
10?
GULF
Kompong Sell
Ve0141)enh
Kam goat Siirl/
(Sihanoukville)?
q?
OF
EC/
Take
algon
TNAM
?10.
THAILAND
40.
0 Communist-controlled location
KVA Communist-controlled
BO
SOUTH
CHINA SEA
99257 7-70 CIA
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A00e500150001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500150001-7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CAMBODIA
Enemy troops are holding their positions in the
center of Kirirom. Yesterday, however, two govern-
ment-relief battalions gained a foothold there, de-
spite intensive Communist mortar fire. Phnom Penh
has sent a fifth battalion of reinforcements to join
in the effort to retake the town.
Elsewhere, there are signs that the Communists
may be preparing another attack on the Lovek ordnance
depot in Kompong Chhnang Province. According to an
intercepted Cambodian Army message, some 500 enemy
troops were assembling at several locations west of
the depot on 14 July, and government forces at Lovek
have begun to destroy remaining munitions stocks to
prevent them falling into enemy hands. Another bat-
talion is being sent to reinforce the depot.
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500150001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500150001-7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NORTH VIETNAM
Recent press accounts claim that Soviet Deputy
Foreign Minister Firyubin told Indian officials that
Hanoi was interested in a Geneva-type conference.
Hanoi radio has denied these reports, and
official contacts of the US
Embassy in New Delhi indicate Firyubin merely reit-
erated the standard Communist position that if the
US committed itself to withdraw from Indochina on
a given timetable, Hanoi might relax its opposition
to a conference. Firyubin's comments in fact tend
to confirm other indications that unless the US
makes substantial concessions, Hanoi is not inter-
ested at the moment in opening any new talks with
Washington.
The-talks with Firyubin are being very
tightly held by the Indian Governmentl
No mention at all is made-
of Laos, despite numerous indications that.
some Communist initiative in that area--
possibly involving the International Con-
trol,Commission, of which India is chal.r-
man--is in.the works,
Firyubinis visit to New Delhi also was
meant-to soothe Indian,sensitivities by
filling them in-on Pakistani President
-Yahya Khan's recent visit to Moscow. The
Soviets usually attempt to do this after
any high.-level exchange between Moscow
and Rawalpindi-.
3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500150001-7
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1,ou1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500150001-7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR - MIDDLE EAST
Perhaps the most significant aspect of
the statement on the Middle East issued
by the Supreme Soviet yesterday was its
attempt to allay international concern
over a possible great power confrontation
in the area. This was apparent in a TASS
summary of the declaration, which contained
a formulation novel for the Soviets that
"only the peoples and governments of the
Middle Eastern States should be masters of
the situation in the Middle East."
Otherwise, the statement generally reflected
a continuity in Moscow's policy. Once
again, for example, it placed the onus for
the dangerous situation on the "imperialist
powers, particularly the US and its client,
Israel." It balanced a warning that mili-
tary danger in the area might increase "if
the aggressor is not curbed" against a call
for a settlement based on the UN Security
Council resolution of November 1967.
/ The Su-
preme Soviet declaration also reaffirmed
Israel's rightto existence,' independence,
and security.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500150001-7
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500150001-7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR
The postponement until next March of the 24th
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
has led to speculation among diplomats in Moscow
that this signals .a defeat for Brezhnev, who as re-
cently as 2 July had publicly reiterated a commitment
?to hold the meeting this year.
There may indeed have been some opposition
among politburo members to convocation of
a congress this year, but Brezhnev was by
no means alone in calling for a 1970 date.
Most of the high-level "campaigners" had
mentioned it in their pre-election speeches
in late May or early June. Thus the post-
ponement looks less like a setback for
Brezhnev than a recognition that more time
is needed to prepare for the meeting.
The major, difficulty apparently has been
working out the guidelines for the 1971-
1975 economic plan. Thus far, among, the
key sectors, priorities affecting alloca-
tion of resources have been worked out
only for agriculture,
Maneuvering for position among party lead-
ers could also have been a factor. The
naming of Brezhnev and Kosygin as the main
speakers at the congress may be aimed at
discouraging such activity.
5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500150001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500150001-7
French
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500150001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500150001-7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
FRANCE
6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500150001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500150001-7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTES
South Vietnam - Cambodia: There are signs that
the Communists may be planning to mark the period
around-20 July--the anniversary of the Geneva
cords--with an upsurge of attacks in the III and IV
corps areas of South Vietnam. These would likely be
made primarily for psychological Impact, as few Com-
munist:main force units are located near prime.tar-
gets. There is some evidence that attacks may also
be mounted in southeastern Cambodia.
West Germany - USSR: Gromyko has been advised
that Foreign Minister Scheel plans to arrive in Mos-
cow on 26 or 27 July for the next round of negotia-
tions on a-nonaggression pact. Gromyko concurred,
noting that most West Germans seem to favor an.agree-
ment with the USSR andEastern Europe. Bonn is gen-
erally optimistic about prospects for concluding a
treaty.
United Kingdom: Considerable harm to Britain's
economy could result from a nationwide dock strike
at this time; the country's trade accounts are al-
ready in the red for the third successive month. The
Tory government is suddenly facing its first domes-
tic test, made particularly significant because of
election pledges to do something about Britain's
often chaotic labor problems. Heath's handling of,
the problem, especially whether he can resist pres-
sures to employ troops in the place of the dock
workers, will be watched closely by miners, local
government employees, teachers, and others who are
readying their own demands,
US-Europe: The potential impact of pending re-
strictive US trade legislation has seriously alarmed
the members of the European Communities (EC). During
the past few days, Dutch officials, for example, have
insisted that the Mills bill, which would. limit US
imports of textiles and other products, could seri-
ously damage the Netherlands,' textile industry and
could lead to a deterioration of the entire up,-Ec
relationship. This may not be an idle threat; the
EC has traditionally reacted as a body when the:in-
terests of one of its members have been threatened.
7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500150001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500150001-7
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008500150001-7