THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 2 MARCH 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977326
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 2, 1970

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The President's Daily Brief
2 MARCH 1970
27
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
2 March 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Hanoi may be trying some "carrot and stick" tactics
in an attempt to move the Paris talks off dead center.
(Page 1)
East. (Page 3)
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In Laos, the pace of the Communist offensive in the
north has slowed. (Page 4)
The Guatemalan Government fears violence in the after-
math of yesterday's election. (Page 5)
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NORTH VIETNAM
Two developments during the weekend suggest that
Hanoi may be trying some "carrot and stick" tactics
in an attempt to move the Paris talks off dead cen-
ter. The "stick" took the form of a blunt assertion
by Soviet diplomats in Paris that the Vietnamese Com-
munists intend to break off the talks. American
newsman Robert Boyd reports that Soviet Embassy of-
ficials in Paris told Cyrus Eaton and himself on 28
February that the Communists will "soon break off
the talks" in an attempt to show that the US is re-
sponsible for the lack of progress.
The Soviet statements probably are part of
an evolving effort by the North Vietnamese
to test the diplomatic climate in Paris.
The Communists may calculate that the pros-
pect of a rupture at this point would dram-
atize their contention that the US has
"downgraded" the talks and would generate
pressure on President Nixon to appoint a
new permanent head of the US delegation.
Hanoi probably has had this objective in
mind ever since it sent its Politburo "ad-
viser" to the talks, Le Due Tho, back to
Paris in early February to attend the French
Communist Party Congress. Tho has stayed
on in Paris, presumably to play some role
in the developing scenario.
A move--or even a threat--to break off the
talks would be risky for the Communists
without some steps to dress up their own
bargaining positions. They seem to recog-
nize that their intransigence has facili-
tated US and GVN efforts to show that the
Communists are not interested in negotia-
tions. This may be why there were some
hints of a "carrot" in an interview of
North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Trinh
which was surfaced this weekend by Daniel
DeLuce of the Associated Press.
(continued)
1
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The North Vietnamese appear to have set up this
interview with some care, presumably in hopes of get-
tinga special message across in the Western press.
DeLuce was notified out of the blue several weeks
ago that he could make a visit to North Vietnam in
the latter half of February.
DeLuce says that Trinh carefully elaborated for
"a considerable time" in response to a question about
the terms Hanoi might accept for a standstill cease-
fire. At one point Trinh seems to have made agree-
ment for such a cease-fire contingent only on the US
accepting the principle of a total American troop
withdrawal and the "right" of the South Vietnamese
to settle their affairs themselves. At another
point, however, he says that "genuine peace" could
only be restored if the US commits itself to an un-
conditional troop withdrawal, elections, and the
formation of a coalition government?all of which
is standard Communist boilerplate.
It is conceivable that Trinh was trying
to draw a distinction between a cease-fire
and a political settZement, but this is
not at all clear from DeLuce's account.
If Hanoi intended Trinh's statement to
have any special significance, the North
Vietnamese are likely to broadcast their
own version of the interview before long.
2
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Fedayeen Activity Increases Along Lebanese/Israeli Border
Mediterranean
Sea
Fedayeen may be
opening new front
Netanya.
Tel Aviv-Yaf?*
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97760 3-70 CIA
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
ARAB STATES :ISRAEL
Lebanon-based guerrillas are ignor-
ing government restrictions and have resumed opera-
tions along the Israeli border. The fedayeen have
violated the agreement reached with Beirut last
November by moving several hundred men into south-
ern Lebanon. They also have reinstituted full-scale
paramilitary training in Lebanon's Palestinian ref-
ugee camps despite public announcements that such
training had ceased.
3
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LAOS: Communist Offensive in North Slows Down
CHINA
NORTH
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Communist-controlled territory
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- Limit of area claimed under
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control, June 1962
Pakse
THAILAND
97762 3-70 CIA
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LAOS
For the past few days enemy military action
west and south of the Plaine des Jarres has remained
at a relatively low level with only minor incidents
reported.
Communist supply problems are probably be-
hind the present lull. In addition to air-
strikes, enemy efforts to move adequate sup-
plies to forward positions probably have
been hampered by the recent government evac-
uation of 15,000 refugees off the Plaine--
an action which depleted the local coolie
labor force.
Meanwhile, the Communists are attempting to play
on government apprehension over the direction and ex-
tent of their offensive. In a press interview of 27
February, the Pathet Lao representative in Vientiane
maintained that unless the bombing of Communist for-
ces stops, the current campaign will go beyond the
1962 cease-fire line. He also said that if the bomb-
ing is halted the Communists might discontinue their
attacks before reaching the 1962 line.
4
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GUATEMALA
Yesterday's general elections were free of
violence, and voter turnout was heavy. There could
be trouble, however, when the results of the ballot-
ing become clear. The government fears that die-
hard rightists will take to the streets if rightist
presidential candidate Colonel Carlos Arana loses
and that Communist terrorists will exploit the situ-
ation. The government also believes it may be with-
out an effective air arm in such a crisis because
most of the first-line combat pilots are strong
Arana supporters.
The early returns are inconclusive, but
both Arana's party and the left-of-center
opposition have already broadcast charges
of government fraud. The reaction of
Arana and his supporters within the mili-
tary will indeed be pivotal to the elec-
tion aftermath. Arana, himself, has
pledged to keep any challenge of the re-
sults within legal channels.
(
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NOTES
Rhodesia: On 27 February Ethiopia's foreign
minister warned Ambassador Hall that even moderate
black African states will react sharply if the US
consulate in Salisbury remains open. Specifically,
the foreign minister said that failure to close the
consulate would probably result in a resolution by
the Organization of African Unity strongly condemn-
ing the US. Today, Rhodesia declared itself a re-
public--a move sure to prompt additional pressure
on the US by both black African states and London.
Cuba: The seizure of a privately-owned US fish-
ing boat by Cuba yesterday is probably the result of
Havana's hypersensitivity to exile raids. Militant
exile groups use both fishing boats and merchant
ships for infiltration missions. Castro's security
forces probably became suspicious of the American
craft when it neared the north coast of Camaguey
Province. The boat--which reportedly is outfitted
for treasure-hunting rather than fishing--was boarded
by two Cubans and escorted to the port of La Isabela
for inspection. If it did not violate Cuba's three-
mile limit, the boat will probably be released as
soon as Havana is satisfied that it was not involved
in exile activities.
6
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Top Secret
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