THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 11 JULY 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977561
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: July 11, 1970

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The President's Daily Brief
11 July 1970
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
11 July 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
An assessment of the situation in Cambodia begins on
Page 3.
Communists meeting in Hanoi may be preparing a new
diplomatic initiative on Laos. (Page 6)
Bonn is anticipating careful, perhaps prolonged,
negotiations with Moscow. (Page 7)
Chilean Communists' efforts to display their strength
by calling a: strike have backfired. (Page 10)
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EGYPT USSR
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Chinese
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COMMUN I ST CHINA
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Cambodia: Current Situation
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CAMBODIA
More than a month has passed since the
North Vietnamese moved deep into western
Cambodia and hit Siem Reap city. It ap-
peared then as if Hanoi may have decided
on an early showdown in Cambodia, but in
the ensuing weeks the war has bogged down
in the summer monsoons. Siem Reap, Kompong
Thom, and Kompong Speu have been harassed
almost every night, but ground assaults
have been few and widely spaced. The Com-
munists are maintaining enough pressure
to keep the Cambodians tied down to de-
fensive positions in the major towns and
cities. An occasional ground attack,
such as the one against Saang early this
week or the munition depot at Lovek, has
been undertaken for psychological or
tactical reasons.
The circumstantial evidence suggests that
the Communists are going through a period
of retrenchment and consolidation. The
loss of materiel from the sanctuaries un-
doubtedly is one important factor; the
sheer magnitude of the task in Cambodia
is another. Some 260 miles of rugged coun-
try separates Communist main force units
along the South Vietnamese border from the
small groups far to the west that have
pushed the Cambodians into Thailand. A
campaign of swift strikes, much of it by
small bands .living off the countryside,
has given the Communists loose control
over more than half of Cambodia's terri-
tory. We doubt that the Communists intend
to fight for every square mile of this
territory, but they almost certainly in-
tend to do as much with it as they can.
This will require more troops, more cadre,
and more help from the indigenous Cambo-
dian, Lao, and tribal people who live in
the area.
(continued)
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We do not have a clear picture of what is
happening in the Cambodian countryside,
but we strongly doubt that anybody?least
of all the leaders in Phnom Penh--has a
much better idea. We do know that the Com-
munists are making a strong effort to build
a Cambodian Communist movement. They have
brought in Khmer-speaking cadre from South
Vietnam ?to help out, and they are using
Vietnamese and Cambodian Communists to set
up an administrative apparatus. It will
not be an easy job. The Cambodian Commu-
nist movement--the so-called Khmer Rouge--
is weak. The Vietnamese are racially dis-
tinct from the Khmer; they speak a dif-
ferent language, and they must overcome
the burden of long-standing Khmer animosity.
We are not inclined to write off the Com-
munist threat on these grounds, however.
The Communists are superb organizers, and
they know how to use terrorism to get what
they cannot get otherwise. We continue
to receive intercepted messages from Cam-
bodian provincial authorities reporting
that entire Cambodian villages are collab-
orating with the Communists and that large
numbers are being trained by the enemy.
There :undoubtedly is a good deal of coer-
cion involved in this, but as long as North
Vietnamese units are available to impose
discipline, such indigenous forces can be
useful to the enemy.
Hanoi probably now recognizes that to cause
the early downfall of the Lon NoZ govern-
ment would require an all-out military op-
eration, including a direct attack on Phnom
Penh itself. Hanoi may yet decide to try
this route, but it seems more likely it
will give the green light to continuation
of recent activities, namely:
--solidifying control over the north-
east; in effect, turning it into an exten-
sion of the Laotian infiltration corridor.
--concentrating on building' a viable
Cambodian Communist movement in territory
already loosely controlled.
--keeping up the pressure on the gov-
ernment itself, perhaps even by rocketing
Phnom Penh or sending in a sapper battalion
to create havoc, in the hope that the Cam-
bodian generals will capitulate to Commu-
nist demands or that the government will
collapse under the accumulated pressure.
(continued)
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The lull in major Communist military actions
continues, but there are indications of enemy inten-
tions to step up attacks in several areas. The Com-
munists may be looking for a significant scrap with
South Vietnamese forces in hopes of inflicting heavy
losses and shaking ARVN's growing confidence. The
onset of the monsoon rain, which is beginning to
hinder motor transport and reduce the air support
available to South Vietnamese forces, may encourage
enemy aggressiveness.
Vice President Ky may visit Bangkok next week
to discuss coordination of Thai and South Vietnamese
air operations in Cambodia. Ky has already visited
Phnom Penh to help coordinate military planning with
the Cambodians. During his stay in Phnom Penh, he
made promises that caused some embarrassment in Sai-
gon. It is not clear whether. Thieu has authorized
Ky's impending visit to Bangkok.
Ky, as a former chief of the South Vietnam-
ese Air Force, could probably make a sub-
stantial contribution to the discussions if
he kept his free-wheeling tendencies in
check. In order to get the Thai to do more
in Cambodia, however, he probably will make
promises that could be difficult for Saigon
to keep.
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NORTH VIETNAM
The Communists may be shaping a new dip-
lomatic initiative on Laos.
Conversations involving-Soviet officials, Pol-
ish ICC representatives,.and the Lao Patriotic
Front apparently have been under way in Hanoi since
4'Ju1y. The Soviets are represented by Deputy For-,
eign,Minister-Firyubin,_who flew unannounced to
Hanoi on 4 July, This is Firytibin's second, unpub-
licized.trip to Hanoi: this year. The' first, late.
in_February, may have been concerned in part with
the new Communist peace proposal for Laos issued
on 6.11arch.
Several developments in the past few days
suggest that Hanoi ma want to resurrect
that proposal
On 7 July the Poles sud en y agree
an ICC offer to help "facilitate" talks.
between the two Lao factions.
Whatever is brewing in-Hanoi:probably is
at least partially-a response to Souvanna
PhOuma's offer to the.Pathet Lao,. late in
June to open talks in Communist territory
with the other Laotian factions, It'might,
for exampl'e,,include a guarantee of Sou-
vannals.security in Khang,Khay, the site
he. proposed'forsuch taZks. Hanoi: has
insisted that a full bombing halt .must
precede any'negotiations, and will prob-
ably continue to insist on this as-the
price for. seriouspolitical bargaining.
The'North Vietnamese now might be willing.
to engage. in talk -restricted solely to
the bombing issue, such as' those with the
US in l.968b They might reason. that. their
recent territorial gains in southern Laos
and the threat of further strong. Communist
military pressures have put them in a
better position than before to extract
concessions from Souvanna.
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WEST GERMANY - USSR
? The , Bonn cabinet has definitely decided to
treat .the draft nonaggression treaty which? emerged
from earlier West German - Soviet discussions as
only "preliminary and open. to change" Although
the West Germans expect the Soviets to press the
Federal Republic for early signature, the cabinet
feels there must be genuine negotiations in order
to make the text more acceptable.
According to US Embassy officials, Bonn also
intends- to send letters to. the Western allies to
the effect that its . agreement with the USSR does
not affect- Bonn's basic relations with them as .
established in the London and Paris agreements of
1952- and. 1954.
(continued)
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These letters are intended to reassure
not only the Allies, but also the opposi,-
tion Christian Democrats who are highly
critical of Brandt's proposed agreement
with Moscow, It is unlikely, however,
that this gesture or the proposed textual
changes. will mollify the CDU.
Meanwhile, Brandt? has explained that although
he regards his Ostpolitik negotiations as closely
related to the four-power talks on Berlin, he does
not go along with opposition demands- that a Bonn-
Moscow agreement be contingent on the successful
conclusion of the Berlin talks. This will remove
one potentially contentious issue from the discus-
sions in Moscow.,
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CHILE
Conservative. presidential candidate Jorge Ales-
sandri was probably the only political leader to
benefit from the inconclusive strike the Communists.
called against the Frei government on 8 July. The
Communists had hoped to turn the strike into a.show
of political strength, but the unions '? response was
so spotty the_Marxists! cause was damaged instead.
The fiasco could stem the recent_upturn in the for-
tunes of the Marxist-backed- presidential candidate,
Salvador Allende.
The government, however, did not. profit from
theCommunist-slip. Student disturbances the same
day resulted in the third student death in recent
weeks and in the, arrest of other students on "au-
tonomous" university premises. The incidents are
blamed on the police and'will contribute to the
leftist campaigri.to paint the administration as
repressive.
This climate of continuing violence, al-
though not yet of major proportions, is
unusual and unsettling in Chile. Ex-
president AZessandri stands to gain the
most from it He has been at pains to
create an image of authority and has been
adroit in handling the issue in recent
weeks.
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NOTES
USSR: The Supreme Soviet is scheduled to convene
in Moscow Monday. This will be the first meeting since
the elections on 14 June, and a major agenda item will
be the formal reconstitution of the government. Some
changes in the Council of Ministers are therefore
likely. If past practice is adhered to, the party's
central committee will meet immediately before to pre-
view the decisions of the Supreme Soviet session.
Bolivia:
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