THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 13 MAY 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977452
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: May 13, 1970

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The President's Daily Brief
13 May 1970
46
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
13 May 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
The Communists continue to press Cambodian Government
forces in border provinces. (Page 1)
Moscow's gesture of support for Sihanouk yesterday
fell short of diplomatic recognition of his newly
formed government. (Page 2)
Allied operations in Cambodia are delaying North
Vietnamese infiltration groups heading for the South.
(Page 3)
Some enemy units in South Vietnam plan additional
activity in areas where allied units have been di-
verted to the Cambodian front. (Page 4)
Tel-Aviv's thrust into southern Lebanon may tempo-
rarily deter fedayeen activity but in the longer
run is likely to lead to a further deterioration
of the situation. (Page 5)
An installation under construction in northeastern
China may be a surface-to-surface missile site.
(Page 6)
?The military situation in Laos is noted on Page 6.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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Cambodia: Current Situation
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104 106
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CAMBODIA
An estimated 100 Vietnamese Communist
troops have attacked a government force across the
river from the town and have destroyed a nearby
bridge. The Communists have also blocked a section
of a road in the area on the east bank of the Me-
kong.(
In the south, Communist forces are still be-
sieging the capital of Takeo Province. An estimated
700 enemy troops ambushed a four-truck government
convoy on Route 3 just north of Takeo on 11 May.
In addition, communications intelligence discloses
that a radio station associated with the military
arm of COSVN is now located about 15 miles southwest
of Takeo.
This is the deepest penetration of such a
facility into this province to date. The
station was located in the Takeo Province
South Vietnam border area on 1 May.
Along the eastern part of the border, top-level
Communist command authorities and some main force
combat units continue to pull back farther into Cam-
bodia. Many are nearing the announced 21-mile limit
of US penetration and could be heading for temporary
sanctuary deeper within the country. I
1
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USSR-CAMBODIA
Premier Kosygin's telegram yesterday to Siha-
nouk is the first direct gesture Of support that
the Prince has received from the USSR. It falls
well short, however, of the full diplomatic recog-
nition already extended by Hanoi and Peking to Si-
hanouk's "Royal Government of National Union."
Kosyqin's message was addressed to "Mr." Norodom
Sihanouk, and it congratulates him not on the for-
mation of his government-in-exile, but on the
"United Front" which he established soon after his
ouster.
Moscow's failure to recognize Sihanouk's
"government" reflects Soviet caution and
uncertainty about the orientation and
prospects for success of a Sihanouk-Zed
liberation movement. Moscow probably felt
compelled to make this demonstration of
support for Sihanouk to counter Chinese
influence on Indochina developments.
Kosygin's telegram bears the mark of a
holding operation while the Soviets sort
out all the implications of the Indochina
situation, but it will be difficult for
the USSR to stay out of step with Hanoi
for long on a policy matter of this im-
portance. Sihanouk quickly accepted the
sign of Soviet support but made it clear
in a telegram to Kosy gin that he was for-
mally requesting official recognition of
his government-in-exile.
2
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NVA Infiltration Troops Temporarily Halted
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MILES
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VC/NVA base area along
Cambodian border
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NORTH VIETNAM
Allied operations in Cambodia are plugging the
infiltration pipeline to South Vietnam. In inter-
cepted messages of 8 and 9 May, Hanoi ordered at
least 19 infiltration groups, currently located at
two major stopover stations in the Lao panhandle,
not to continue south. The groups are small, and
the total number of personnel involved is around
500. Infiltration authorities at the stations are
being told to guarantee security for the groups and
to keep them fit and ready to move out when ordered.
The delay unquestionably is due to allied
operations in Cambodia. All the halted
groups are slated for assignment in either
the III or the IV corps areas of South
Vietnam. Their route normally would take
them through the area of allied operations
in Cambodia.
Other infiltration groups headed for south-
ern South Vietnam probably are also being
affected, although there is no evidence of
this as yet in intercepts. About 12,000
North Vietnamese replacement troops were
scheduled to arrive in the III and IV
corps areas during May, June, and July.
Heavy losses of equipment in Cambodian
base areas are likely to give the enemy
further reason to delay the arrival of
substantial numbers of new troops.
Hanoi is moving some of its MIG jet fighters
now stationed in China back to North Vietnam. Thus
far, eight MIG-21s and six MIG-19s have arrived at
Yen Bai airfield northwest of Hanoi. These deploy-
ments may reflect Hanoi's apprehension over the pos-
sibility of renewed US bombing of the North. They
will augment an already substantial fighter force--
some 60 MIG-21s and ten MIG-19s--based in North Viet-
nam.
3
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SOUTH VIETNAM
Some Communist units within South Vietnam are
planning offensive operations to take advantage of
the diversion of allied forces to the Cambodian
front. Numerous references to the deployment of al-
lied forces to the Cambodian border have cropped up
in recent intercepts and documents. In many cases,
enemy units were directed to try to strike in areas
where allied strength has been cutback.
We cannot judge how great an effort the
Communists can put together in the immedi-
ate future, as this will depend on the
readiness of various units and other local
conditions. The Communists nevertheless
are probably anxious to get an operation
of some sort going, if not one severe
enough to force the early withdrawal of
US or South Vietnamese troops from the
border regions, then at least one strong
enough to score some tactical success
against lightly defended areas.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LEBANON ISRAEL
In contrast to fedayeen claims of heavy fight-
ing and high casualties, Israeli officials seem to
be trying to depict their day-long "combing opera-
tion" in southern Lebanon as limited. They describe
it as a "screening" action designed to capture feda-
yeen and to destroy their bases. Tel Aviv has given
no figures of guerrillas killed and says only that
Israeli forces took 11 prisoners and destroyed some
40 buildings and ten vehicles, while suffering 11
wounded themselves. It also warns that much stronger
ripostes are in the offing if fedayeen attacks from
Lebanon continue.
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With the Lebanese cabinet delicately bal-
anced between pro- and anti-fedayeen fac-
tions, the Lebanese Army's communiques
may have been an attempt to head off pub-
lic criticism of the government for not
acting forcefully enough against the Is-
raelis. It is possible, however, that a
fedayeen-led outcry may still bring down
the cabinet. Ambassador Porter believes
that in any case the Lebanese public is
likely to blame the US for not stopping
the attack and that some groups may even
accuse the US of complicity with Tel Aviv.
Over the longer term, events in Lebanon
are likely to parallel the developments
of the past few years in Jordan. The Is-
raeli attack is unlikely, to deter further
fedayeen incursions into Israel for long.
Fearful of initiating yet another govern-
ment-fedayeen confrontation with its ac-
companying political problems, Beirut
probably will not attempt any strong meas-
ures of its own to control the fedayeen.
This in turn is likely to lead to further
Israeli air and ground strikes against
fedayeen concentrations in Lebanon.
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NOTES
Communist China: Satellite photography shows
that an installation under construction since 1967
at I-cho-mao in northeastern China may be a surface-
to-surface missile site.
Laos: Communist military activity continues
to focus on the Bolovens Plateau. The enemy has
succeeded in dispersing government guerrillas from
a key position located some ten miles northwest of
the provincial capital of Attopeu. The guerrillas
are now regrouping in an effort to retake it. In
the north, there have been only a few minor clashes
in the Long Tieng area.
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Top Secret
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