THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 20 MAY 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977464
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: May 20, 1970

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008300170001-7
The President's Daily Brief
20 May 1970
27
Top Secret 50X1
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
20 May 1970
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PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Cambodia
Communications of COSVN units continue to reflect
considerable disarray. (Page 3)
Communist forces in Northern Laos have been holding
back, but they are still a considerable threat.
(Page 4)
Some highlights from Fidel Castro's latest speech
are on Page 6.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008300170001-7
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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CAMBOD I A
(continued)
1
1
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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Cambodia: Current Situation
THAILAND
?
twgj eng
Purs
IN
.ampong Thom
Ko pong cham
entifooeir3,
beachhead
W.
ssible corn unist
-deploypent
19/
1Communist-controlled
//7// Contested or under Communist
influence
SOUTH
CHINA SEA
;ig.?
98595 5-70 CIA
, ?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008300170001-7
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
On the military side, the Communists apparently
are becoming more active again' south of Phnom Penh.
An army message reports-that some Communist forces
intend to move from Prey Veng to an' area just south
of the capital-, where another enemy unit with heavy
weapons is already installed in a Vietnamese temple.
According to press reports, however, the only- actual
fighting south of Phnom Penh at the crossroads
town of Tram Khnar, 25 miles from the capital.:
The military situation in the-city of Kompong
Cham is still tense. Some enemy elements-apparently
are threatening the city from entrenched positions.
on-its outskirts, and' yesterday all government forces
pulled back across the Mekong River to Kompong'Cham
when-Communist pressure made their, beachhead at
Tonle Bet untenable.
many Viet- 50X1
namese residents in the-northern provinces-of Kratie
and Stung Treng are rallying.to Communist forces
a number of young Chi- 50X1
nese from Kompong Cham and other population centers
also are joining the enemy.
The Communists apparently are becoming increas-
ingly active on the west bank of the Mekong. Inter-
cepted messages also indicate that some Communist
troops are moving westward into Kompong Thom Prov-
ince, and an army supply truck has been seized by
the Communists in that province. A Cambodian bat-
talion is moving into the area to try and block
further Communist inroads.
2
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOUTH VIETNAM - CAMBODIA
? The northward movement of important elements of
COSVN to a site in Cambodia about 20 miles north of
the border, which we reported in The President's
Dail Brief on 16 Ma has been confirmed
Communications,Of COSVN units continue to
reflect considerable disarray caused by allied cross-
border operations,.. Messages exchanged between intel-
ligence units, fOr example, have alluded to "insur-
mountable problems" and orders to "set up adequate
defenses" and "conserve food stocks." Some units
have been directed to avoid contact with allied
, forces.
3
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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LAOS
AREA OF
MAIN MAP
Vientiane
612
an Ban \
ala
hou
houn
Xieng
houaflgviII
ang Vieng
?
110 20 Miles
.? lb 2.0 Kilometers /..)
98596 5-70 CIA
,
? COmmunist-held location
?. ?
overnment-held location
t
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008300170001-7
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LAOS
In recent weeks General yang Pao's guerrillas
have secured Long Tieng Valley from all but minor
enemy harassment, and substantial numbers of civil-
ians have begun returning to the area. For the most
part, North Vietnamese troops have been reacting to
ground actions rather than initiating them. Inter-
cepted enemy messages have shown that casualties
have been heavy in some North Vietnamese units. The
Communists extended supply lines into the Long Tieng
area are vulnerable to ground harassment, and heavy
rains are only a few weeks away.
The redeployment of several front-line units of
the North Vietnamese 316th Division back onto the
Plaine des Jarres suggests the Communists are already
shifting to a defensive posture. These deployments
and the continuing presence of the 312th Division
suggest that the Communists are hoping to avoid a
repetition of last year's debacle, when Vang Pao's
offensive took the Plaine des Jarres almost without
a fight.
. Vang Pao still faces a considerable threat. Re-
cently the Communists seized several government posi-
tions within rocket range of Long Tieng--demonstrat-
ing that they still retain an offensive capability.
Some 1,500 men have been sent to southern Laos to
meet the upsurge in Communist military activity
there, and Vang Pao 's positions remain vulnerable
to sapper attacks.
If Vang Pao succeeds in clearing the area
south of the Plaine, he can sit tight,
consolidate his hold around Long Tieng,
and give his troops a much needed respite.
This strategy might include an effort to
recapture bases north of the Plaine and
some harassment of the enemy's rear areas,
but it would avoid a major wet season of-
fensive. Such a course could conceivably
return the fighting in the north to the
pre-1969 ground rules, when the Plaine was
more or less a Communist sanctuary and the
Communists refrained from driving toward
Long Tieng and the Meo heartland.
(continued)
4
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
This course runs the risk of allowing the
Communists to maintain forward positions
on the Plaine from which they could mount
a fresh offensive toward Long Tieng in the
fall. An offensive to push the Communists
from the Plaine once again or to interdict
Route 7 might set back Communist plans,
but it would probably be more costly than
last year's effort.
Either way, it seems doubtful that the Meo
guerrillas can extricate themselves from
the war of attrition in which they have
been locked with the Communists for the
past decade.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008300170001-7
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CUBA
In a two-hour speech last night, Fidel Castro
ranged over a great variety of topics. Some of the
highlights:
--A blast at the British because Cuban exile
groups use the Bahamas. "Cuba is not going to adopt
a policy of standing by with folded arms."
--An admission that the sugar harvest will be
less than the goal of ten million tons. "This is
something hard to take."
--A statement that Cuba "should withdraw from
the Swiss Embassy its status as representative of
the United States? interests in Cuba."
6
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Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A008300170001-7