THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 2 APRIL 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977381
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 2, 1970

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The President's Daily Brief
2 April 1970
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
2 April 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
France has called for an Indochina peace conference
(Page 1) and at Annex we assess the reactions of.
the countries most affected.
Cambodian anti-Communist ferver is cooling. (Page 2)
The Communists in South Vietnam displayed their
strength Tuesday night (Paae 3)
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The Sudanese Government forces scored a victory, over
the Ansar insurrectionists, but the conflict is far
from settled. (Page 5)
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FRANCE-INDOCHINA
France has called for an international peace
conference on Indochina.
Since the opening of the Paris peace talks
in 1968, the French have refrained from
publicly pressing their long-held view
that the Vietnamese war is only one part
of a broader crisis that requires a re-
gional solution. Because of the recent
deterioration of both the Cambodian and
Laotian situation, as well as the continued
stalemate in the Paris talks, the French
apparently are convinced that a reasser-
tion of their position now has a good chance
of being well-received by all parties con-
cerned.
Our preliminary thoughts on the reactions
of the interested parties are outlined at
4nnex.
1
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CAMBODIA
On 1 April, the government issued a communique
protesting recent South Vietnamese cross-border forays
against Communist troops. This further reflects the
government's efforts to persuade Hanoi that Phnom
Penh wants to talk.
Phnom Penh's initiatives are in marked con-
trast to the tough line taken toward the
Vietnamese Communists since the sacking of
their embassies last month. They may stem
from a more sober assessment of the diffi-
cult position the government's anti-Vietnam-
ese gyrations have put it in. The govern-
ment probably is greatly concerned about
prospects for increased Communist military
and subversive pressures against it.
2
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SOUTH VIETNAM
As more reports become available, it seems ap-
parent that the Communist attacks on the night of
31 March - 1 April were the heaviest of the past six
months. They were roughly comparable to the flare-
ups that occurred almost monthly in 1969. The Com-
munists have been trying to mount a "high point", for
more than a month, although until a few days agomost
indications suggested something less than a country-
wide effort.
Hanoi may have concluded only recently that
a show of strength would be useful. It
might have seen this as a way to back up
its tough stance on Cambodia, dampen Sai-
gon's ardor for cross-border attacks on
Communist forces, and contribute to ap-
prehension in the US about recent develop-
ments in Southeast Asia.
The effort highlights both the strengths
and weaknesses of the Communists' present
position. Such widespread, coordinated
action demonstrates once again the viabil-
ity of the Communist apparatus, the con-
tinued effectiveness of its command and con-
trol mechanisms, and its ability to in-
crease allied casualties sharply. On the
other hand, unless the offensive action is
sustained, for some time, which seems un-
likely, it probably will not inflict any
permanent damage on the allied position or
even set back significantly such programs
as pacification. At this stage in the war,
the Communists seem unwilling to pay the
price in manpower that serious pursuit of
these objectives would require.
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3
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4
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Ansar Dissidence in the Sudan
RED
SEA
DARFUR
Al Fashir,
Kuraymah
Provinces with Ansar Ad Damir
pockets of resistance
Omdurman
? Khartoum
Ansar stronghold falls
Vo government forces
\ Alba)
Island Madam
Wad
\
Port Sudan.
Kassala
Ma.lakal
CENTRAL
RP BLIC
EMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC
CONGO
98087 4-70 CIA
UGAND
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5cgoki
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SUDAN
Aba Island, softened by shelling and air attacks,
fell to government forces on 31 March.
the Ansar defenders put up a tough fight
and casualties were heavy on both sides.
Although the Numayri regime has won the
first round, Ansars throughout the rest
of the country (they number about three
million) may be stimulated to greater re-
sistance by the fall of Aba.
an undetermined number of
Ansar tribesmen in the western province of
Kordofan were already moving toward Khartoum.
If armed resistance by the Ansars grows,
Khartoum may renew the request it made to
Egypt during the siege of Aba Island for
military assistance, including TU-16s.
5
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NOTES
Fedayeen - North Vietnam: Fatah leader Yasir
Arafat, eager to tap all'available sources for mil-
itary aid to his guerrillas, wound up a week in Pe-
king and is now in Hanoi. We assume he is seeking
weapons, propaganda support, and some kind of offi-
cial status for the fedayeen.
Argentina:
Israel-Syria: A large buildup of Israeli forces
has been noted in the Golan Heights area of occupied
Syria,. It is
too early to deduce Israeli intentions, but some
kind of action against Syria is not unlikely.
6
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
POSSIBLE REACTIONS TO THE FRENCH PROPOSAL
ON INDOCHINA
All the potential participants in any confer-
ence will find it very hard to turn the new French
proposal down cold. This would even be true for the
North Vietnamese', who have historically taken the po-
sition that Indochina's inhabitants do not need thich'.
a forum--or indeed any outside interference at-all--
to work out their problems. Hanoi may in fact. dis-
cern some advantage in being relatively forthcoming
in its reply. The Communists. may think, for instance,
that in keeping the idea of talks alive they would be
encouraging friction between the US and the South
Vietnamese, and they may also see the proposal as a
way- of encouraging antiwar sentiment in the US. Be-
yond this they may believe there is a chance of bring-
ing pressure to bear for a bombing halt in Laos and
for recognition of their present advantageous posi-
tion on the ground there. They could also see a con-
ferenceas a way of putting Sihanouk to better use
than they can while he is in Peking.
On the other hand, Hanoi must.reckon with the
possibility that US withdrawals from South Vietnam
would be.delayed if a conference was in the offing,
as well as the danger that the Saigon government
might be able to consolidate its position while the
talks dragged,on. Moreover, they must view with some
apprehension the prospect of going to the negotiating
table with their Soviet and Chinese backers at odds.
Unless they actually inspired the French ini-
tiative, the communists probably will take some time
hammering out their response while they wait for re-
actions from other countries. If they do feel con-
strained to reply, the best guess is that they will
combine an acceptance of the basic idea with some
fairly steep preconditions, such as a demand for an
end to US bombing in Laos or of B-52 raids in South
Vietnam,
(continued)
Al
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The Saigon government almost certainly sees.
the French proposal as a Pandora's box of new chal-
lenges to its legitimacy and to its desire to carry
on-the war against the Communists Its response,
however, is likely to be tempered. to avoid any out-
right rejection of a conference or any appearance of
serious discord with the US.
Moscow will almost certainly take its cue from
Hanoi. The Soviets apparently have not been deeply
involved in recent developments and they have shown
no signs of interest in such a move lately.
Moscow would prob-
ably prefer, however, to see the Indochina problem
switched to the diplomatic arena.
Peking is probablyunhappy over the French
initiative because for some years it has opposed any
move toward a negotiated end to the war. Neverthe-
less,' if Hanoi approves of such a conference, Peking
almost certainly would attend.
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