THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 7 MAY 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977442
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: May 7, 1970

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The President's Daily Brief
7 May 1970
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
7 May 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Allied military operations have forced COSVN to cur-
tail sharply its radio communications. (Page 1)
For their part, Cambodian troops reportedly took
heavy losses yesterday when they tried to push Com-
munist forces from the west bank of the Mekong near
the Neak Luong ferry. (Page 3)
The Communists' promise to return to the Paris talks
next week, after boycotting them yesterday, is one
more sign that they are treading warily in these
times of uncertainty in Indochina. (Page 4)
Recent satellite photography shows that the Soviets
are continuing work on the J-Bird their lar est
space booster. (Page 5)/
_Soviet officials, meanwhile, are putting out further
aignals of impending high-level personnel changes.
(Page 7)
France's annual nuclear test series will begin about
the middle of the month in the Pacific. (Page 8)
Some of the political problems besetting the Saigon
regime are outlined in an Annex today.
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COSVN Staff Moving to Avoid Allied Operations
Demilitarized Zone
THAILAND
Q ng Ngai
? Tank
Sap
S N military, --
and intelligence
components
shift north
hook Area
CO VN political hq.11. c N h
0,1 Parrot's )k Ar
CORPS -
?
98447 5-70 CIA
VC/NVA base area along
? Cambodian border
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SOUTH VIETNAM - CAMBODIA
The top military and intelligence components of
COSVN have shifted about ten miles to the north in
the Fishhook sector and have cut back communications,
limiting them mainly to the hours of darkness. The
only exception has been the COSVN element that con-
trols the various subregional headquarters in South
Vietnam's III Corps. This station appears to be re-
suming some of its normal activity. Communications
between the COSVN's military command and its polit-
ical headquarters, which has been moving to evade
allied actions in the area west of Mimot, also ap-
pear to have been affected.
These communication anomalies resemble
those occurring during earlier allied at-
tacks on Communist headquarters areas in
South Vietnam. In these earlier opera-
tions, enemy communications were curtailed
as long as allied forces were nearby, but
they usually returned to normal when al-
lied forces moved away. Headquarters
staffs managed to survive, apparently be-
cause of their compactness and mobility in
terrain that provides ready concealment.
Elements of only one North Vietnamese combat
regiment have been contacted in the Fishhook region
so far, but intercepted messages reveal that COSVN
has ordered another regiment to attack allied forces
in the area soon. Early reports on the other opera-
tions along the Cambodian border indicate that some
allied units have come under heavy enemy fire, but
no sustained ground battles have developed.
The Thieu government fears that Viet Cong agents
may be able to foment major disorders in Saigon dur-
ing the next few weeks, in coordination with in-
creased military activity in the countryside.
The subject was discussed at an emergency cab-
inet meeting on 4 May
Security officials warned that many Commu-
nist agents have infiltrated Saigon and are attempt-
ing to inspire disorders which would peak on or
about 19 May. Buddha's birthday will be celebrated
this year on that date, which also happens to be Ho
Chi Minh's birthday.
(continued)
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Adding concern is the diversion for
the Cambodian operations of many units which normally
operate in the Saigon area.
that the police are not taking their usual precau-
tions because of poor morale. The police have been
reported to be discouraged by the government's fail-
ure to back them up in their handling of student and
veteran demonstrators.
The government is taking some steps to rem-
edy the situation. Four battalions have
been moved into the capital and the curfew
has been extended. The government has also
followed up its order closing all schools
and universities in the Saigon area by
banning all strikes, demonstrations, and
meetings prejudicial to public security
and order.
At Annex we discuss some of the other political
problems? currently besetting Thieu.
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CAMBODIA
several army bat-
talions made an unsuccessful effort yesterday to
push Communist forces from the west bank of the Me-
kong River near the Neak Luong ferry, south of Phnom
Penh. Cambodian troops reportedly took heavy losses.
No other significant engagements or Communist attacks
were reported elsewhere in the country.
The government's evident determination to
have a military showdown with the Commu-
nists is illustrated by its apparent in-
tention to break diplomatic relations with
the Viet Cong's Provisional Revolutionary
Government and resume closer relations with
Saigon. These decisions ma be announced
today.
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VIETNAM
More significant than the Communists refusal
to show at yesterday's session of the Paris talks
was their announcement that they would be back next
week. The failure to break off the talks defini-
tively, after months of threatening to do so, is
the best example to date of Hanoi's unwillingness
to close off any political options0. The propaganda
treatment of recent US military actions--condemning
them in strong terms but carefully not committing
Hanoi to forceful retaliation--is also illustrative
of the recent caution of the North Vietnamese.
Hanoi's slowness in recognizing Sihanouk's
government-in-exile" may have been caused
by the same urge to temporize. It ex-
tended recognition yesterday only after
Peking, Budapest, Pyongyang, and. Tirana
had already done so. Moreover, the North
Vietnamese did not say initially, as the
Chinese had, that they were pulling their
remaining diplomats out Of Phnom Penh.
This suggests that even now the Vietnamese
Communists are reluctant to foreclose com-
pletely the possibility of dealing with
the Lon Nol government.
One of the reasons for Hanoi's caution
may be its inability to get Moscow and
Peking to agree on a. common line. Party
First Secretary Le Duan has been away from
home almost three weeks. His absence at
such a critical time strongly suggests
that the Vietnamese are being pulled in
different directions by their two princi-
pal allies, with Peking pressing a mili-
tant line and Moscow advising moderation.
Such problems may delay long-range deci-
sions involving the commitment of politi-
cal and military assets in Indochina..
They should not, however, get in the way
of Hanoi's day-to-day tactical decisions
on the battlefield.
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Soviets Continue Work
on Complex J Vehicle
Soviet Complex J Vehicle
Liftoff thrust ----13-14 million lbs.
Earth orbit payload
(pounds)---- 200,000-300,000
Payload on Lunar
Trajectory
(pounds) 70,000
US Saturn V'
Liftoff thrust ----7.0 million lbs
Earth orbit payload
(pounds) --- 285,000
Payload on Lunar
Trajectory
(pounds) -100,000
Sarum V uses Mr energy upper start
St inerease payload capability
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USSR
The latest photography from a satellite over
Tyuratam shows that the Soviets are still working
on their largest space booster--assembled on one of.
the pads at Complex J and therefore dubbed "the
J-Bird".by US observers of Soviet rocketry. The
first booster of this type-to be tested blew up on
the other pad at Complex J last July during an.at-
tempt to launch a payload to the moon. The exten-
sive damage to that pad is still being repaired.
The J-Bid is the Soviet counterpart of the
Saturn V, but/
/it cannot deliver as
large -a payload to the moon. The difference in per-
formance is in the high-energy propellants in the
upper stages of the Saturn.
The Soviets would have to use two J-Birds
to put a man on the moon--a rendezvous
would be .necessary. Thus, both launch
pads at Complex J would be needed. Inter-
planetary probes and circumlunar missions
can be handled by one J-Bird, which could
also be used to orbit a permanent space
?station .weighing 100 to 150 tons. An un-
manned lunar landing and return mission
could also be launched.
Because of the problems the Soviets have
been having with their large space boost-
ers, the intelligence community, has esti-
mated that they probably will not be able
to make a lunar landing before 1973.
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USSR
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USSR
Recent comments of two Soviet officials posted
abroad to a, US official tend to add weight to other
reports we have had of impending changes in the So-
viet leadership. A. A. Agronov, an adviser to the
Soviet SALT delegation, on 16 April volunteered that
Premier Kosygin will probably soon go into honorable
retirement. General Major Stolnik, Soviet military
attache in Washington, responding to a. query on the
reported illnesses of several Soviet leaders, said.
that Kosygin, President Podgorny, and Politburo mem-
ber Suslov are 411 in poor health. He added that
their advanced ages (66, 67, and 67 respectively).
make it difficult for the three to execute their re-
sponsibilities. Consequently he believes that they
are likely to be replaced by younger men in the near
future.
It is unlikely that two such responsible
Soviet officials would speak in this way
without instructions. It would seem that
the USSR is preparing foreign opinion for
some high-level resignations and wishes
them to appear as normal retirements. The
interesting thing will be who moves up.
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NOTES
USSR - Communist China: The Soviet leadership
was clearly rankled by Peking's stinging attack last
month marking the Lenin centennial and accusing
Brezhnev of betraying Leninism.
The
Soviets have recently stepped up their personal crit-
icism of Mao including his family life.
France: This year's nuclear test series is
slated to begin on 15 May at the Pacific test center
near Tahiti. The program will extend into August
USSR-Czechoslovakia: The most interesting
feature of the friendship treaty signed yesterday
is the assumption by the signatories of mutual
de-
fense obligations not confined to Europe. The War-
saw Pact treaty and earlier Soviet bilateral treat-
ies With East European allies explicitly limit de-
fense obligations to Europe. East Europeans anxious
to stay out of a Sino-Soviet war will read this pro-
vision as confirmation of their wOrst fears'.
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SAIGON UNREST BECOMING CRITICAL
The Thieu government has become overloaded with
problems of political discontent. and is finding it-
self unable to deal effectively with all of them at
once. During recent months the regime has tried a
combination of firmness and conciliation as it has
dealt with each protesting group in turn. No sooner
has the government at least temporarily alleviated
one source of unrest, however, than it has been con-
fronted by another.
These troubles began late last October, when
new austerity taxes were announced, immediately
sparking higher prices. Salaried people, including
the military and government officials, Thieu'S two
most important Constituencies, were particularly
hard hit. Deep and widespread antigovernment resent-
ment developed-. A variety of interest groups in
Saigon, sensing that the government'was on the de-
fensive, began agitating against the government in
subsequent weeks'.
President Thieu has tried to be flexible in
handling dissenters. To some, in particular the
ethnic Cambodians and veterans, government policy
has been relatively conciliatory--and to some degree
the pressures generated by these groups were relieved
at least temporarily. But as Thieu dealt lightly
with some he was coming down hard on others. Gov-
ernment handling of the Chau trial intimidated the
opposition during much of the winter. Moreover,
student prisoners were reportedly tortured and par-
ticular issues of newspapers were seized wholesale.
In any event, neither tough nor soft policies
seemed to work; the number of opposition groups grew
and as they grew gained confidence. The feeling is
now abroad that the government is on the defensive
and critics can safely get away with actions which
once would have been dangerous.
In this atmosphere previously taboo subjects
have been raised to embarrass the government. Thus,
although many South Vietnamese generals have been
notoriously corrupt for years, a Senator has just
come forward to make public charges of corruption
against III Corps Commander Tri, and President Thieu's
intelligence adviser, General Quang. The potential
for serious political scarring is almost unlimited,
since corruption is widespread and it will be ex-
tremely difficult .for Thieu to weed out all the tar?
gets for scandal when he must have the support of
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the general officer corps to remain in office. All
that is required to keep the pressure on the govern-
ment is for the Senator and other enemies of corrup-
tion or enemies of the regime to have enough courage
to make the charges. In the past, such courage has
been rare, but more such charges may be made if the
government remains on the defensive.
Meanwhile, militant Buddhists with long memories
of earlier struggles against some of the present mili- -
tary men in the regime, have begun to take off the
wraps. Activists from the An Quang faction have
forced an armed clash with-a rival,,government-backed:
Buddhist sect and reportedly with some government
forces. If this clash has produced some new An Quang
martyrs, as some reports claim, and further clashes
develop between the militant Buddhists and government
forces, it is possible that significant military
strength might have to be diverted from the war for
domestic purposes. This happened during the so-called
Buddhist Struggle Movement in 1966.
While the Saigon leadership tries to keep the
lid on domestic discontent, tries to make Vietnamiza-
tion work., and tries to adjust to the developing
situation in Cambodia, it has suddenly been con-
fronted with:An unfavorable decision from the Su-
preme Court. The court has declared the politically-
sensitive conviction of Deputy Tran Ngoc Chau to be
unconstitutional and the economically important-aus-
terity taxes to be invalid.
,There have been a variety of indications that
those. at the center of power in Saigon are becoming
progressively more discouraged over the regime's in-
ability-to deal effectively with the many problems.
confronting it. Both President Thieu and Prime Min-
ister Khiem have on occasion hinted that they might
leave office sooner than they had once expected.
There. appears to be some loss of mutual confidence
between Thieu and some of his key lieutenants, as
well as a tendency toward greater secretiveness
within the inner: circles of government, suggesting
that some important officials are becoming less sure
of themselves and where they stand.
Alarmed by accumulating pressures,
Thieu held the special cabinet meeting
and ordered a crackdown, particularly
against dissident students. A crackdown will prob-
ably not help the government deal more effectively
President
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with its difficult economic problems, particularly
the rising cost of living. Nor will it gain the
respect of the many cliques in Saigon who see the
regime primarily as an obstacle to a share of power
at the center. The government, however, will prob-
ably be tempted to resort to increasingly repressive
measures to suppress the rising tide of criticism,
thereby hoping to reduce the developing air of cri-
sis, at least for the time being.
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