THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 14 APRIL 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977401
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 14, 1970

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The President's Daily Brief
14 April 1970
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
14 April 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
The Soviet leadership clique probably will survive
the stresses and strains noticed recently. (Page 1)
The Lon Nol government has turned in a creditable
performance thus far, but the Communists have not yet
demonstrated their real strength. (Page 2)
(Page 3)
Laos was quiet last night, but both sides are probing
and testing each other while getting ready for more
vigorous action. (Page 5)
At Annex we present an assessment of the divisive
problems of the collective leadership in the USSR.
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USSR
Several current indicators tend to undercut re-
cent rumors that a major shakeup in the Soviet lead-
ership is about to occur. (Nevertheless, pressures
for change are growing, and are examined at Annex.)
--Shelepin, who appears to have lost ground
returned to
public view last Friday.
--Rumors of a Central Committee plenum last
week proved to be false.
We expect a largely ceremonial Central Committee
meeting early next week as part of the celebration
of the Lenin centennial. Unity will probably be
maintained for this occasion.
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CAMBODIA: Current Situation
.Lornphat
Kh marak \ ": KA
PhdatIlf-alfie ;le A Pc,. ? Phnom Penh'
L / -W-il f ? ? .
l',.) )14. .. Kom pone. PA
, 1 ,!..,. Speu'
(d'VC do." ,.:,...?,,,, /
. li (destroy ibutp
\
. 1 i. Chrey .Th
, ..' ) C ,Zakrio?
98193 4-70 CIA
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CAMBODIA
The new. leaders in Phnom Penh have handled
themselves with remarkable aplomb, but the
crucial tests may still be before them.
The spate of Communist attacks along the
border in recent days once again raises
the specter of an all-out Communist offen-
sive. Because the Communists do not like
to gamble, and because a heavy-handed at-
tack against Cambodia would involve seri-
ous military and political losses, the
odds are still against it.
The danger, however, is that the Communists
may be driven to more forceful measures
than they would otherwise wish to take.
If the North Vietnamese become convinced
that the Lon NoZ government will not agree
to some accommodation on bases and supply
problems that they can live with, and if
South Vietnamese forces continue to move
across the border with Phnom Penh's tacit
acquiescence if not active support, the
Communists may then feel that they have
no other choice but to move forcefully to
restore Sihanouk.
Their current activity serves two purposes.
It helps carve out larger areas of Commu-
nist influence in Cambodia, and at the
same time it puts Phnom Penh on notice
that it is in for rough treatment if it
continues to be obdurate.
The Cambodians have suffered fresh setbacks
along the border. Viet Cong forces attacked and
destroyed seven small government outposts in Kandal
Province on 12 April. In the largest action, over
40 government defenders were killed or wounded at
the village of Chrey Thom, In Kompong Cham Province,
heavy Viet Cong attacks against the Krek army gar-
rison resulted in similar government losses, Near
Prasot, in Svay Rieng Province, there were further
clashes between Cambodianand Communist forces.
According to an unconfirmed press report, the town
of Svay Rieng-came under artillery fire yesterday,
but damage apparently was slight.
.Cambodian army intercepts indicate-that the
Viet Cong have ..been arming local Vietnamese villagers
in scattered areas along the eastern border.
(continued)
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Such reports have contributed to the in-
creasingly hostile attitude Phnom Penh is
showing toward the Vietnamese community
in Cambodia.
(continued)
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AREA OF
MAIN MAP
Vientiane
N
LAOS: Current Situation
LAOS
Muong
S6u it?
s?z\
'Bouam-'-
Ti
Long.
NVA aintainingl
press re,onbase
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? BleunV pushing north ?
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Government forces KiltoN,
holding their ground '',- --,
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ang Vieng
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Government-held. location
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Ctimmunist-hela I catio
98195 4-70 CIA
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LAOS
Only minor skirmishing was reported yesterday
in the Sam Thong area, but the government's position
there remains precarious. On 12 April government
forces repulsed an attack by an estimated two North
Vietnamese battalions. yang' Pao's forces are still
holding the Sam Thong airstrip as well as the sur-
rounding valley, but the enemy commands the high
ground to the north.
Government forces have begun pushing north of
Tha Tam Bleung.. Advance elements have called in air
strikes on a large enemy troop concentration near
Muong Pot,.and other government troops sweeping to
the east have uncovered a sizable enemy...Cache of
long-range rockets. The Communists remained active
in the area between,Tha Tam Bleung and Long Tieng,
however, and overran at least one government hilltop
position overnight.
Interrogation of a recently captured North
Vietnamese private underscores some of the
problems that have beset the Communists in
northern Laos during the past few months.
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I He claims that continuous combat
has taken a heavy toll of the battalion's
experienced troops and that it now consists
mostly of trainees and a few experienced
officers.
In spite of these troubles, the battalion
is still an effective fighting force. Two
of its companies occupied part. of Sam
Thong. early in April before being driven
off. The battalion also may have been in-
volved in the latest round of attacks
against the base.
The Communists are maintaining_pressure against
the government base at Bouam Long, north of the
Plaine des Jarres.. The base and its surrounding
outposts remain, under heavy weapons and artillery
fire as elements of the North Vietnamese 312th Di-
vision continue to close in.
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N-class Nuclear-Powered Torpedo Attack Submarine
IRELAND
?
Soviet N-class submarine
sinks from undetermined
causes
Atlantic
Ocean
Operational units 14
Armament 32 torpedoes
Maximum submerged speed 30 knots
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NOTES
USSR: In Moscow late yesterdays TASS announced
that the Soviet Navy will conduct exercises--code-
named OKEAN--in the Atlantic and Pacific.
USSR: press
reports that a Soviet N-class nuclear-powered attack
submarine sank from undetermined causes about 400
miles southwest of Ireland on 12 April.. The crew
apparently was saved by nearby Bulgarian and Soviet
merchant ships before the submarine went down. Thus
far there has been no public announcement by the SO-
viets. Two years ago a G-class diesel submarine
sank in the Pacific, the only other known loss in
recent years.
USSR:
Panama: General Torrijos has suggested that,
to set the stage for canal treaty negotiations, the
US could demonstrate its good will by .making certain
economic concessions, such as granting. Panama the
use of areas and facilities within the Zone. In a
'talk with Ambassador Sayre, he also asked whether
Panamanian President Lakas could meet with President
Nixon to work out an agreement on procedures and
guidelines for negotiations. Although Torrijos no
doubt sees significant political advantages in any
economic benefits he can obtain, his suggestions
may only be an opening position.
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SOVIET LEADERSHIP
We continue to search the Soviet scene for clues
to the situation within the politburo.. Reliable evi-
dence on this matter remains extremely limited, but
our general sense of the situation is that the col-
lective leadership will have trouble getting through
1970 intact.
The central problem remains the state of the So-
viet econOmy. ;Its sluggish growth continues to pre-
occupy the Soviet leaders, who can no longer doubt
that the technological gap between the USSR and the
West is growing. -This winter has provided an acute
contrast between US Apollo successes-and-meat short-
ages in Soviet cities. At the same time, the lead-
ership has few unambiguous successes_to offset this
record. Neither in relations with China .and Eastern
Europe nor in_their dealings with the non-Communist
world can they show great gains. Only. in .the compe-
tition in strategic weaponry can they claim to have
improved the USSR's position, and evendlere pending
US weapons programs threaten to wipe -out their gains.
The preparations for the Lenin centennial?have had
a hollow ring, and new category of."Leniniana" po-
litical jokes- is making the rounds of the population.
All the signs indicate that the party continues
to reject the Western diagnosis that the Soviet-style
command economy, while well suited for the tasks of
industrial development, cannot cope effectively with
the further demands of the current technological rev-
olution. A series of .timid reforms addressed to this
problem has now run its course without bringing the
hoped-for efficiency. In the conservative Moscow
climate, however, this record has served-to bring
such reforms into disrepute rather than tocommend
bolder proposals. The difficulty is at bottom po-
litical; Czechoslovakia is read as an_object lesson
in how modern approaches to economic management
quickly bring into question the Communist Party's
monopoly of power.
This is the final year of the current five-year
plan, and basic ..targets should long.since_have been
decided for the next five-year periodf_now.less than
eight months away. Decisions on allocations are al-
ways contentious matters for Soviet leaders. Some
of them, in addition to taking part ._in the policy-
making collective, have executive responsibility for
one or another sector of the economy- Success or
failure in these fields can have a decisive effect
on their careers. All have a rough approximation
Al
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of political "constituencies" on wham they depend
for political support--regional leaders and/or ?such
interest groups as the military or heavy industry.
The lagging economy means that some hard infighting
is necessary to protect each group's interest.
The politburo that faces these problems is-an
aging one-the oldest member is 71, the majority are
in their 60s, and .nearly all have recurring health
problems. If we are right in our sense of increas-
ing tension, then medical accident can play a major
and unpredictable role.in changing the_alignments.
At the moment, the strongest position appears
to be that of BrezhnevI who has escaped the ills to
whichflesh is. heir this winter. So far as we can
determine, none of :the personnel changes-announced
or merely rumored--of recent weeks.hasdaMaged-his
position, and several of them may have -strengthened
it.. If politburo shifts are made in the. next few
months, we 'would:expect him to have the:major hand
in them. He might move against the economic admin-
istrators headed ..by Kosygin as a means, of blaming
them for the faltering record of growth,- .The nam-
ing of the two ,provincial leaders, known to hold
Conservative economic views, to posts in Kosygin's
bailiwick, even..though planned since-_last-,fall, can
be read in this light. Or Brezhnev might strike out
against Shelepin,,the perennial younger challenger
(51) who seemsto have been. unable to protect one or
two of his supporters in the recent reorganization
of the propaganda apparatus.
Politburo Changes engineered by_Brezhnev would
probably have little early effect on Soviet policy',
Even now his, is voice in .this area,,
and if he disposed.of.one or a fev.of-his colleagues,
the consequences for-decision-making would be mini-
mal. Effective economic reform would standeven
less of a chance, and, in view of Brezhnevs atten-
tiveness to the military, the Soviet position on
SALT might harden,_although we doubt-thatit would
be reversed, But the caution which ,is the hallmark
of post-Khrushchev Soviet policy is characteristic
of BrezhneV himself, and he apparently harbors no
radical projects which a loosening of .the ..bonds of
Collectivity would free him to launch.
The present leaders' combination of age, iner-
tia, and rigidity, however, makes them vulnerable
and imparts a special importance to the next party
congress. That convocation, already overdue and now
rumored for late fall, provides the occasion against
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which all the current leaders must calculate their
maneuvers. A new central committee will be elected
at that meeting, and this poses a test of strength
for each member of the politburo. The membership of
the central committee registers, to an important de-
gree, the positions of the top leaders and fixes
them for the next phase of politics. , The younger
political leaders might decide loyally, to await their
turn--Polyansky appears to have adopted this posture--
or they may be too impatient for that. Indeed, ma-
neuvering in anticipation of the congress could pre-
cipitate major top-level changes well in advance of
that event.
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