THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 7 MARCH 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977336
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 7, 1970

, 1-7
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The President's Daily Brief
7 March 1970
47
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
7 March 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
A remarkably definitive peace proposal was outlined
yesterday by a Pathet Lao spokesman in a broadcast
from Hanoi. (Page 1)
The war of nerves continues on the Lebanese-Israeli
border with Beirut unable to control the fedayeen
and Israel determined to eliminate terrorist activ-
ity along its border. (Page 4)
The Soviets finally responded to US proposals to ease
the Middle East conflict at the four-power talks yes-
terday. (Page 5)
The Soviets may press hard at the SALT talks for an
agreement which would prevent the transfer of stra-
tegic weapons to third countries. (Page 6)
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LAOS
,A Pathet Lao spokesman issued a statement from
Hanoi yesterday that outlines the most explicit Com-
munist terms to date for ending the war. The state-
ment asserts that as a precondition to a political
settlement the US must "stop escalating the war,
completely cease the bombing of Lao territory without
conditions, and withdraw all US advisers and military
personnel from Laos." These demands are not new but
the statement then goes well beyond previous Pathet
Lao pronouncements and spells out what the Communists
are prepared to do to end hostlities,.
Specifically, the Pathet Lao have indicated that
once the bombing is halted, they are prepared to ac-
cept a cease-fire. During this period, the Pathet
Lao propose that a "consultative political conference
composed of representatives of all Lao parties.. ..set
up a provisional coalition government." The state-
ment goes on to add that the conference would estab-
lish a "security zone" to protect the normal func-
tioning of this coalition government from pressures
within or outside of the country.
This security zone proposal reflects Com-
munist sensitivity to their past:experi-
ences trying to participate in a,government
in rightist-controlled Vientiane While
the proposal for a cease-fire would be
welcome news in Vientiane, it isnot with-
out a price.
The Communists also are insisting that once a
stand-down in military operations has been achieved,
the "pro-American forces" must withdraw from areas
they have "illegally" occupied and resettle all the
refugees who have fled Communist-controlled areas
of Laos. Furthermore, the Pathet Lao state that
once a provisional coalition government has been
established, they are prepared to participate in
new general elections aimed at creating a new na-
tional: assembly and government which would be "truly
representative of the Lao people of all nation-
Hanoi has made it clear that the statement
carries North Vietnam's full endorsement
and has underscored its importance by al-
lowing the statement to be made from Hanoi
and broadcast internationally over the of-
ficial North Vietnamese news agency.
(continued)
1
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
The timing of the statement may provide
some clues as to its purpose. Issued after
the retrieval of the Plaine des Jarres,
which until Vang Pao's offensive last year
had been in Communist hands since 1963, it
comes before the Communists have pushed
into sensitive government-held areas. The
statement comes at a time when neither side
can claim .a distinct or clear-cut advantage.
It had been widely assumed, for example,
that the Communists would have wanted to
reintroduce their presence into all areas
under their control in 1962 before moving
toward negotiations. They have not yet
done so and on balance the Communists today
control fewer people and no more strategic
territory than they did in 1962 or 1963.
This lends some credibility to their offer
to seek a "political solution" and it prob-
ably will increase its acceptability in
Vientiane. At the same time, however, by
issuing the statement now, the Communists
provide themselves with a political justi-
fication for intensified military activity,
particularly should Souvanna reject it out
of hand. The Communists presumably felt
that they had to make some positive sound-
ing response to Souvanna's political offer,
first to "neutralize" the PZaine des Jarres
and then, more recently, to reconvene the
signers of the 1962 declaration.
In making a "complete" cessation of US
bombing in Laos--something which Hanoi
must calculate would be unacceptable to
Washington--a precondition to talks be-
tween the Lao factions, North Vietnam may
hope to achieve a number of purposes. It
is possible that in so doing they may hope
to drive a wedge between Souvanna and the
US, perhaps even causing Souvanna to pub-
licly call for a cessation of US bombing.
But Souvanna has made it clear both in
statements to the North Vietnamese ambas-
sador last year and in a press conference
only yesterday, that what happens in the
infiltration corridor is a subject for set-
tlement between the United States and North
Vietnam.
(continued)
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Even if Souvanna does not lend himself to
such manipulation, the North Vietnamese
hope the statement provides them with a
decided political and propaganda advantage
on the issue of Laos and its relation to
the war in South Vietnam. The statement
is clearly designed, at least in part, to
play on growing fears in the US that the
Laos war is getting out of hand.
The statement of 6 March may reflect more,
however, than simply a North Vietnamese
effort to embarrass the US or maneuver
Washington into stopping the bombing in
the infiltration corridor. It is conceiv-
able, for example, that North Vietnam re-
ally wants to tamp down the fighting in
North Laos. In the past two years the
fighting has been extremely costly in lives
and material and has demanded an ever grow-
ing number of front-Zine troops to achieve
relatively limited gains.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LEBANON-ISRAEL
The possibility of fedayeen activity along the
Israeli-Lebanese border continues to be a matter of
intense concern in Tel Aviv and Beirut. Lebanese
President Hilu's assertion to Ambassador Porter on
5 March that a large Israeli force had crossed into
Lebanon (see The President's Daily Brief of 6 March)
has proven to unfounded.? There was a skirmish
in the same general area on that day, but apparently
the story was blown out of proportion before it
reached Hilu.
Last night Israel carried out what it described
as a warning raid acrOss the border into central-
southern Lebanon. The Israelis destroyed five houses
allegedly associated with fedayeen activity and two
Lebanese military posts'.
At the root of the Lebanese sensitivity
are the Israelis' repeated warnings and
their threat to establish a "no-man's
land" north of the border if the Lebanese
fail to curb fedayeen activity in the area.
The Israelis claim there has been an. in-
crease in commando activity there in re-
cent weeks, and are concerned by the dis-
covery on 3 March of an explosives cache
in a village, and by other isolated ter-
rorist activities.
Israel apparently will not be satisfied
until the attacks on its frontier communi-
ties cease entirely. Tel Aviv's announced
intention to create a unilaterally demil-
itarized, uninhabited zone along this bor-
der eventually may be carried out if ter-
rorism continues.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR - MIDDLE EAST
At the four-power session yesterday the Soviets
responded to long-standing US requests to make their
position more explicit on the critical issues of
withdrawal of Israeli forces and declaration of peace.
Soviet representative Malik detailed the Soviet re-
actions to US peace proposals and elaborated on the
USSR's proposals for withdrawal..
Malik's remarks constitute only a slight
movement in the USSR's position and have
the earmarks of an effort togain time,for
further diplomatic?and perhaps military--
moves in the Middle East. The Soviet re-
sponse probably is intended to arouse in-
terest and to put Washington under diplo-
matic pressure to calm the situation.
MaZik's statements reinforce other Soviet
efforts to persuade the US to withhold a
decision on new Phantom jet fighters for
Israel and to press Tel Aviv to reduce its
level of military activity. This in turn
would aid current Soviet efforts to improve
Egyptian air defenses.
With respect to Egypt, Moscow may believe
that signs of progress in New York will
help to put off Egyptian demands for new
kinds of military aid that would expose
the Soviets to new risks. There is no
evidence that any new Soviet weapons sys-
tem has yet been delivered to the UAR.
5
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR-SALT
On two recent occasions, second secretary Kuli-
kov of the Soviet Embassy in London has tried to
elicit US views on an agreement to prevent the trans-
fer of strategic weapons to third countries. Kulikov
said that Moscow wants to discuss this topic when the
SALT talks resume next month and asked particularly
if the US would sell the Poseidon missile to the UK.
The Soviets presented a proposal to pro-
hibit the transfer of delivery vehicles
to third countries at the Helsinki talks.
Kulikov's remarks suggest that Moscow may
pursue the subject with some vigor in an
effort to limit US arms sharing arrange-
ments with NATO allies.
6
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WEST GERMANY
The Bundesbank yesterday raised its discount
rate from 6 to 7.5 percent, the highest rate in the
postwar period. The cost-of-living index for Janu-
ary was 3.5 percent higher and the index of indus-
trial prices 4.7 higher than those for January 1969.
This sharp rise in the discount rate, fol-
lowing immediately upon the reduction in
the UK rate from 8 to 7.5 percent, demon-
strates the impatience in West German
banking circles with the government's fail-
ure to take stronger anti-inflationary
measures. It also serves as a warning to
business and labor to moderate their price
and wage demands.
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Top Secret
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