THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 2 JUNE 1970
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0005977488
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
10
Document Creation Date:
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 24, 2016
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 2, 1970
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The President's Daily Brief
2 June 1970
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
2 June 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Events in Cambodia are discussed on Page 1.
Libya may try to enhance its image in the Arab world
by moving against US interests. (Page 3)
(Page 4)
On Page 5 we examine various aspects of the situa-
tion in Peru.
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Cambodia: Current Situation
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SOUTH
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98716 6-70 CIA
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CAMBODIA
Recent Cambodian Army reports indicate that in-
creasing numbers of enemy troops are infiltrating
the northern provinces of Preahyihear and Kompong
Thom. One intercepted army message claimed that
Communist elements have been assembling in groups
of about 100 men and infiltrating eastern areas of
Preah Vihear,. where they have occupied two villages.
On.30 May some 150 Communist troops captured the
town of Rovieng on Route 12.
In Kompong Thom Province, the Communists di--
rected mortar fire on the capital during the night
of 31 May - 1. June; this was the first enemy action
against the city. Additional attacks are certain
to follow. During the same night the Communists
captured the town of Baray, south of the capital,
thereby tightening their cOntrol over Route 6.
The Communists' objectives in moving into
areas well west of the Mekong are still
difficult to determine. They may be push-
ing toward the sizable Vietnamese commu-
nity near the Tonle Sap in western Kompong
Thom, or they may be preparing for an
eDentuca linkup with other forces now op-
erating in provinces west of Phnom Penh,
possibly to open new logistics routes.
The recent northwestward shift of the
headquarters of the Viet Cong 275th Regi-
ment from Kratie suggests that this unit
may also be involved.
In the northeast, steady enemy pressure finally
forced the govdrnment to evacuate the town of Lom-
phat on 31 May, under the cover of allied air sup-
port. Two government battalions previously stationed
at Lomphat as well as most of the town's civilian
population, are moving north to Labansiek. Army
messages report that yesterday the Communists am--
bushed several government convoys carrying evacuees
from Lomphat and destroyed a number of trucks. -The
Communists also attacked Labansiek again, but thus
far air support has prevented the town's capture.
It probably is only a matter of time, however, be-
fore the governments presence in Ratanakiri Prov-
ince is completely eliminated.
(continued)
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A large South Vietnamese armored column is con-
tinuing its drive to clear the Communists from the
east side of the Mekong River between the Neak Luong
ferry crossing and the town of Kompong Cham to the
north. The column hopes to engage retreating ele-
ments of the Viet Cong 9th Division, which were
driven out of the town of Prey Veng last weekend.
after occupying parts of it briefly. The headquar-
ters of the division was located about 13 miles
southwest of Kompong Cham town on 31 May.
Thai Prime Minister Thanom has all but confirmed
that Bangkok intends to send "volunteers" into Cam-
bodia. He told the press yesterday that while no
final decision had been made, the government was
"considering" training battalion-sized units for de-
ployment into the major towns in western Cambodia
and into Phnom Penh. He implied that the objections
raised by some members of-his government would be
overruled.
The main political headquarters of COSVN has
moved farther northward in Cambodia. It is now
some 33 miles north of South Vietnam's Tay Ninh
Province border.
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LIBYA
According to Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals
Undersecretary Qiblaaiwi, the' very, large Increase in
oil prices demanded by A government committee headed
by former premier Maghribi may be intended by him to
provide an excuse for unilateral action against the
,companies. Qiblaaiwi told a US Embassy officer last
week that he believes the only way the companies
might avoid a showdown with the government is to make
a prompt offer to settle on higher prices than they
had previously wished to accept. The official im-
plied that the government's intent was to engineer
a seizure of Anglo-American oil interests in retri-
bution for US and UK support of Israel.
Premier Qaddafi is currently urging other
Arab states to exert maximum pressure on
the US if the US decides to rant urther
military aid to Israel.
It is clear, nevertheless, that Qaddafi
would not hesitate to try to intimidate
the oil companies and the US through di-
rect action against American interests
in Libya. Rather than move against the
oil companies directly, he could seize
virtually empty Wheelus Field in a sym-
bolic act of defiance before 11 June--
the date the US now plans for a formal
turnover of the base to the Libyans.
The Libyan Air Force already has moved
automatic weapons inside the base per-
imeter and armed some 500 airmen there.
Qaddafi would gain great credit among
the Arabs for seizure of Wheelus, and
it would boost his image as a leader in
the campaign,against US policy on Israel.
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WEST GERMANY
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PERU
The following is a general roundup of re-
cent developments in Peru:.
The military government has stepped up its so-
called revolution in 1970, promulgating new reform
measures and becoming more repressive against its
opponents. Among the reforms, two that were decreed
in December 1969--the reorganization of the court
system and the new regulatory press law--have pro-
vided the Velasco government with the tools to begin
silencing its critics. The newly appointed Supreme
Court has already demonstrated that it will uphold
the government when government actions are challenged,
and one newspaper publishing company has been ex-
propriated and turned over to a Communist-dominated
workers ? cooperative.
President Velasco has continued to lead the
.campaign to reduce the influence of the wealthy oli-
garchy--the people he sees as the principal "enemies
of the revolution." New foreign exchange controls
issued last week are typical of government moves to
curb the economic influence of the oligarchs. Under
these controls, Peruvians who maintain banking ac-
counts in dollars, in Peruvian banks or in accounts
abroad, must turn their dollars in for soles or face
severe penalties.
The principal economic problem that has faced
the Velasco government is its failure to attract new
investment, either from domestic or foreign sources.
The new restrictions, which could set the stage for
a large increase in public investment, have instead
frightened Peruvian businessmen and could hinder gov-
ernment efforts to get the stagnating Peruvian econ-
omy moving again.
Pr?dent Velasco has demonstrated increasing
sensitivity to the charges of Communist influence
in his government. He has forcefully denied the
charges on several occasions and has declared his
revolution to be "nationalist and humanist." The
government in recent weeks has attempted. toreduce
the growing Communist influence in certain sectors
of Peruvian society. For instance, the Communist
Party tried to gain control of the Committees for
the Defense of the Revolution, which were developed.
with the encouragement of the government as a means
(continued)
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of achieving a popular base.. The governmentis now
taking steps it hopes will assure its-control of
newly formed groups.
The government's reaction to the Communist ques-
tion undoubtedly reflects the fear that such charges,
combined with increasing economic problems, could
lead to disaffection within the military establish-
ment and the'. possible eventual collapse of the gov-
ernment. Disagreement With some of the Velasco gov-
ernments policies exists within- the military but
such opposition has thus far been-subordinate to the
concept 'of unity behind the military government.
Only a serious deterioration in the internal: situa-
tion--widespread economic failure, labor unrest and
student discontent--would be likely to prompt the
military to reverse President Velasco's policies or
overthrow his government.
In a press. conference the other day President
Velasco said that-Peru's relations with the US have
improved considerably from their low point in Octo-
ber 1968--the date'of the expropriation of the Inter-
national Petroleum. Company's holdings. Velasco has
given no indications' however that his government is
prepared to yield. on compensation of IPC and-Peru's
claim to a 200-mile territorial sea--the major isSIWS
impeding further improvement of relations.
Relations with the Soviet Union and' Eastern
Europe have slowly become more cordial', and talks
continue on economic cooperation, trade, and'techni-
cal. assistance. Perhaps the major event in Peru's
foreign relations in recent months was the visit to
Lima last month of the apparent number two. mariin-
Yugoslavia?Edvard Kardelj. He received red, carpet.
treatment from the Peruvians and appears to have'
gained some advocates for the Yugoslav model-of eco-
nomic self-management" and possibly for the policy of
nonalignment.
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