THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 3 JUNE 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977490
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: June 3, 1970

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The President's Daily Brief
3 June 1970
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
3 June 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
South Vietnan
(Page 1)
Current developments in Cambodia are discussed on
Page 3.
Room for peaceful maneuvering in the Middle East -
appears to be decreasing. Soviet propaganda has
become more harsh and the Israelis are incensed
over their highest monthly casualty rate since the
end of the June war. (Page 5)
US oil firms are involved in two multilateral con-
troversies over exploration concessions in the
Persian Gulf area. (Page 6)
Italy's upcoming regional elections are discussed
at Annex.
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-SOUTH VIETNAM
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(continued)
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Cambodia: Current Situation
I
s-
THAILAND
PREAH VI )
Route 1
iem Reap ?
-oM-Ohat
okheo
ttam bang
Gover
reinfo
OMPO
Ko pon
horn
Governme
overrun
pon/gLitam
PHNOM PENH
vay
teng
Angtass.b
/NY
RIENG
am pot
AIGON
TNAM
GULF q.
OF
THAILAND
O Government-controlled location
? Communist:-Con.trolled location
Communist-controlled
SOUTH
CHINA SEA
MILES
98734 6-70 CIA
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CAMBODIA
There are growing signs the Communists intend
to develop an extensive infiltration and base area
on the west bank of the Mekong. Cambodian military
messages indicate the enemy is now largely in con-
trol of Route 12 from the Laos border as far south
as Rovieng. Communist units are fanning out in the
countryside and seem to be establishing a rudimen-
tary administrative apparatus. Government battalions
in Preah Vihear Province have broken down into
smaller units and are planning to run guerrilla op-
erations against the Communists.
Elsewhere in the country, the government is
sending reinforcements into Kompong Thom city, and
the area commander has asked for air attacks on
road sections in the province held by the enemy.
In Kompong Cham Province, a government position
near the Communist-controlled Prek Kak rubber plan-
tation was overrun on the night of 31 May - 1 June.
The defending battalion was forced to withdraw.
This reverse increases the threat to Kompong Cham
city from the north.
The Communists appear to be having some suc-
cess recruiting ethnic Cambodians to help administer
newly won towns. A Cambodian deputy from Chhlong
town, which fell to the Communists in late April,
has told US officials that ethnic Cambodians as
well as Vietnamese and other minorities were col-
laborating with the small occupying force of be-
tween 50 and 100 men. The Communists have gone so
far as to name ethnic Cambodians as "mayors" of
Chhlong and Kratie towns.
The commitment of most of these new Cam-
bodian recruits is probably highly tenta-
tive.f
(continued)
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USSR - MIDDLE EAST - ISRAEL
Soviet propaganda has recently taken an uncom-
monly tough stand on the Middle East,
--The Soviet press has caustically ridiculed
Mrs. Meir's speech to the Knesset on 26 May, char-
acterizing it as US-inspired propaganda calculated
to offset the reaction to further arms deliveries.
--A Pravda commentary on 31 May advocated "forc-
ing" Israel to respect the UN Charter. The same day,
.Pravda reverted to the toughest Kremlin interpreta-
tion of the Security Council resolution, calling for
the "speediest" Israeli withdrawal from all occupied
Arab ,lands. The article also said. that .a political
settlement must be just and "naturallywithout.any
concessions to the aggressor."
--Other press commentaries have noted "Egypt's
intention to repulse any aggression from the air and
have claimed that Israeli military superiority is
"coming slowly but surely to an end." On 29 May,
an official TASS statement warned that Tel Aviv's
present policy is "fraught with dangerous conse-
quences, for Israel itself above all."
Moscow's hard public line, together with
its recent military and diplomatic steps,
suggests that the Kremlin has adopted a
policy of trying to squeeze concessions
out of Israel by steadily increasing po-
litical, psychological, and military pres-
sure on Tel Aviv.
Given Israel's present "siege mentality,"
such a course on Moscow's part could be a
dangerous miscalculation.
Sixty-five Israelis were killed on the various '
fronts last month, including 19 civilians. This is
the highest monthly total since the June war, About
half of the losses were sustained on the Egyptian
front. Israeli casualties since the June war now
total about 690 dead and 2,425 wounded; in the war
itself, the figures were 800 and 3,000.
The Israeli public tends to associate the
increased casualties with Soviet support
for Nasir. Should the losses continue at
the May rate, the government would be under
more pressure than ever to attempt some
new and drastic military action, despite
the risk of direct clashes with the Soviets
in Egypt.
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UK and Iran warn Occidental
Oil Co. against drilling near
Abu Musa (island in dispute
between Sharjah and Iran)
Fujai at,
-25-
Boundary
byAbtDj)ab . ::??
. :
Saudis rerieW4041.04haf
Abu Pbabi ?6asi:411,b0r.a:1
ikons :area's, ?
98735 6-70 CIA
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PERSIAN GULF
US-owned international oil firms are currently
embroiled in two political controversies in the Per-
sian Gulf. Occidental is threatened by both the UK
and Iran, if it commences operations off Abu Musa
Island in a location granted it by the British-pro-
tected sheikhdom of Umm al-Qaiwain. The neighboring
sheikhdom of Sharjah, also a British charge, is ac-
knowledged by Britain and the other sheikhdoms to
own Abu Musa, and it has granted oil rights on the
island itself to another US firm, Buttes Gas and
Oil Company. Recently Sharjah extended the terri-
torial waters of Abu Musa so that they now overlap
the concession area of Occidental. The UK has pro-
posed a three-month moratorium on oil operations so
that the dispute may be worked out. Occidental rep-
resentatives yesterday told the British the company
would honor the moratorium.
There was a minor incident the day before, how-
ever, when Occidental barges in the disputed area
near Abu Musa Island were boarded by a British mine-
sweeper. Occidental responded by filing a high
court writ in London claiming "damages" from the
minesweeper commander and the UK Defense Ministry.
The "damages" referred to probably are legal rather
than physical.
Iran disregards the claims of the two sheikhdoms
and views the island as Iranian. It threatens to
take direct action against any oil operations not
sanctioned by Tehran. The Iranians are apprehensive
about the "devious" British role in the concession
dispute. Iran's Acting Foreign Minister Khalatbari
told Ambassador MacArthur on 31 May that the Iran-
ians suspect that the UK will use force if Tehran
asserts its rights to Abu Musa.
On the southern shore of the Persian Gulf, the
Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company (ADPC) is working in an
area disputed between Abu Dhabi, a British protec-
torate, and Saudi Arabia. The British are the ma-
jority owners of ADPC but Mobil and Jersey have a
22 1/2 percent interest. Saudi Arabia, which for-
mally claimed the area in 1949, insists that ADPC
is working in an area assigned to Saudi Arabia under
a 1955 agreement with the UK.
(continued)
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Some work has continued however/
/ Another American company,
Aramco, has already given up its concession rights
in the disputed area.
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NOTE
USSR: The Soyuz 9 spacecraft and its two-man
crew seem to be functioning satisfactorily.
the two cosmonauts may attempt a longer-duration
mission than previous Soviet manned space flights,
The longest such flight to date was five days.
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Regional
ELECTIONS IN ITALY
On 7 and 8 June the electorate in most of
Italy will vote to fill the usual local
and provincial posts and to choose 15 new
regional councils. These councils are due
to take over a number of the functions now
exercised by the central government, in
effect decentralizing it to a degree. At
least three of them will probably, be domi-
nated by the Communists, who will then be
operating at a higher level of governmental
authority than at any time since they left
the national government in the late 1940s.
The non-Communist parties are concerned
about this and about the political alli-
ances some of their local affiliates may
accept in the new structures of regional
government.
The four member parties of Premier Mariano
Rumor's coalition government will view the
returns as a gauge against which to check
their assessment of political currents in
Italy today. In particular, the voting
will test the popularity of the vigorous
anti-Communist position of the Unitary
Socialist Party; its fortunes will affect
politicians' judgments about the expediency
of cooperating with the Communists in the
future.
Elections
The establishment of regional councils for the
country's 15 new regions will mark a fundamental
change in the organization and administration of the
country. (Five special regions including the is-
lands of Sicily and Sardinia and the three ethnic
minority areas in the north are already functioning
but are peripheral to the national life politically
as well as geographically.) The regions will have
quasi-autonomous status in various fields including
some police functions, welfare and regional public
works, They will also have independent financial
resources estimated initially at $1 billion from
national revenues and $200 million in locally col-
lected revenue. The councils that will administer
them will have a membership numbering 30-80, under a
president chosen from the council. Legislation gov-
erning the councils powers is to be worked out by
the central and regional governments after the elec-
tions.
(continued)
Al
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Results of Italian National Elections, May 1968
LEFT
Co
Ct'r4 A
Italian Socialists & Republicans
Unitary Socialists 2.0 %
Proletarian
Socialists
Communists
4.5 %
A
4.0
14.5%
98 643 5-70
Italy Faces Regional Elections
Christian Democrats
39.1%
Liberals 58 %
Neo-Fascists 4.5%
Monarchists 1.3 %
Others 1.4 %
FRIULI-
VENEZIA
GIULIA
VENETO
e(?,
LAZIO
Rome?
Communist domination likely
Communist domination possible'
"Regional government already established
0
SICILIA*
98644 5-70 CIA
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Extrapolations from previous election results
indicate that three regions in the center of the
country?Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, and Umbria--are
likely to have governments controlled by the Com-
munists and their allies, possibly including ?the
Socialists; There may also be Communist-dominated
regional governments in Liguria and Marche.
The Communist campaigns in the three regions
they are likely to dominate illustrate the differ-
ences in approach of two key factions within the
Italian Communist Party. The campaign in Umbria is
stressing the importance of the strike weapon, of
the worker, and of the leadership of the proletariat.
The chief Communist candidate and proposed regional
president is a labor leader. The campaigns in
Emilia-Romagna and in Tuscany, in contrast, are
stressing the party's pragmatic ability to work with
men of various political beliefs. The chief. Commu-
nist candidates in these two regions have political
rather than labor backgrounds. The Communists in
Tuscany have been candid in stating that they would
use their victory to provide a model of what Commu-
nist government on a national scale would be like,
to gain experience in working with various political
currents, and to lobby ?in Rome for national policies
favored by the party.
In other parts of the country, both north and
south of the red belt, most of the regions will
probably be run by coalitions resembling the center-
left coalition of the central government. Signifi-
cant for the future will be the extent to which the
Socialist Party breaks the national pattern to join
the Communists on the local and regional level.
Implications for the National Coalition
On the level of national government, the June
elections have particular importance as a test of
the competitive political strengths of the center-
left coalition parties and of the Communists. Vot-
ing patterns are usually extremely stable in Italy,
and political leaders give great weight to gains or
losses of one or two percent of the electorate.
Even changes of this magnitude, therefore, have na-
tional repercussions. Interpretation of the elec-
tions, however, will be influenced by the political
bias of the interpreter as he studies inevitable in-
consistencies in the vote on the local, provincial,
and regional levels.
(continued)
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Of special interest will be the performance of
the Unitary Socialist Party (PSU), which seceded
from the main body of the Socialist Party (PSI) in
July 1969 after almost three years of union. The
PSU said it seceded because the PSI was too willing
to work with the Communists. The PSI, on the other
hand, attributed the secession to personal rivalries.
In any case, the PSU is waging a vigorous anti-Com-
munist election campaign, attacking both Socialists
and Christian Democrats as too left-leaning.
Should the PSU do significantly better than it
did as an independent party in 1963, it would insist
on recognition of its enhanced standing at the na-
tional level. In any such move, its efforts would
be aided by its implied threat that President Sar-
agat, who is sympathetic to the PSU, might use his
constitutional power to call new national parliamen-
tary elections before the normal expiration of the
parliamentary term in 1973.
Failure of the PSU to increase its vote signif-
icantly, on the other hand, would tend to strengthen
the hand of Socialists and left-wing Christian Demo-
crats who favor some degree of acceptance of Commu-
nist cooperation in regional government and in the
national parliament.
A3
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Top Secret
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